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Abstract
Given that evolutionary biologists have considered coevolutionary interactions since
the dawn of Darwinism, it is perhaps surprising that coevolution was largely overlooked
during the formative years of evolutionary computing. It was not until the early 1990s
that Hillis’ seminal work thrust coevolution into the spotlight.
Upon attempting to evolve xed-length sorting networks, a problem with a long and
competitive history, Hillis found that his standard evolutionary algorithm was producing
sub-standard networks. In response, he decided to reciprocally evolve a population of test-
lists against the sorting network population; thus producing a coevolutionary system. The
result was impressive; coevolution not only outperformed evolution, but the best network
it discovered was only one comparison longer than the best-known solution. For the rst
time, a coevolutionary algorithm had been successfully applied to problem-solving.
Pre-Hillis, the shortcomings of standard evolutionary algorithms had been understood
for some time: whilst dening an adequate tness function can be as challenging as the
problem one is hoping to solve, once achieved, the accumulation of tness-improving
mutations can push a population towards local optima that are difcult to escape. Co-
evolution offers a solution. By allowing the tness of each evolving individual to vary
(through competition) with other reciprocally evolving individuals, coevolution removes
the requirement of a tness yardstick. In conjunction, the reciprocal adaptations of each
individual begin to erode local optima as soon as they appear.
However, coevolution is no panacea. As a problem-solving tool, coevolutionary al-
gorithms suffer from some debilitating dynamics, each a result of the relative tness as-
sessment of individuals. In a single-, or multi-, population competitive system, coevo-
lution may stabilize at a suboptimal equilibrium, or mediocre stable state; analogous to
the traditional problem of local optima. Populations may become highly specialized in
an unanticipated (and undesirable) manner; potentially resulting in brittle solutions that
are fragile to perturbation. The system may cycle; producing dynamics similar to the
children’s game rock-paper-scissors. Disengagement may occur, whereby one population
out-performs another to the extent that individuals cannot be discriminated on the basis of
tness alone; thus removing selection pressure and allowing populations to drift. Finally,
coevolution’s relative tness assessment renders traditional visualization techniques (such
as the graph of tness over time) obsolete; thus exacerbating each of the above problems.
This thesis attempts to better understand and address the problems of coevolution
through the design and analysis of simple coevolutionary models. Reduced virulence
a novel technique specically designed to tackle disengagementis developed. Empirical
results demonstrate the ability of reduced virulence to combat disengagement both in sim-
i
ple and complex domains, whilst outperforming the only known competitors. Combin-
ing reduced virulence with diversity maintenance techniques is also shown to counteract
mediocre stability and over-specialization.
A critique of the CIAO plota visualization technique developed to detect coevo-
lutionary cyclinghighlights previously undocumented ambiguities; experimental evi-
dence demonstrates the need for complementary visualizations. Extending the scope of
visualization, a rst exploration into coevolutionary steering is performed; a technique al-
lowing the user to interact with a coevolutionary system during run-time. Using a simple
model incorporating reduced virulence, the coevolutionary steering demonstration high-
lights the future potential of such tools for both research and education.
The role of neutrality in coevolution is discussed in detail. Whilst much emphasis
is placed upon neutral networks in the evolutionary computation literature, the nature
of coevolutionary neutrality is generally overlooked. Preliminary ideas for modelling
coevolutionary neutrality are presented.
Finally, whilst this thesis is primarily aimed at a computing audience, strong reference
to evolutionary biology is made throughout. Exemplifying potential crossover, the CIAO
plot, a tool previously unused in biology, is applied to a simulation of E. Coli, with results
conrming empirical observations of real bacteria.
ii
Acknowledgements
Thankfully, throughout my PhD I have received tremendous help and support from many
colleagues, friends and family: to each and every one, I am eternally grateful.
For love, support and patience throughout, I want to thank Helen Pickup and Mum.
For technical help, I want to give particular thanks to Martin Thompson and Lee Bulmer:
without Martin’s graphical expertise and computer support, the steering interface would
have failed to leave the drawing board; without Lee’s coding skills, I’d still be sorting
through reams of data by hand. I would like to thank Steven Walker for preliminary CIAO
plot investigations (Walker, 2000) and Dave Gordon for drawing my attention to similari-
ties between reduced virulence and the Laffer Curve. Special thanks goes to Dave Harris,
Simon Lessels and Hywel Williams for guidance, support and general input throughout;
nobody else has had to endure my ranting quite so much! Thanks to the Biosystems group
at the University of Leeds, both past and present, for being a great group to work with; and
the Biosystems reading group for many hours of stimulating conversation and drinking.
Thanks to all those from outside Leeds whose conversations and opinions have helped
to direct my research, including (especially) Richard Watson, Jordan Pollack, Dave Cliff,
Peter Todd and Geoffrey Miller. A big thanks to Neil Currums for giving me time when-
ever I needed it, Tom Bysouth for accommodation during my many last-minute visits and
Tom Barnes-Lawrence for access to his computer. Finally, none deserves acknowledge-
ment more than Seth Bullock, my supervisor and mentor, without whom this thesis would
not have been possible: thanks, Seth.
To the one who would have enjoyed it most.
iii
Declarations
Some parts of the work presented in this thesis have been published in the following
articles:
Cartlidge, J. & Bullock, S. (2002), Learning lessons from the common cold: How reducing
parasite virulence improves coevolutionary optimization. In Congress on Evolutionary
Computation, pp. 14201425. IEEE Press, Piscataway NJ.
Bullock, S., Cartlidge, J. & Thompson, M. (2002), Prospects for comptational steering of
evolutionary computation, in Bilotta, E., et al. (Eds.) Workshop Proceedings, Artificial
Life VIII, pp 131137. MIT Press, Cambridge MA.
Cartlidge, J. & Bullock, S. (2003), Caring Versus Sharing: How to Maintain Engagement
and Diversity in Coevolving Populations, in Banzhaf, W., Christaller, T., Dittrich, P.,
Kim, J., & Ziegler, J. (Eds.) Seventh European Conference on Artificial Life, pp 299308.
Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Germany.
Cartlidge, J. & Bullock, S. (2004a), Combating coevolutionary disengagement by reducing
parasite virulence, Evolutionary Computation, 12(2), 193222.
Cartlidge, J. & Bullock, S. (2004b), Unpicking tartan CIAO plots: Understanding irregular
coevolutionary cycling, Adaptive Behaviour, 12(2), 6992.
iv
Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1.1 The Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1.2 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1.3 Overview of Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1.4 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 How to Read this Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 A History of the Coevolutionary Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3.1 Interspecic Interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3.2 The Pre-Darwinian Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3.3 Darwin’s Entangled Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3.4 Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.5 Post-Synthesis Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3.5.1 The Evolutionary Synthesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3.5.2 New Techniques: A New Perspective . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.3.5.3 The Coining of Coevolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2 Review of Evolutionary Computation 19
2.1 Articial Evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2 Genetic Algorithms (GAs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2.1 A Simple Generational GA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2.2 Worked Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.2.3 Modes of Variation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2.3.1 Mutation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2.3.2 Recombination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.2.4 Assessment and Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3 Realism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
v
2.3.1 Fixed Population Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.3.2 Genotype-Phenotype Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.3.3 Static Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3 Coevolutionary Computation 34
3.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.2 Dening Coevolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.2.1 The Standard Denition of Coevolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2.2 The Coevolutionary Continuum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.2.3 When is it not Coevolution? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.2.4 Fitness Propensity and Fitness Realization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.2.5 A New Denition of Coevolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.2.6 Relativism versus Absolutism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.2.7 Moving Mountains: A Dynamic Landscape . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.2.8 The Nature of Objective Fitness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.3 The Success Stories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.4 Critique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.4.1 Visualization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.4.2 Overspecialisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.4.3 Cycling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.4.4 Mediocre Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.4.5 Disengagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.4.5.1 Classifying Disengagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.4.5.2 Coevolutionary Neutrality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.5 Classroom Analogies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4 Research Statement 78
4.1 Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.2 Justication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.3 Prospects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
5 Reduced Parasite Virulence 81
5.1 Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5.1.1 Here Today, Gone Tomorrow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5.1.2 Don’t Bite the Hand that Feeds You . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
vi
5.2 Analogies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
5.2.1 Parasite Virulence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
5.2.1.1 Myxomatosis: An Illustrative Example . . . . . . . . . 85
5.2.1.2 A Case of Group Selectionism? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.2.2 The Laffer Curve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.3 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.3.1 Maintaining Relative Fitness Diversity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.3.2 Asymmetry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
6 Combating Disengagement 92
6.1 The Numbers Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
6.1.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
6.1.2 Investigating Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
6.1.2.1 Set Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
6.1.2.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
6.1.3 Further Investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
6.1.3.1 Comparing the Phantom Parasite . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
6.1.3.2 The Engagement-Optimality Trade Off . . . . . . . . . 100
6.1.3.3 Re-engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
6.1.3.4 Random Parasites: Canonical Evolution . . . . . . . . 101
6.1.4 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
6.2 The Coin Toss Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
6.2.1 Diversity Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
6.2.2 Set Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
6.2.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
6.2.4 Caring versus Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
6.3 Sorting Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
6.3.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
6.3.2 Set Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6.3.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6.3.3.1 Non-Spatial Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6.3.3.2 Spatial Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
6.4 Dynamic Parasite Virulence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
6.4.1 Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
6.4.2 Measuring Engagedness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
vii
6.4.3 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
6.4.4 Investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
6.4.4.1 The Numbers Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
6.4.4.2 Sorting Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
6.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
7 Visualizing Coevolutionary Dynamics 123
7.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
7.1.1 EC Visualization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
7.1.2 Visualizing Coevolutionary Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
7.2 CIAO Plots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
7.2.1 Plotting CIAO Contests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
7.2.2 Progress and Cycling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
7.2.3 Unpicking Tartan CIAO Plots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
7.3 RockPaperScissors: An Intransitive Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
7.3.1 Study 1: A Simple Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
7.3.1.1 Feature Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
7.3.1.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
7.3.2 Study 2: A Complex Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
7.3.2.1 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
7.3.3 Study 3: Random Drift . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
7.3.4 Understanding Irregular Coevolutionary Cycling . . . . . . . . . 145
7.4 Study 4: A Simulation of E. coli . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
7.4.1 Replication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
7.4.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
7.5 Revisiting the Coin Toss Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
7.6 Steering Coevolution Through Interactive Visualization . . . . . . . . . . 154
7.6.1 Prospects for Computational Steering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
7.6.2 Proof of Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
7.6.2.1 Steering the Numbers Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
7.6.2.2 Example Output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
7.6.2.3 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
7.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
8 Transient Neutrality 167
8.1 Modelling Neutrality With NK Landscapes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
8.2 Towards an NKCqd Landscape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
viii
8.3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
9 Conclusions 175
9.1 Summary of Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
9.2 Limitations of the Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
9.3 Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
9.4 Verication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
Bibliography 179
ix
List of Figures
2.1 Example GA Output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.1 The Coevolutionary Continuum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.2 Fitness Propensity and Fitness Realization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.3 Invasion and Extinction Cycles in Anolis Lizards . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.4 The Phantom Parasite and Φ Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.1 The Laffer Curve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.2 Reduced Parasite Virulence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
6.1 Numbers Game Results: Bias 0.75 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
6.2 Numbers Game Results: Bias 0.9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
6.3 The Effects of Mutation on Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
6.4 The Engagement of Random Parasites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
6.5 The Coin Toss Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
6.6 Coin Toss Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
6.7 A Four-Element Sorting Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6.8 Sorting Network Results: Non-Spatial Asexual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
6.9 Sorting Network Results: Spatial Asexual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
6.10 Dynamic Virulence in the Numbers Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
6.11 Dynamic Virulence and Engagement in the Numbers Game . . . . . . . . 120
6.12 Sorting Network Results: Dynamic Virulence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
7.1 CIAO Plot Schematic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
7.2 Idealised CIAO Plots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
7.3 Tartan CIAO Plot Schematic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
7.4 RPS Study 1 Results: CIAO Plots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
7.5 RPS Study 1 Results: Event Plot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
7.6 RPS Study 1 Results: Probability Graphs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
7.7 RPS Study 1 Results: State Transition Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
x
7.8 RPS Study 2: Example FSM Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
7.9 RPS Study 2 Results: CIAO Plots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
7.10 RPS Study 2 Results: Event Plot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
7.11 RPS Study 2 Results: Probability Graph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
7.12 RPS Study 2 Results: State Transition Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
7.13 RPS Study 2: Enlarged CIAO Plot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
7.14 RPS Study 3 Results: CIAO Plots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
7.15 RPS Study 3 Results: Event Plot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
7.16 RPS Study 3 Results: Probability Graphs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
7.17 RPS Study 3 Results: State Transition Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
7.18 RPS Study: Fitness Variation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
7.19 E. coli Simulation: Grid Output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
7.20 E. coli Simulation: CIAO Plots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
7.21 E. coli Simulation: Event Plot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
7.22 E. coli Simulation: Probability Graphs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
7.23 E. coli Simulation: State Transition Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
7.24 Coin Toss Results: CIAO plots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
7.25 Steering Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
7.26 Example Fitness Distributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
7.27 Steering Interface: Screen Shot 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
7.28 Steering Interface: Screen Shot 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
7.29 Steering Interface: Screen Shot 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
7.30 Steering Interface: Screen Shot 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
7.31 Steering Interface: Screen Shot 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
7.32 Steering Interface: Screen Shot 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
7.33 Steering Interface: Screen Shot 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
7.34 Steering Interface: Screen Shot 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
8.1 Example NK, NKp and NKq Landscapes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
8.2 A Partial NKCqd Landscape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
xi
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Outline
Simultaneously decimating the creationist paradigm and the common misconception of
humans as distinct from (and somehow better than) the rest of the animal kingdom, the
publication of Charles Darwin’s (1859) On the origin of species induced one of the great-
est intellectual revolutions in the history of mankind. Today, evolutionary theory pervades
virtually every facet of modern biology. However, some aspects of evolution, such as the
evolution of interactions between species (or coevolution), are much less pervasive than
more traditional evolutionary topics, such as the study of genetics.
Following the publication of Origin, coevolution was largely ignored by evolutionary
biologists for more than 100 years. However, in recent decades, interest in (and un-
derstanding of) coevolutionary systems has grown signicantly. Since the evolutionary
synthesis1 (1936-1947), the introduction of novel tools, such as evolutionary game theory
and the digital computer, have made a major contribution to the development of coevo-
lutionary theory. Yet, whilst much progress has been made, coevolutionary biology is
undoubtedly still in its infancy.
In the 1960s, the evolutionary process was rst harnessed computationally in the form
of an evolutionary algorithm (EA). Such algorithms, incorporating populations of simple
individuals, can be utilised either as a modelling tool for biologists or as an optimisation
1Also named the “modern synthesis”, this period witnessed a synthesis of the Mendelian and Darwinian
paradigms.
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tool for complex problem solving. When running an evolutionary algorithm, the popula-
tion adapts to the specic task they are given; whether that be a computational problem
or an abstract model of a natural system. In both domains, evolutionary algorithms have
had fair success.
Since 1990, coevolutionary interactions have been added to the standard evolutionary
algorithm. Initially introduced as a method of improving the ability of EAs to optimise,
coevolutionary algorithms also facilitate the evolutionary modelling of biological inter-
species interactions. With potential not only as a powerful problem-solving tool capa-
ble of outperforming standard evolutionary algorithms, but also (uniquely) as a tool for
sophisticated individual-based modelling of coevolutionary interactions, coevolutionary
algorithms are an exciting innovation. Unfortunately, however, the full potential of co-
evolutionary algorithms, specically as an engineering tool, has not yet been realised.2 To
address this, several fundamental problems must rstly be confronted.
The primary aim of this thesis is to improve the utility of coevolutionary algorithms
for problem solving by furthering current understanding of the dynamics of articial co-
evolutionary systems. As a subsidiary goal, it is hoped that the knowledge derived in this
thesis will further theoretical understanding of biological coevolution.
1.1.1 The Problem
The dynamics of coevolutionary systems are notoriously difcult to understand and anal-
yse. This proves a severe hindrance when attempting to utilise coevolution as a com-
putational tool. As a result, unless comprehension improves, articial coevolutionary
algorithms are unlikely to full their potential as a general purpose optimisation tool.
This thesis aims to begin to address these issues by improving the understanding
(and control) of the coevolutionary dynamics of computational systems, particularly two-
population antagonistic (or competitive) systems. Where relevant, related insights into
biological coevolution will also be considered.
Specically, this thesis has four aims (unequal emphasis; see chapter 4 for a more
detailed discussion):
1. To clarify denitions of coevolution in biological and articial systems.
2. (a) To further understanding of disengagement, a deleterious phenomenon that
hinders coevolutionary progress.
2Where the term “engineering” is used in this thesis, reference is made to the engineering side of artificial
life (the autonomous robotics community, for example) and not engineering in general (electronic, chemical,
civil, etc.). This thesis is focused upon developing and understanding coevolutionary algorithms so that they
may be more productively used in the future; it does not attempt to solve problems picked from the field.
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(b) To produce a novel algorithm with which to tackle disengagement.
3. (a) To further understanding of the specic challenges facing appropriate visual-
ization of coevolution.
(b) To critique present visualization techniques and suggest novel alternatives.
4. To further understanding of neutrality in coevolutionary systems, and the relation-
ship between neutrality and other coevolutionary phenomena.
1.1.2 Motivation
This thesis is primarily motivated by the desire to improve the ability of coevolutionary al-
gorithms to perform as a problem solving technique. Having achieved success in a variety
of applications over the past few decades, evolutionary computation nevertheless suffers
from some practical problems that are difcult (if not impossible) to overcome; two of
the most serious include premature (sub-optimal) convergence of solutions, and difcul-
ties in dening an adequate assessment of tness. Coevolutionary computation, able to
circumvent some of the problems associated with standard evolutionary approaches, has
been proposed as an alternative. However, the introduction of coevolution introduces
several new problems each associated with relatively poorly understood coevolutionary
dynamics.
If successful, this thesis should further understanding of coevolutionary dynamics,
whilst introducing novel methods to tackle some of coevolution’s problems. The future
benets of improving coevolutionary computation are potentially widespread in engineer-
ing applications and may also improve biological modelling techniques. In conjunction,
many of the questions raised in this thesis have biological analogies. As such, there is a
possibility that answering these questions may shed light upon coevolutionary phenom-
ena in the biological world. The possibility of addressing such fundamental scientic
questions is a strong motivator.
1.1.3 Overview of Results
The major results presented in this thesis are summarised below:
1. Denitions of coevolution, both in biological and articial systems, are claried
(see chapter 3).
2. The phenomenon of disengagement is classied for the rst time (chapter 3). A
novel technique designed to combat the effects of disengagement is introduced
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(chapter 5), with empirical evidence suggesting that alternative state-of-the-art ap-
proaches are outperformed (chapter 6).
3. A detailed investigation of CIAO plotsa standard coevolutionary visualization
uncovers previously unobserved ambiguity (chapter 7).
4. A novel interactive visualization method incorporating a steering mechanism is
introduced. Such steering allows run time manipulation of the coevolutionary sys-
tem (chapter 7).
5. A discussion of neutrality in coevolutionary systems is undertaken for the rst
time and a novel framework for investigating coevolutionary neutrality is suggested
(chapter 8).
1.1.4 Methodology
As part of the general research methodology used throughout this thesis, the evolutionary
biology literature is extensively used as a source for ideas and inspiration with which to
tackle the problems of articial coevolution. Having some overlap with coevolutionary
computation, it seems plausible to expect that the more mature eld of evolutionary bi-
ology may contain established knowledge and techniques with potential application to
articial coevolution. A better understanding of the similarities and differences between
articial and biological systems can be gained by integrating knowledge between these
elds.
To test and develop preliminary ideas, trivial problem domains are used for early ex-
periments and analysis. Such simplistic models aid transparency, allow tractable results
and afford more insight. More complex problem domains are used for further devel-
opment of work. Whilst simple models allow general dynamics to be observed, more
complex problems show whether ndings are transferable to domains of interest whilst
demonstrating the potential application of novel techniques to non-trivial optimisation
problems. However, the big question, and one that unfortunately remains open, is how
to discern the set of interesting problems an algorithm is best suited to.
Finally, once developments in articial coevolutionary systems have been established,
considerations are made as to whether such developments can give insight into biological
coevolution. In this way it is hoped that ideas can circulate between evolutionary biology
and evolutionary computation.
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1.2 How to Read this Thesis
Bio-inspired computing, as its name suggests, lies at the interface between computing
and biology. Inspired by biological systems, novel computer algorithms, such as the
ubiquitous genetic algorithm (see chapter 2), are developed as a tool for problem solving,
whilst developments in computational understanding lter back into biology via innova-
tive modelling techniques, such as agent-based simulations. As such, it is possible to
approach bio-inspired computing from two perspectives; either that of a biologist, or that
of a computer scientist.
However, it is unwise to separate biology and computing, or biological modelling and
problem solving, exclusively. In order to fully appreciate one angle it is important to
have a rm grasp of the other. Thus, although this thesis is primarily concerned with the
computational perspective, attention will also be focused, where necessary, from the
perspective of biology.
To aid comprehension, it is important for the reader to understand which perspective is
taken at any one time; optimisation for instance, has a very different connotation when
taken from a computational rather than a biological viewpoint. Thus, when a biological
perspective is taken, it shall be, where appropriate, highlighted by framing the text within
a box, as such:
This text is highlighted by a framing box in order to indicate that the reader should be
taking a biological perspective. This notation will only be used where appropriate.
Due to the strong coupling between biology and computing, it is intended that, before
introducing coevolutionary computation, the reader shall receive a historical account of
coevolution in evolutionary biology. Integral to understanding the development of arti-
cial coevolution whilst anticipating possible future developments, the following section
outlines a brief history of evolutionary biology from a coevolutionary perspective.
1.3 A History of the Coevolutionary Perspective
Within evolutionary biology the study of coevolution has historically received relatively
little attention; a remarkable fact given how pervasive coevolutionary interactions are in
nature. No species has an evolutionary history entirely independent of other biota, yet
it was not until 1979 that the rst textbook to dedicate an entire chapter to coevolution
appeared (Futuyma, 1979). As a result, coevolution is often perceived as ancillary to the
core evolutionary framework.
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In this section, I will attempt to address this issue by presenting a brief history of evo-
lutionary biology from a coevolutionary perspective. The reason for this is not to espouse
a paradigm shift, or scientic revolution a` la Kuhn (1970; for an extended discussion
see Chalmers, 1999)it is certainly not my intention to encourage the reader to see ev-
erything as coevolutionbut to highlight that coevolutionary ideas have a long history,
traceable to the inception of evolutionary theory. I wish to demonstrate that, far from
being anomalous, coevolutionary theory is integral to evolutionary biology. The reason
why coevolution has been under-represented in evolutionary research is not because it is
uninteresting, but rather that the coevolutionary dynamics involved in inter-species inter-
actions are more difcult to analyse than many other facets of evolutionary theory.
1.3.1 Interspecific Interaction
Given that all animals eat plants, or other animals, interspecic interactions are an in-
escapable necessity of the natural world. Species simply do not evolve in isolation, but
rather, to varying degrees, have an evolutionary history of interactions with other biota.
In the majority of situations, the primary driving force behind evolutionary adaptations
are interspecic interactionsthe biotic environment generally changes at a greater rate
than the physical environment. For this reason, much of the diversity and specialisation
observable within the natural world is due to interspecic interactions, or coevolution.
Indeed, in the form of endosymbiotic3 interactions, coevolution is considered directly
responsible for one of the most signicant transitions in evolutionary history. Margulis
(1970) postulates that the emergence of eukaryotesorganisms with nucleated cellsis
due to the incorporation of free-living prokaryotes (now represented by mitochondria and
chloroplasts) by a host cell. This is no small matter. Without eukaryotes, there would be
no plants, animals or fungi.
However, despite the impact that the complex evolved network of interspecic inter-
actions has undoubtedly had upon the evolution of species, there has been a distinct lack
of emphasis upon coevolution throughout much of the history of evolutionary biology.
The evolution of interspecic interactions has often been perceived as a side-issue.
. . . generations of students in courses in evolutionary biology were trained
without realizing that they were studying only half the problem of the evolu-
tion of adaptation and diversity. Or they studied evolving interactions as parts
of other courses, giving the impression that the evolution of interactions was a
3Ehrman (1983) describes endosymbiosis as the “most intimate [of] coevolved systems. . . in which one
of the organisms incorporates the other—an intricate co-habitation of two species in which a symbiont
exists in the cells of a host for at least a [proportion] of its partner’s life cycle”.
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specialised topic outside the scope of the fundamental questions in evolution
(Thompson, 1994, p55).
In an attempt to understand why the evolution of interspecic interactions, or coevo-
lution, was so marginalized for such an extensive period of time, it is necessary to review
the history of evolutionary biology from a coevolutionary perspective. However, the most
salient feature of such a review is the surprising fact that, whether implicit or explicit, talk
of interspecic interactions pervaded the formative years of evolutionary biology.
1.3.2 The Pre-Darwinian Perspective
In 1809 the French zoologist Jean-Baptiste Pierre Antoine de Monet, Chevalier de Lamarck
introduced the world to his edgling theory of evolution in Philosophie Zoologique (1809).
Although Lamarck is now best associated with his discredited theory of hereditythe
inheritance of acquired characteristics, or soft inheritanceDarwin and other early
evolutionists acknowledged him as a great zoologist and his ideas as a forerunner of
evolution.
Pre-Lamarck, the general consensus was a static world with constant conditions; ig-
noring the odd miraculous interposition. The greatest achievement of Philosophie Zo-
ologique was to consider the worldspecies and environmentas dynamic. Prior to
Darwin, the general consensus was essentialist, believing that each species had its own
species-specic essence, thus making it theoretically impossible for a species to change
or evolve. However:
. . . since Lamarck believed that species could not become extinct, he con-
cluded that they must undergo constant evolutionary change in order to re-
main adapted to the changes in their environment (Mayr, 1982, p406).
Unfortunately, Lamarck’s ideas were largely ignored in his own lifetime. In 1829 he died
in poverty and obscurity.
Lamarck was the rst to think about a dynamic world with species evolving in re-
sponse to a changing environment, though he never explicitly mentioned the effect that
evolving species have upon an environment and the subsequent interspecic interactions
(Mayr, 1982, Chapter 8). However, explicit musings upon such interactions predated
Lamarck’s evolutionary theory. Whether the environment maintained constancy or not,
it was obvious to some that species-interactions (though non-evolutionary) pervaded the
natural world, beautifully exhibiting the plan of the Creator. Take the following passage
from Joseph Priestly in 1764:
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Are not all plants likewise suited to the various kinds of animals which feed
upon them?...The various kinds of animals are, again, in a thousand ways
adapted to, and formed for, the use of one another (Thompson, 1994, p23).
In 1798 the English economist Thomas Robert Malthus rst published his Essay on
Population (Malthus, 1798), acknowledged six decades later by both Darwin and Wallace
as having a profound inuence upon their subsequent theories of evolution (Mayr, 1982;
Nordenski¤old, 1935). Considering the reasons why populations do not increase geomet-
rically, Malthus concluded that populations are checked by a limited food supplythere
is not an innite abundance of resources. Such scarce resources produce a necessity to
out-compete in order to survive: there is a struggle for existence. Only the strongest, or
the luckiest, survive.
Wherever therefore there is liberty, the power of increase is exerted; and the
superabundant effects are repressed afterwards by want of room and nour-
ishment, which is common to animals and plants; and among animals, by
becoming the prey of others (Malthus, 1798).
Upon marrying the changing environment and constant species adaptation presented
by Lamarck with both the interspecic interactions and mutual adaptations of Priestly
(ignoring his teleological viewpoint) and the struggle for existence resulting from com-
petition for scarce resources pronounced by Malthus, one could begin to form a proto-
coevolutionary theory. However, it was Charles Lyell, a Geologist and (until 1859) anti-
evolutionist, who rst stated the importance of interspecic interactions explicitly:
Lyell contributed one important thought, subsequently developed by Darwin:
it is not only the physical factors that can cause extinction but also competi-
tion from other better-adapted species (Mayr, 1982, p406).
Yetunexceptional given the eraapplication was one step ahead of theory. At-
tempting to avoid the potentially devastating effects of crop disease, early nineteenth cen-
tury plant breeders began the selective breeding of cereal crops for resistance to disease,
particularly wheat rust. Though early breeders would not have considered wheat rust to
be an evolving organism, they were nevertheless engaged in a coevolutionary struggle
(Barrett, 1983).
1.3.3 Darwin’s Entangled Bank
The publication of On the Origin of Species on November 24, 1859, ignited possibly the
greatest scientic revolution of all time, and sounded the death knell of anthropocentrism.
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To quote Mayr (2001), [Origin] almost single-handedly effected the secularisation of
science. In the rst sentence of the nal paragraph of Origin, Charles Robert Darwin’s
most famous of passages encourages the reader to imagine an entangled bank, evidenc-
ing that, from the outset, Darwinian evolution incorporated interspecic interactions and,
hence, coevolutionary theories.
It is interesting to contemplate an entangled bank, clothed with many plants
of many kinds, with birds singing on the bushes, with various insects itting
about, and with worms crawling through the damp earth, and to reect that
these elaborately constructed forms, so different from each other, and depen-
dent on each other in so complex a manner, have all been produced by laws
acting around us (Darwin, 1985, p459).
Darwin explicitly tackles coevolutionary interactions in an earlier chapter of Origin
the rst real account of the evolutionary process. Given the following sentence, there can
be no denying that Darwin understood the inuence of interspecic interactions.
Thus I can understand how a ower and a bee might slowly become, either si-
multaneously or one after the other, modied and adapted in the most perfect
manner to each other, by the continued preservation of individuals presenting
mutual and slightly favourable deviations of structure (Darwin, 1985, p142).
However, Darwin was not alone. After twenty years of procrastination, Darwin un-
veiled his theory of evolution in Origin after becoming aware that Alfred Russel Wallace
had arrived at an almost identical theory. In a letter sent to Darwin in 1858, Wallace pre-
sented his own theory of evolution. Amazed by the similarity of Wallace’s theory, and
fearing that he would be beaten to publication, Darwin attached some of his own work to
Wallace’s letter and forwarded it on to Lyell and Hooker for presentation to the Linnean
Society of London (Mayr, 1982). Interestingly, though Wallace had independently arrived
at his own evolutionary theory, he was also well aware of the importance of interspecic
interactions.
Even the peculiar colours of many animals, especially insects, so closely re-
sembling the soil or the leaves or the trunks on which they habitually reside,
are explained on the same principle; for though in the course of ages varieties
of many tints may have occurred, yet those races having colours best adapted
to concealment from their enemies would inevitably survive the longest (Wal-
lace, 1858, original italics).
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Immediately following Origin, Darwin undertook a coevolutionary study of orchids
and moths (see Thompson, 1994). He states:
. . . there has been a race in gaining length between the nectary of Angraecum
and the proboscis of certain moths (Darwin, 1862, p202-3).
Yet the rst landmark in coevolution came not to Darwin, but to Wallace’s friend, the
entomologist Henry Walter Bates. Having stayed behind in Brazil after Wallace returned
to England, Bates developed his theory of mimicry through the observation of butteries.
Bates observed that each species of the unpalatable heliconid butteries was associated,
where it occurred, with one or more species of edible butteries which mimicked them in
colouration (Mayr, 1982)Batesian mimicry (Bates, 1862). Bates’ work became one of
the major initial applications of Darwinian evolution and an outstanding contribution to
coevolutionary theory (Thompson, 1994).
In 1879, Fritz M¤uller contributed the most important extension to the mimicry prin-
ciple; mutual mimicry may occur between unpalatable, poisonous, or venomous animals
such as wasps and snakesM¤ullerian mimicry (M¤uller, 1879). M¤ullerian mimicry com-
prised the rst quantitative statement of the conditions under which reciprocal evolution
may occur (Thompson, 1994).
However, despite the initial success of mimicry theory, interspecic interactions were
largely ignored in the nal decades of the nineteenth century and the pre-synthesis years
of the twentieth. In the following section we attempt to understand why this period saw
such a dearth of coevolutionary theory.
1.3.4 Challenges
In order to study interspecic interactions in the Victorian era, there were several prag-
matic challenges one must overcome. Primarily, empirical evidence was lacking. As
Thompson (1994) notes, whereas one could study species’ morphologies by having them
shipped from far continents, species-interactions were not so easy to attain; they cannot
be housed in a museum, they have no comparable morphologies and they rarely leave
a direct fossil record. Thus, in order to gain a signicant understanding of a particular
interspecic interaction, one must directly observe the coevolutionary system in situ. Un-
fortunately, this may involve extensive periods in inhospitable conditions, such as those
faced by Bates in the Brazilian rainforests during his eleven years of study between 1848-
1859. Little wonder then, that species interactions were often overlooked.
Secondly, interspecic interactions simply include an extra level of complexity over
and above that found within a single species. Explaining morphologies on the basis of
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physical conditions is a much easier task than attempting to understand complex, evolving
interspecic interactions, that can often be counter-intuitive. Given that nineteenth cen-
tury Darwinians faced the challenge of trying to convince and convert anti-evolutionist
essentialists, one can imagine why explanations of particular animal and plant morpholo-
gies would appear more appropriate than descriptions of complex networks of interspe-
cic interactions. Much of Victorian society was not quite ready for man’s relation to
primates, let alone coevolutionary theory.
Finally, even if empirical evidence is collected and a receptive audience is discovered,
one major challenge still persistshow to interpret such evidence. Complex interspecic
interactions are very hard to analyse and interpret. In the pre-synthesis years, few tools
existed, making it virtually impossible to study many coevolutionary systems adequately.
Coevolution was often not overlooked because of lack of interest, but because it was
beyond the scope of contemporary science. Fortunately, the greatest biological revolution
of the twentieth centurythe evolutionary synthesiswould change this scenario.
1.3.5 Post-Synthesis Developments
The term evolutionary synthesis was introduced by [Huxley (1942)] to des-
ignate the general acceptance of two conclusions: gradual evolution can be
explained in terms of small genetic changes (mutations) and recombina-
tion, and the ordering of this genetic variation by natural selection; and the
observed evolutionary phenomena, particularly macroevolutionary processes
and speciation, can be explained in a manner that is consistent with the known
genetic mechanisms (Mayr & Provine, 1980).
1.3.5.1 The Evolutionary Synthesis
During the initial decades of the twentieth century, two seemingly incommensurable
paradigms (as dened by Kuhn, 1970) dominated evolutionary biology; the naturalist
camp and the geneticist camp.4 Despite all that had been learned since Origin, the camps
disagreed almost as much as they did in Darwin’s day (Mayr & Provine, 1980). Severe
communication problems, exacerbated by idiosyncratic terminologythe term blend-
ing, for example, referred to an intermediate genotype for the geneticists, whereas for
students of whole-organisms (the naturalists) it referred to an intermediate phenotype
(Mayr & Provine, 1980)ensured that the camps remained at cross-purposes. Though
4The situation was actually more complicated than this, but as a simplification, this partition serves the
purpose of this chapter (for a more detailed review, see Mayr & Provine, 1980).
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both elds matured greatly in the early decades of the twentieth century, each severely
under-appreciated the other, often misunderstanding the signicance of the opposition’s
discoveries.
The rediscovery of Mendelian genetics at the turn of the century initiated the forma-
tion of modern population genetics. Generally, it was believed that Mendelian genetics
disagreed with Darwinism: rather than attributing much of evolution to natural selection,
Mendelism elevated mutation to the primary source of evolution, considering adaptation
as a result of mutation-pressure. Believing only in hard inheritance (genetic heredity
only) the geneticists considered species in terms of discrete genetic systems. Resulting
theoretical models led geneticists to predict that there was often not enough variation
for natural selection to act. As such, new species were thought to originate from single
macro-mutationssaltationism.
Contrastingly, the naturalists generally accepted gradual Darwinian evolution. Hav-
ing secured a great wealth of knowledge of natural species, naturalists were well versed
in the subtle (seemingly continuous) variations species displayed. Unlike the spatially in-
dependent discrete mathematical models that population geneticists (such as R. A. Fisher
and J. B. S. Haldane) tended to use, naturalists understood the key role spatiality (in
particular geographic isolation) played in the variation exhibited by natural species. Re-
alising that natural populations contain enough variation for natural selection to occur,
naturalists placed much less emphasis upon the role of macro-mutations in speciation.
Unconstrained by Mendelian genetics, naturalists often utilised theories of soft inheri-
tance (both genetic and non-genetic heredity), including the neo-Lamarckian evolution of
acquired characteristics.
Given such markedly different paradigms it is surprising that, in the years between
1936-1947, a synthesis between Mendelian genetics and natural selection occurred. Mar-
rying population genetics with natural selection, it was possible to nally understand how
continuous changes in phenotypic traits can result from a discrete genetic system. The
resultant neo-Darwinist paradigm buried, once and for all, the theories of soft inheritance
and saltationism.5 Many of the questions Darwin raised nearly a century before had -
nally been answered. In conjunction, the powerful mathematical tools developed by the
geneticists could be applied to the wealth of knowledge the naturalists had gathered.
Laying the ghosts of the nineteenth century to rest, evolutionary biology was able
to rapidly progress, ourishing in the unity of knowledge the formally disparate groups
5This is not strictly true. One may consider that a resurgence in these theories has occurred since the
evolutionary synthesis. Whilst the theory of punctuated equilibria (Eldredge & Gould, 1973; Gould &
Eldredge, 1977) can be loosely equated with saltationism, the theory of memes (Dawkins, 1976) is a strong
contender for soft inheritance.
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could collate. Within a decade of the synthesis, Watson and Crick (1953) had discovered
the double-helix of DNA and with it the fundamental mechanism of replication. The nal
piece of the neo-Darwinist jigsaw slotted into place:
It has not escaped our notice that the specic pairing we have postulated
immediately suggests a possible copying mechanism for the genetic material
(Watson & Crick, 1953).
1.3.5.2 New Techniques: A New Perspective
Inclusive Fitness
Exemplied by Wynne-Edwards (1962), group selectionismconsidering a group or
species to be the unit of selection rather than the individualpersisted in the decades
immediately following the evolutionary synthesis. Group selection gained popularity
through its ability to explain apparently altruistic behaviour in organisms. Why, for exam-
ple, do social-insects, such as ants, forego their own lives to save a nest if not for the good
of the species? Group selectionism assumes that a population will increase its chances of
survival if it can adapt to act harmoniously with other species and the physical environ-
ment (Thompson, 1994). Thus, group selection presupposes that coevolutionary systems
(such as host-parasite interactions) will always become more mutually benecial and less
antagonistic through time. This view severely stunts possible research avenues into the
evolution of interspecic interactions.
However, group selectionism was forcibly attacked during the 1950s and 1960s as
many argued that evolution occurred through natural selection among individuals, not
groups. The nail in the cofn for group selection came when Hamilton (1964) produced
his brilliant work on inclusive tnessthe tness of an adult individual cannot be cal-
culated merely by its offspring, but must take into account the likely number of other’s
offspring that include a proportion of similar genes. Inclusive tness thus explains altru-
ism towards kin and quickly explains the mystery of self-sacricing ants. However, as
Grafen (1991) points out, the concept of inclusive tness is very complicated and often
misunderstood:
. . . the scope of inclusive tness covers all interactions in which the genotype
of one individual affects the tness of conspecics. The special role of rela-
tives is a powerful result of the theory, not a restricting assumption (Grafen,
1991, p9)
Inclusive tness, and the death (or, at least, exile) of group-selectionism, meant that
all interspecic interactions were no longer expected to result in mutualism.
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These views opened the way for studying how different ecological conditions
favoured different degrees of specialization and different outcomes of coevo-
lution (Thompson, 1994, p48).
Game Theory
Originally developed as a modelling tool for economic behaviour, game theorythe use
of quantication methods to study competitive situationsenabled, for the rst time, the
analytical study of competitive games (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1953). Unlike
probability theory, which is constrained to analyse games of chancethe equivalent of
no-player game theorygame theory assumes that rational agents engaged in a conict
of interest choose, at each turn, the most appropriate strategy. Outcomes are not random
events but are determined by rational play.
By treating rationality as stability, and self-interest as Darwinian tness, game theory
was rst applied to evolutionary biology in the 1960s. Paradoxically, though game the-
ory was rst developed as a tool for economics, it has proven more applicable to modern
evolutionary biology (Maynard Smith, 1982, Preface).6 Game theory enables evolution-
ary biologists to predict which, of a given set of strategies, will perform well within a
population. Further, one can observe whether such a strategy, once used by the majority,
can be invaded (outperformed) by some opposing strategy and whether such strategy in-
vasions will cycle periodically, uctuate chaotically or settle at an equilibrium. Such an
equilibriuma population converged upon a non-invadable strategyis termed an Evo-
lutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS; Maynard Smith & Price, 1973).
Over the last four decades, game theory has revolutionised evolutionary biology, -
nally permitting the formal analysis of evolutionary competition. In conjunction with
population genetics, game theoryinherently considering the interaction between oppos-
ing strategiesoffers a new technique for studying coevolution (e.g., Maynard Smith,
1982; Sih, 1998, Chapter 10).7 Slatkin (1983) describes how this can be done:
6The reason for this is game theory’s assumption of rationality. Economic agents often do not act
rationally—they are prone to uninformed decisions, biases and prejudice, they may be unprepared to take
risks, or to follow whims, trends and fashions. However, by replacing rationality with population dynamics
and stability (Maynard Smith, 1982), the assumption is no longer as fallible—Darwinian fitness cannot be
“deceived” as easily as human rationality. However, as Gould and Lewontin (1979) argue, embryological
and morphological constraints can lead to inherent biases in evolutionary dynamics—the open question
is “to what extent?” In response, the evolutionary game theorist can return to the initial assumptions of
the game, where each possible strategy is explicitly defined as equally achievable, thus side-stepping the
anti-adaptationist argument.
7However, it should be recognised that game theory and population genetics tend to consider fixed
equilibria, often overlooking the coevolutionary dynamics of continuous change (Maynard Smith, 1982,
Introduction). Yet, game theory can handle cyclic trajectories if additional analytic techniques are applied
(e.g., Maynard Smith, 1982, appendix J).
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Game theory can be used to understand models of coevolving systems by en-
visioning each species as a player that is trying to maximize its gain through
certain kinds of interactions under the assumption that the other species is
trying to do the same (Slatkin & Maynard Smith, 1979). For example, the
coevolution of two competing species can be understood in terms of the strat-
egy of generalization leading to the use of more resources but causing more
intense competition, as contrasted with a strategy of specialization leading to
the use of fewer resources but also leading to less intense competition (Lawlor
& Maynard Smith, 1976).
Computer Models
The development and growth of the digital computer after World War II heralded a new
age in evolutionary biology. As computational power slowly trickled into the hands of
biologists, there emerged a new methodology for studying evolution. For the rst time,
it became possible to simulate evolving populations and observe interactions on the level
of individual agents. Taking into account detailed logistical factorssuch as population
structure, migration or generation timemuch more intricate models of interactions be-
tween both individuals and populations became available.
When modelling host-parasite coevolution, for example, it is necessary to capture
not only the genetics of both populations, but also the spatial interplay of epidemiol-
ogy. Achieving this mathematically, however, is fraught with technical complications. As
such, mathematical models of host-parasite interactions tend to capture only one aspect
of the system. Generally, these include parasite-host genetics with no epidemiology, host
genetics and frequency dependent tnesses, or population models with no genetics (May
& Anderson, 1983).
Unlike population genetics and game theory, computer models trivially reproduce
complex population interactions and subsequent coevolutionary dynamics. However, they
are unfortunately much more opaque to analysis. The benets of adding complexity with
ease is countered by the fact that results gleaned from such complex simulations may be
analytically intractable.
Throughout the 1960s, several attempts were made to harness the essence of evolution
computationally. These included evolution strategies (Rechenberg, 1973), evolutionary
programming (Fogel, Owens, & Walsh, 1966) and genetic algorithms (Holland, 1975).8
Each used a very simplied analogy of evolution, including a population of individuals
consisting of very simple genetic code, some measure of assessment, and a subsequent
8See chapter 2 for a review of evolutionary computation.
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process of reproduction and mutation.
Implemented as a (non-evolutionary) computer simulation, the model of animal con-
ict by Maynard Smith and Price (1973) was one of the rst compelling game theory
models in evolutionary biology. Modelling conict as a series of pairwise confrontations
between two opponents, Maynard Smith and Price (1973) allowed adversaries a choice
of three available actions each move; a conventional threat display, a potentially danger-
ous attack, or a retreat. Five opponent strategieseach a set of probabilities governing
the choice of actionwere dened. Each strategy played itself and the other four over
a series of 2000 moves, with results demonstrating that limited war strategies (those
including conventional displays) were evolutionarily stable, whilst total war strategies
(those without conventional displays) were not. However, in a little cited letter to Nature,
Gale and Eaves (1975) point out that an alternative ESS exists in the form of a frequency-
dependent mixture of total war strategies. Using (perhaps) the rst rudimentary evolu-
tionary simulation model, Gale and Eaves (1975) demonstrate that, despite their absence
as an equilibrium end-point in game theory, total war equilibria will be reached from cer-
tain initial conditions. This demonstrates a potential advantage of evolutionary simulation
models; such techniques are able to consider evolutionary trajectories unavailable to game
theory.
Since the evolutionary synthesis, the necessary tools to study coevolution have grad-
ually developed. Computers afford intricate simulation models, game theory allows for-
mal analysis of competition, and the principle of inclusive tness offers a range of non-
mutualistic coevolutionary outcomes. Marrying such techniques with the post-synthesis
advances in genetics and ecology, evolutionary biology nally reached a position to tackle
the fundamental questions of coevolution.
1.3.5.3 The Coining of Coevolution
In 1958, the rst mathematical model of coevolution was published (Mode, 1958). Demon-
strated by Flor (1955) to exist in interactions between ax and ax rust, Mode (1958)
utilised the concept of gene-for-gene interaction, matching each gene for host resistance
with an explicit gene for parasite virulence (see Thompson, 1994, p52-3).
However, it was not until 1964 that the term coevolution was rst dened:9
9Although (Mode, 1958) included the term “co-evolution” in the title of his paper, Futuyma and Slatkin
(1983) suggest that Ehrlich and Raven (1964) coined the term “coevolution”. Presumably, their reasoning
follows that Ehrlich and Raven explicitly define “coevolution” in terms of interspecific interactions, rather
than implicitly referring to “co-evolution” as some sort of ecological evolution or multiple evolution in
a generic sense. As Ehrlich and Raven (1964) suggest, many studies of community evolution tend to
be narrow in scope and ignore the reciprocal aspect of interactions, often considering one population as
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. . . coevolution is the examination of patterns of interaction between two ma-
jor groups of organisms with a close and evident ecological relationship, such
as plants and herbivores (Ehrlich & Raven, 1964).
During their seminal work on the antagonistic coevolution between butteries and
plants, Ehrlich and Raven (1964) conclude, on the basis of an extensive survey of pat-
terns affecting food plant choice, that the phylogeny of parasites (buttery larvae) tracks
the phylogeny of hosts (plants) during the continual evolution of defensive and counter-
defensive measures. Within 3 years, Janzen’s seminal work on the interdependency be-
tween the swollen-thorn acacias and their ant inhabitants paved the way for the study
of mutualistic coevolution (Janzen, 1966). After the breakthrough of Ehrlich and Raven
(1964) and then Janzen (1966), the late 1960s and early 1970s witnessed a dramatic in-
crease in the attention evolutionary biologists bestowed upon coevolution, both antago-
nistic and mutualistic.
Perhaps the most signicant publication of the early 1970s was van Valen’s (1973) A
New Evolutionary Law, in which he introduced his radical Red Queen hypothesis.10 van
Valen made an analogy between the Red Queen and biological coevolution after discover-
ing a surprising trend concerning the probability of extinction of species. After analysing
huge data sets collected across a wide range of biological taxa, van Valen noticed that,
counter to intuition, all groups for which data exist go extinct at a rate that is constant for
a given group. Assuming that species evolve in a relatively static environment, one would
expect benecial adaptations to accumulate over evolutionary time, enabling progressive
generations to be better equipped at defending against extinction than their ancestors. To
explain his ndings, van Valen proposed a new evolutionary law of extinction, with the
Red Queen hypothesis as its central tenet: biotic forces provide the basis for self-driving
. . . perpetual motion of the effective environment. Any benecial adaptation by a par-
ticular species is, by denition, detrimental to other species inhabiting the same effective
environment. Coevolutionary forces will, in turn, select for specic counter-adaptations
in these species. In this way, adaptive advantage is continually eroded. In Red Queen
fashion, species are truly running to stand still.
The Red Queen hypothesis was not only the rst instance of an explicitly general
coevolutionary theory, but also hinted at coevolution’s potential to be one of the predom-
inant forces driving evolution in nature. One may expect Red Queen dynamics to drive
a run-away process of continual counter-adaptationa coevolutionary arms race. Such
invariate.
10Appearing in Lewis Carroll’s Through The Looking Glass, the Red Queen is a living chess piece that
continually runs to stand still. No matter how fast she moves, the surrounding landscape always keeps up
with her.
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arms races are considered a profound force driving evolutionary adaptation in the natural
world, and have sometimes been characterised as a source of strong selection for novel
adaptations capable of accelerating evolutionary progress (Dawkins & Krebs, 1979).11
Throughout the 1970s, coevolution began to develop as a discipline in its own right,
aided by the rst textbook to dedicate an entire chapter to coevolution (Futuyma, 1979)
and culminating in the appearance of entire works solely concerned with coevolution
(Thompson, 1982; Futuyma & Slatkin, 1983). After two centuries of dabbling with inter-
specic interactions, evolutionary biologists nally had a rm foundation with which to
study coevolution. However, the rise in emphasis upon coevolution led to the worrying
situation in which coevolution had become such a pervasive concept that it was in danger
of rendering itself moot. As a backlash to this (discussed in detail in Chapter 3) attempts
were made to restrict coevolution by enforcing strict denitions.
1.4 Summary
Based upon the concept of interspecic interactions, biologists from the time of Darwin
and beyond have entertained a coevolutionary perspective on the natural world. How-
ever, it was not until after the evolutionary synthesis that the emergence of new techniques
facilitated the establishment of coevolution as an independent discipline. Yet despite the
availability of new tools and a greater understanding of the natural world, due to their
inherently counter-intuitive nature, coevolutionary systems will undoubtedly continue to
elude the understanding of evolutionary biologists for some time.
In the following chapter we will see that evolutionary computation has, perhaps sur-
prisingly, failed to take a coevolutionary perspective until very recently. Given that evolu-
tionary computation was developed during the pinnacle expansion period of coevolution,
it is interesting that interspecic interactions have largely been ignored.
11The concept of coevolution driving an evolutionary arms-race is central to coevolutionary computation
in general, and this thesis in particular. See chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion.
Chapter 2
Review of Evolutionary Computation
Facilitated by the growth and accessibility of digital computers, the discipline of evo-
lutionary computation (EC)applying biologically inspired computational analogues to
complex search problems, or to biological modellingemerged during the 1960s. How-
ever, though interest in coevolution ourished amongst evolutionary biologists during this
period (refer to chapter 1), interspecic interactions were mysteriously absent during the
formative years of EC. Indeed, in marked contrast to evolutionary biology, only in the last
decade or so has a coevolutionary perspective entered evolutionary computation.
Since evolutionary computation plays such an integral role throughout this thesis, this
chapter endeavours to outline the fundamentals of EC in order to provide the reader with
sufcient background knowledge. Specically, the genetic algorithm (GA)a tool used
extensively throughout the experimental chapters 6 and 7is introduced in detail.
2.1 Artificial Evolution
It is generally accepted by contemporary evolutionists that evolution per se does not re-
quire biological organisms in order to occur. As Lewontin (1970) suggests, the process
of evolution requires three necessary (and sufcient) properties; variation, differential
tness, and heritability. Given that such requirements are fullled, a population is ca-
pable of evolving whether biological or not, thus allowing the possibility of articial
evolutionthe evolution of non-biological entities.
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Lewontin (1970) states that Darwin’s scheme embodies three principles:
1. Different individuals in a population have different morphologies, phys-
iologies, and behaviours (phenotypic variation).
2. Different phenotypes have different rates of survival and reproduction
in different environments (differential tness).
3. There is a correlation between parents and offspring in the contribution
of each to future generations (tness is heritable).
[These] embody the principle of evolution by natural selection. While they
hold, a population will undergo evolutionary change (Lewontin, 1970).
In the form of an evolutionary algorithm (EA)a collective term for the class of al-
gorithms incorporating, amongst others, the genetic algorithm (GA)digital computers
afford the necessary framework with which to instantiate articial evolution. Though EAs
vary dramatically, the underlying conceptualisation of biological evolution is shared by
all; whether used for evolutionary simulation modelling or for parameter optimisation,
evolutionary algorithms are inherently population-based search techniques that incorpo-
rate some form of heredity, variation and selection.1
Individuals within a population are dened using a simple encoding scheme (analo-
gous to DNA) before being assessed in order to assign each a tness score, roughly
approximating adaptive success. With success breeding success, individuals reproduce
in proportion to their tness. Aside from the occasional mutation, children are replicas
of parents. In this manner, EAs utilise Darwin’s principle of survival of the ttest,
attempting to drive the population to become ever more successful at the desired task.
Following World War II, as computers began to pervade evolutionary biology, many
forms of evolutionary algorithm sprang into existence, eventually resulting in three recog-
nised schools that persist, to varying degrees, today. In Germany, Rechenberg (1973)
developed the evolution strategy, or Evolutionsstrategie (ES), whilst around the same time
two alternative approaches, evolutionary programming (EP, Fogel et al., 1966) and genetic
algorithms (GAs, Holland, 1975), emerged in the USA. Though other forms of evolution-
ary algorithm were developed (e.g., Reed, Toombs, & Barricelli, 1967), they were not
widely adopted.
1This is perhaps misleading since evolutionary algorithms occasionally utilise a population size of one;
a “(1+1)EA”. Each generation, a mutant offspring is created from the lone population member and the two
are compared. The winner is retained for the following generation whilst the loser is discarded. Com-
monly referred to as “hill-climbers”, such algorithms exhibit very different dynamics to multi-individual
population EAs.
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Although [ESs, EP and GAs] share an identical meta-model, each one em-
phasises different features as being most important to a successfully modelled
evolutionary process (B¤ack, 1996).
Apart from the variety of encodings used, the most salient differences between the
algorithms is the emphasis that each places upon the genetic operators (mutation and re-
combination) and population size.2 Whereas Holland’s GA relies upon genetic recombi-
nation and mutation in multi-individual populations, evolutionary programming generally
utilises only mutation, whilst evolution strategies historically incorporate a (1+1) popula-
tion hill-climber. As Mitchell (1996) suggests: Holland was the rst [to] attempt to put
computational evolution on a rm theoretical footing. Unlike EP and ESs, GAs were
not designed purely for function optimisation, but rather as a way to accurately model the
evolutionary process. As such, GAs more realistically capture the essence of evolution
than competing algorithms, perhaps inuencing their popularity over recent decades (see
section 2.3 for a discussion of realism).
It is important to highlight the fact that, over the past three decades, the strict classi-
cations discussed here have not remained steadfast. Many algorithms now form some
sort of hybrid inspired by several schools of thought. Yet, the majority of work covered
in this thesis ts most comfortably into the GA class. For this reason, and because of
the pervasiveness of GAs in the EC community, the following section introduces GAs in
detail.
2.2 Genetic Algorithms (GAs)
GAs often vary radically from the original design of Holland. Indeed, only ten years after
Holland (1975), De Jong (1985) commented upon the metamorphosis of GAs, suggesting
that: today, researchers often use the term genetic algorithm to describe something
far from the original conception of Holland. Consequently, there is no rigorous GA
denition. Yet, as Mitchell (1996) suggests, most GAs (including Holland’s) share some
common elements: populations of individual genotypes, selection according to tness,
crossover to produce new offspring, and random mutation of offspring.
This section introduces a simple generic GA containing only Mitchell’s core com-
ponents. Hopefully, this should be enough to elucidate the standard GA approach without
2Traditionally, each algorithm is associated with a particular encoding scheme; ESs with real-valued
n-dimensional vectors, EP with finite state machines and GAs (at least initially) with binary strings. Such
associations, however, are not ubiquitous. In particular, having the ability to accommodate a wide variety
of encodings, GAs frequently utilise alternatives to binary string encodings in contemporary work.
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becoming entrenched in, possibly idiosyncratic, details. Throughout the remainder of this
section, Mitchell (1996, Chapter 1) is utilised as a basis.
2.2.1 A Simple Generational GA
A simple GA often follows the following plan:
1. Randomly generate an initial population of n individuals, each consisting of a geno-
type of length l. Set generation counter g = 0.
2. Using a pre-dened function, calculate the tness f(x) of each individual, x, in the
population.
3. Repeat the following until n offspring have been created.
(a) Select, with replacement, two parent individuals, where the probability of
selection is a monotonically increasing function of tness (refer to section
2.2.4).
(b) With probability pc, apply crossover to the parents’ genotypes (refer to section
2.2.3.2).
(c) ∀i ≤ l, mutate new offspring at location li with probability pm (refer to section
2.2.3.1).
4. Replace the current population with the new population of offspring. Increment
counter g.
5. If (g < gmax & solution not found) goto step 2, else end.
Many GA applications follow this simple procedure. However, the success of an al-
gorithm depends upon the details of the particular procedure chosen. Such details include
the population size n, the number of generations gmax, and the probabilities of mutation
pm and crossover pc. Also, the modes of variation (see section 2.2.3), assessment and
selection (section 2.2.4) play an important role. Often, some effort is needed to tweak
these aspects in order to achieve sufcient success, either in modelling or optimisation.
A simulation model can be classied successful if it accurately reects an abstraction
of the system it is modelling; such simulations can then be used to develop new hypothe-
ses about the natural system of interest. In contrast, a successful optimisation algorithm
is one that generally discovers good solutions to a required problem in a reasonable
amount of time. For optimisation, the realism of an algorithm is largely irrelevant (see
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section 2.3). The following section details a worked example of a problem solved by a
GA.
2.2.2 Worked Example
The Problem
Using the 53-letter alphabet Σ={a,b,. . . ,z, ,A,B,. . . ,Z}, containing the 26 lower-case let-
ters, 26 upper-case letters and space character, nd the string of 19 characters equal to:
Rules of Engagement.3 Although this problem may at rst appear trivial, there are 1953
possible combinations of 19-character strings. Thus, using an exhaustive search would
require an inordinate amount of time (2.97 x 1067 iterations, on average).
Set Up
Rather than use a binary encoding for the genetic algorithm it seems sensible, given the
nature of the problem, to represent each individual as a 19-character string containing
letters drawn from the alphabet Σ. To begin, set generation counter to 0 and initialise the
population of n = 100 individuals randomly.
Each generation, individuals are assessed by calculating the number of loci which
match the solution string. Thus, g1={Ruses of EngKgmmBnt} receives a tness f(g1) =
15, whilst g2={Rules of Engagement} receives the maximum tness f(g2) = 19. If the
solution string has not been found and the number of generations is less than gmax = 1000,
then the population is allowed to reproduce. Using tness proportionate selection (biased
selection favouring high scoring individuals, see section 2.2.4), offspring are created using
1-point sexual crossover (crossover location chosen randomly, see section 2.2.3.2) and
point mutation (section 2.2.3.1).
Let p1={Rules of EngaJememt} (tness 17), and p2={NulesYof Engagement} (tness
17), be chosen to reproduce. The crossover point is chosen at locus 12. Hence, {Rules
of Eng} is copied from parent p1 and {agement} is copied from parent p2. Occurring at
each locus with probability pm = 0.02, mutation affects only locus 17, ipping allele e
to a randomly chosen alternative, B, thus resulting in the nal offspring h={Rules of
EngagemBnt} (tness 18).
Once 100 offspring are generated the parent population is replaced. The generation
counter is incremented and the assessment phase is repeated.
Results
Figure 2.1 displays the result of one evolutionary run. Each time a new individual is
discovered, capable of outperformingcontaining more correct lociall previous indi-
3This example is functionally equivalent to Dawkins’ (1986) evolution of the sentence “Methinks it is a
weasel”.
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viduals, its genotype, tness score and generation of rst discovery are output. After just
11 generations a solution appears with more than half of all loci correct. The run com-
pletes when an optimal solution evolves at generation 44; having searched a total of 4500
individuals: very few in comparison to the expected number of iterations a blind search is
expected to take, on average.
Gen    Score   Best Genotype (So Far)

000      4      RVFIYLrgJbnICgDmBKT

002      5      RVFIYLrgJbnICgDmBKt

004      6      jqldbDoYnbnICgDmBKt

005      7      LursMofuEIDaVTRfYt

006      8      Ryue LEezEngCgDmBnS

007      9      RVFxoLofJbngxgemqqt

011     11      RulesmoQ EXCgDmsnZ

013     12      RulesYCh EnhCgDmwnt

017     14      RulesYof EngCgeYsnZ

028     15      Ruses of EngKgmmBnt

029     16      NulesYof EngaJement

030     17      RulesYof EngaJement

042     18      Rules of EngagemBnt

044     19      Rules of Engagement

Figure 2.1: Results from a simple GA. Initially randomised, individuals are encouraged to
evolve towards the solution genotype Rules of Engagement. Each new best individual
is output. After just 44 generations an optimal solution is discovered.
2.2.3 Modes of Variation
2.2.3.1 Mutation
The second law of thermodynamics states that any copying system will suffer occasional
errors. Thus, in biological systems, mutation is an unavoidable consequence of the uni-
verse we inhabit.4 However, though mutations are often considered deleterious, the evo-
lutionary process is fundamentally reliant upon them as a source of variation.
4Error-checking mechanisms, commonly found in biology, vastly reduce the probability of mutation.
However, such mechanisms are energy expensive. Thus, no copying mechanism is perfectly error free.
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The rate of mutation, pm, is an important factor in evolution. If pm is too high, then
benecial adaptations are likely to be lost; for each benecial gene, there is a probability
pm that it will be replaced by a random, often deleterious, alternative. However, if pm is
too low then there is little chance of any gene mutating, whether benecial or not. As
such, relatively few new alleles are able to enter the gene-pool, thus reducing the level
of variation within the population. As alleles are shufed through sexual recombination
(or reproduced unchanged in asexual systems), it is likely that the population will begin to
converge upon one genetic clone. Although neither situation is acceptable for success-
ful evolution, whilst some variation is necessary, less is usually better. Accordingly, the
rate of mutation is often kept low. Following biological systems as a guiding heuristic,
GAs often utilise a mutation rate of approximately one expected mutation per offspring,
pm =
1
l
.
The most frequently used mutation in the GA community is the point mutation. In
general, given a discrete genetic alphabet, Σ, containing σ characters, when mutation oc-
curs at a particular locus, the current allele is exchanged for a randomly selected allele
α ∈ Σ. If an ordering is imposed upon Σ, mutations may move either up or down the
alphabet. Thus, if Σ = {0 < 1 < 2 < . . . < 9} then allele 3, say, may mutate to either
2 or 4. If a GA is encoded with continuous real-values, mutations generally occur by
adding a random value (drawn from a gaussian distribution with mean 0) to the current
value. However, susceptible to bias, such mutations may drive the evolving population
into particular regions of space (see, e.g., Bullock, 1999, 2001). More unusual encod-
ings (such as nite state machines) require more specialised forms of mutation (see, for
example, Koza, 1993; Gruau, 1995).
Inspired by biological systems, more complicated forms of mutation may also be used
within a GA. Translation mutations copy a chunk of genotype from one location to an-
other, whilst others, such as Holland’s (1975) inversion operator, swap the characters
found at two, or more, locations. Finally, given a variable-length encoding, mutation may
either increase or decrease the length of genotype.
2.2.3.2 Recombination
Genetic recombination, or crossover, is a mechanism for producing new offspring geno-
types through the combination of two parent genotypes in a sexual GA population. Re-
combination accelerates the transfer of genetic information throughout a population and
reduces the similarity between a parent and its offspring; in biology, one theory (of many)
suggests that sexual recombination may have evolved to combat the effects of parasitism
(as offspring are likely to enter an environment in which antagonistic parasites have
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specically adapted to their parents, genetically variable offspring that are not identi-
cal to parents may have a higher resistance to parasites, Hamilton, 1980), whilst another
suggests that a changing environment is responsible (Waxman & Peck, 1999).
Crossover generally comes in three avours. To illustrate these, let us assume that
parents p1 = {111111} and p2 = {000000}, each of length l = 6 are selected for recom-
bination.
Single-point. Randomly choose crossover position c such that 0 < c ≤ l = 6. Form new
(offspring) genotype by copying the genotype of p1 from loci 1 to c inclusive, then
subsequent loci copied from p2. For example, if c = 3, then offspring= {111000}.
Multi-point. Randomly choose n crossover positions such that 0 < c1 < ci < cn ≤ l =
6, then copy p1 from loci 1 to c1 inclusive, p2 from c1 + 1 to c2 inclusive, p1 from
c2 + 1 to c3 inclusive, etc. For example, suppose n = 2 with c1 = 2 and c2 = 5,
then offspring = {110001}.
Uniform. For each locus, chose with equal probability whether the copied character will
be from p1 or p2. For example, assume loci 2, 5, 6 copied from p1 and loci 1, 3, 4
copied from p2, then offspring = {010011}.
Importantly, it should be noticed that recombination is a process for mixing genetic
information within a population; it is not a mechanism for creating new genetic material.
Without mutation, a sexual population will eventually become fully converged upon one
genotype. At such times recombination becomes redundant (see, for example, Harvey,
1993).
2.2.4 Assessment and Selection
Each generation, it is necessary to assess the tness or success of each individual
within the GA population in order to determine which should contribute more, or fewer,
offspring to the following generation. Fitness assessment must determine which individ-
ual solutions are better than others in terms of the designated problem at hand. As
such, the assessment function chosen is strongly linked to each particular problem and is
very task-specic. However, some important considerations always apply. Assessment
should not demand excessive computation and should discriminate between individuals
throughout the entire evolutionary run, irrespective of whether the population consists of
relatively poor, moderate or high tness individuals.
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Following assessment, individuals are selected to reproduce. Based upon the tness
assigned to each individual, the following methods of selection are commonly used within
the GA community.
Fitness proportionate selection. Originally used by Holland (1975), tness proportion-
ate selection directly maps an individual’s tness with the number of offspring that
individual will be expected to produce. In similar fashion to standard evolutionary
biology models, Holland’s expected number of offspring is calculated by dividing
the tness of an individual by the average tness within the population. Thus if
f(x) = 3 and average population tness f(x¯) = 1.5, then individual x would be
expected, on average, to produce 2 offspring. This procedure maintains constant
population size.5
Fitness proportionate selection is most often implemented using the roulette wheel
approach. Each individual is allocated a slice of the wheel, with size proportional
to tness. The wheel is then spun and whichever slice the pointer lands upon, that
individual is chosen to breed. This is repeated n times, where n is the size of the
population.
Rank-based selection. Rank-based selection (e.g., see Baker, 1985) was introduced in
order to avoid premature convergence within a population. As individuals become
similar, the absolute difference in tness falls, leaving proportionate selection strug-
gling to discriminate. If the best individuals only expect 0.001 more offspring than
the average individual, then clearly, being best no longer holds signicance (assum-
ing population size is not many orders of magnitude greater than 1000).
Rank-based selection avoids the problem of convergence faced by tness propor-
tionate selection by calculating the expected number of offspring through an in-
dividual’s tness ranking within a population, rather than absolute tness score.
Thus, no matter what the difference between the best individual and the worst, the
expected number of offspring of each never varies. In this way, selection pressure
(the advantage gained from being a t member of the population) remains constant
throughout a run.
5Let n = current population size, n′ = new population size, f(x¯) = mean population fitness and∑
f(x) = sum of population fitness, then
n′ =
∑ f(x)
f(x¯)
=
∑
f(x)
f(x¯)
=
∑
f(x)∑
f(x)
n
= n
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Tournament Selection. Avoiding the necessity to sort a population into ranked order,
tournament selection is a computationally efcient way of implementing rank-based
selection. Two individuals are chosen at random from the population. A random
value r is chosen between 0 and 1. If r ≤ k, where k = 0.75 say, then the ttest
individual is chosen to reproduce, else the less t individual is chosen. Both are
then replaced back into the original population.
Throughout this thesis, tournament selection will generally be used, however, the
method employed varies somewhat from that described above. Tournaments con-
taining t individuals are chosen, with the ttest individual always selected to repro-
duce (k = 1). This approach forces much stronger selection pressure, allowing the
ttest individuals more expected offspring, whilst weaker members of the popula-
tion become less likely to reproduce.
Elitism. First used by De Jong (1975), elitism is a technique to be used in conjunction
with either tness proportionate, rank-based, or tournament selection. Designed
to prevent the destruction of successful genotypes during reproduction, elitism en-
sures that the best q individuals of each generation are copied unchanged into the
following generation. As a result, good adaptations can only be displaced by better
adaptations; they cannot be lost by chance. Though elitism often performs well in
optimisation, it is a very unnatural addition to the GA.
Steady-State. Genetic algorithms generally follow the generational model described in
section 2.2.1. However, alternative steady-state models are not uncommon. Rather
than have a xed population size, with new individuals replacing old individuals
each generation, a steady-state GA places new offspring into the same population as
their parents. This is equivalent to having generational overlap, or elitism, the frac-
tion of which has been termed the generation gap (De Jong, 1975). Steady-state
models are sometimes preferred when modelling natural systems if such genera-
tional overlap is more realistic. Considering human populations, it is common for
grandparents and grandchildren to co-exist. When modelling human social inter-
actions, therefore, a steady-state approach would be the obvious choice. However,
apart from the generation gap, steady-state selection comprises much the same fea-
tures as generational selection.
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2.3 Realism
Throughout this thesis, an implicit concern reoccurs; as an analogue of natural evolution,
just how realistic is the standard GA? The relevance of this question, however, varies
greatly depending upon a GA’s particular usage; whilst realism may, on occasion, be
of utmost importance, at other times it becomes no more than a distraction. As a pre-
emptive measure to alleviate possible confusion, this section attempts to address the issue
of realism in GAs (applicable to EAs in general), specically commenting upon why and
when realism is important. In conjunction, some unrealistic, yet intrinsic, aspects of the
standard GA are outlined.
Necessarily, successful scientic theories must, to some degree, realistically char-
acterize nature. However, it is not necessary for a theory to accurately copy a natu-
ral system; indeed, through the introduction of simplifying assumptions, no theoretical
model (by denition) entirely replicates reality. Determined by the encompassing scien-
tic paradigmunderpinning which aspects of reality should be incorporated and which
are unimportantonly the pertinent aspects of reality are reected in a theory.
For example, consider Newton’s classical theory of gravitation. According to Newton,
when modelling gravity, the pertinent aspects of a system are the relative mass and loca-
tion of objects. An object’s colour, for instance, is irrelevant. As such, under the paradigm
of Newtonian gravitation, a realistic model would accurately reect the mass and location
of objects whilst ignoring other extraneous variables such as colour, roughness, edibility,
etc. The addition of colour, whilst more accurately copying nature, would not improve
(when considering classical theory) the accuracy of the model in predicting future system
states. In general, a scientic model should not attempt to copy nature per se, but should
rather attempt to capture the theoretical ideas that have been derived from nature.
Evolutionary algorithms are generally utilised for one of two specic purposes; ei-
ther the modelling of natural systems, or as an engineering tool for solving complex
search problems (optimisation). Reected in the details of an EA’s construction, each
task requires a very different approach. Whilst modelling necessitates a certain amount of
realismdetermined by the parts of a system that theory predicts will affect evolution
optimisation yields no such constraint upon algorithm design.6 Such antagonistic require-
ments have directed the development of EAs throughout their history.
Holland’s original aim for the genetic algorithm was to develop a mathematical
framework which makes it possible to extract and generalize critical factors of the bi-
ological processes (Holland, 1992, original Preface). Holland clearly understood that
6Although optimisation is less constrained by theory, the underlying theoretical assumption that evolu-
tion is in some sense an “optimisation process” is implicit.
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when modelling a biological system it is important that the simulation, where evolution-
ary theory deems relevant, accurately reects the natural system. For instance, when
modelling multiple demes within a population, the rate of migration should be similar to
the biological migration rate. Unrealistic assumptions in a model may lead to artefactual
results, thus rendering the simulation invalid.
Affording micro-interactions between agents as well as simulation complexity, re-
peated trials and control of variables, GAs offer a powerful research mechanism for evo-
lutionary biologists. Though the biological community has been slow to embrace evolu-
tionary simulation models, some notable successes have taken place, including pioneering
work on the Baldwin Effect (Hinton & Nowlan, 1987), measuring evolutionary adapta-
tions (Bedau, 1996), and modelling of sexual selection and ecosystems (see Mitchell,
1996).
Though Holland strove for a framework with which to model the evolutionary pro-
cess, he was also aware of the GA’s potential applicability to parameter optimisation
(rst realised by De Jong, 1975). Now widely applied, GAs have achieved successful
implementation in a diverse set of problem domains, including evolving computer (Lisp)
programs, evolving cellular automata to perform computations, predicting dynamical sys-
tems and protein structures, evolving neural networks, and evolving learning rules (see,
e.g., Goldberg, 1989; Davis, 1991; Mitchell, 1996).
In contrast to evolutionary modelling, when applying evolutionary algorithms to prob-
lem solving, the importance of realism is subtly different. As the goal of optimisation is
to produce adequate solutions to a problem in reasonable time, rather than accurately
model a natural system, it is irrelevant whether an optimisation algorithm accurately re-
ects any natural system or not. However, it is important that EAs, when used for optimi-
sation, realistically capture the fundamental essence of evolutionary theory.
Though realism may not be a prerequisite for optimisation, it is quite possible for
natural systems to inspire the innovative design of EAs (clearly demonstrated by the fact
that evolutionary algorithms are used for optimisation at all). As a source of novel ideas,
nature plays an important role in articial evolution for optimisation.
Yet, one must be careful not to fall into the trap of assuming that realistic algorithms
will necessarily improve performance. Just because nature is a specic way does not im-
ply that an abstraction of nature will be good for optimisation. Though nature may inspire,
realistic additions to an algorithm should be discarded if no improvement in performance
can be proven. To assume that the natural way is the best waythat because we see it
around us it must be optimalis to fall into the naturalistic fallacy (Moore, 1903). It is
impossible to deduce a normative statement from a factual state; just because something
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is a particular way does not mean that it ought to be that way. Hence, when applied to
optimisation, an evolutionary algorithm should only be adapted to improve performance
and not to increase realism for its own sake.
2.3.1 Fixed Population Size
In the standard generational GA, one underlying assumption is that of xed popula-
tion size; each generation, the current population is substituted for one of identical size.
Computationally, this assumption makes perfect sense, removing the necessity to accom-
modate a uctuating population whilst avoiding catastrophes, such as extinction events,
which may prematurely terminate a run. However, by xing population size, a genetic
algorithm loses much realism; population dynamics play an integral role in evolutionary
biology. As a result, some evolutionary phenomena, such as disengagement (or extinc-
tion), vary between articial and natural systems.7
2.3.2 Genotype-Phenotype Mapping
In nature, there exists a clear separation between the genotype (the underlying genetic
encoding) and phenotype (all the effects of a gene upon the world)8 of biological or-
ganisms. The genetic structure of an organism largely determines phenotypic structure,
however, embryological and environmental factors also play a key role, resulting in a
highly non-linear mapping from genotype to phenotype.
During the evolutionary synthesis (see section 1.3.5.1) it became generally accepted
that the inuence between genotype and phenotype runs in one direction only. Whilst
a change in genotype is likely to induce some (perhaps unpredictable) phenotypic trait,
changes in phenotype do not affect the underlying genotype. As such, the genotype-
phenotype mapping allows life-time adaptations and learning whilst preserving the ge-
netic structure to be passed on unchanged to progeny. In conjunction, deleterious changes
to the phenotype, such as the loss of a limb, are not passed to offspring.
In contrast to natural systems, the standard genetic algorithm generally blurs the re-
lationship between genotype and phenotype. For simplicity, it is often assumed that one
7Such disparities between phenomena in natural and artificial systems is a recurring theme throughout
this thesis.
8It is useful to consider Dawkins’ definition of the extended phenotype: “As always, ‘effect’ of a gene
is understood as meaning in comparison with its alleles. The conventional phenotype is a special case in
which the effects are regarded as being confined to the individual body in which the gene sits. In practice it
is convenient to limit ‘extended phenotype’ to cases where the effects influence the survival chances of the
gene, positively or negatively” (Dawkins, 1982).
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directly encodes the other, i.e., genotype=phenotype.9 However, such a simplication de-
stroys the possibility of generative encodings, life-time adaptations and learning. Thus,
not only is realism lost, but the opportunity to apply these powerful mechanisms to opti-
misation and problem solving is also removed.10 To Holland’s (1992, Chapter 3) credit,
genotype-phenotype mappings are considered in his early work, with a discussion of
epistatic interactions between alleles leading to non-linear changes in phenotypic traits.
2.3.3 Static Environment
The general consensus since the days of Lamarck is that the world is not static (see section
1.3.2). However, this has not been widely reproduced in genetic algorithms. Though pop-
ulations constantly evolve within a genetic algorithm, the assessment function generally
does not; irrespective of conspecics, a particular individual will always achieve the same
tness score (assuming a deterministic tness function). Given that a GA’s assessment
function equates to the environment of an evolving population, this is perhaps unrealis-
tic. As natural populations evolve within an adapting environment, more realism could be
achieved by utilising a dynamic assessment function, whereby the tness of an individual
(not to be confused with reproductive success) is free to vary through time.
One may argue that a static environment can be considered accurate when modelling a
relatively short (in evolutionary terms) time period. However, given that a GA population
often evolves from some random conguration to one that contains highly specialised
individuals, the relative evolutionary timescale to achieve this progress in the biological
world undermines this argument; by the time such evolution would have occurred, the
world is likely to be very a different place.
Undeniably, by allowing a GA to evolve in a static environment, predictability and
interpretability each become a much easier task. Given that Holland’s initial intention
was to set up a rigorous mathematical framework for understanding biological evolution,
it is likely that simplicity was a primary factor in choosing the static model. However,
it is disappointing and a little surprising that early GA protagonists did not consider the
possibility of dynamic environments, especially given the surge in enthusiasm toward
coevolution around the time of Holland’s initial work (see section 1.3.5.3).
9This is not strictly true since a distinction between genotype and phenotype will always exist in some
sense. Irrespective of the complexity of the genotype-phenotype mapping, it is always true that the geno-
type alone is acted upon by the genetic operators of recombination and mutation, whilst the phenotype is
similarly subject to assessment and selection.
10Non-trivial genotype-phenotype mappings have appeared in more recent years, for example, in the
evolution of artificial neural networks (Beer & Gallagher, 1992), or the generative encodings of Hornby
and Pollack (2001). However, in no sense does any GA exhibit a mapping approaching the complexity of
biological systems.
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2.4 Summary
Developed by Holland (1975), the genetic algorithm is a versatile tool that can be used for
both optimisation and biological modelling. Though Holland’s GA was greatly inspired
by biological evolution, little attempt was made to incorporate coevolutionary ideas for
many years; a surprising fact considering the surge in interest in coevolution amongst
evolutionary biologists during this period. In the following chapter, coevolutionary algo-
rithms are treated in detail.
Chapter 3
Coevolutionary Computation
The coevolutionary perspective has profoundly affected the accepted understanding of the
natural world (chapter 1). Further, having become a subsidiary of evolutionary computing,
coevolutionary algorithms now present great potential as a tool for both problem-solving
and biological-modelling (chapter 2). However, it is still not entirely understood what
coevolution iswhat constitutes coevolution?
Highlighting the difculty of dening such a multi-faceted phenomenon, this chap-
ter introduces the variety of guises in which coevolution appears. A novel denition of
coevolution (to be used throughout this thesis) is then proposed. Using the concepts of
tness propensity and tness realization (Mills & Beatty, 1994), a hard distinction
between coevolution and non-coevolution is drawn. The expected advantages of utilising
coevolutionary (rather than non-coevolutionary, or standard evolutionary) techniques
for problem solving are discussed. A brief overview of historical successes illustrate
coevolution’s potential. Finally, problems regarding coevolution’s idiosyncrasies are de-
tailed: the chapter ends with a critique of the literature regarding previous attempts at
combating these problems.
3.1 Background
A major transition in the development of GAs occurred at the beginning of the 1990s when
a dynamic environment was rst introduced in the form of a coevolutionary host-parasite
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GA (Hillis, 1990). Having steadily risen in usage since Hillis’ pioneering work, coevolu-
tionary algorithms are now familiar practice in the eld of evolutionary computation and
offer two immediate advantages over standard evolutionary approaches.
Firstly, coevolution (such as the competitive framework used by Hillis) removes the
problem of dening a tness function with which to assess individuals. Let us consider
the standard evolutionary approach of the worked example shown in section 2.2.2. Given
the purposely simplistic nature of this example, the assessment function is trivial; the
tness of an individual equals the number of loci containing alleles that match that of the
model sentence Rules of Engagement. In more complicated scenarios, however, the
denition of an assessment function can be tricky, if not impossible; how to operationally
dene tennis ability or amusement, for example? Using competitive coevolution, it
is only necessary to be able to assess which of two individuals can beat the other. Thus,
setting up a simple pairwise competition between individuals sufces. In Hillis’ model,
the parasite lists (through competition with hosts) remove the necessity for dening an
assessment function for host networks.
Secondly, coevolution allows the potential for open-ended evolution; that is, evo-
lution that is not constrained to a xed optimum, such as biological evolution. Unlike
the worked example of section 2.2.2, or Hillis’ sorting networks, open-ended evolution
would be captured in a hypothetical domain whereby robot foxes and robot rabbits are
coevolved, with foxes attempting to pursue evading rabbits. Given a suitably rich envi-
ronment and strategy space that allows sophisticated behaviours to evolve, it would be the-
oretically possible for fox and rabbit strategies to continually become more sophisticated
in a seemingly endless fashion. This exciting potential of coevolutionary computation is
a signicant advantage over standard evolution.
In general, coevolutionary algorithms can be loosely categorised into two avours,
cooperative and competitive (or antagonistic) coevolution. Despite the considerable dis-
crepancy in methodology between the two, each offers a similar advantage over the
standard evolutionary approach.
Cooperative coevolutionary algorithms are often utilised in situations where a prob-
lem can be naturally decomposed into sub-components. Individuals represent such sub-
components and are assessed in a series of collaborations with other individuals in order
to form complete solutions (for example, Potter & De Jong, 2000; Watson & Pollack,
2000; Wiegand, Liles, & De Jong, 2001). Cooperative coevolutionary algorithms have
had success in a variety of domains, for example, manufacturing scheduling (Husbands
& Mill, 1991), function optimisation (Potter & De Jong, 1994), designing articial neural
networks (Potter & De Jong, 1995) and room painting (Puppala, Sen, & Gordin, 1998).
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Competitive coevolution either occurs within one population engaged in self-play, or
between multiple populations. Individuals represent complete solutions that are gradually
rened throughout an evolutionary run. Single population competitive coevolution has
been successfully applied to the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (Axelrod, 1984; Lindgren &
Nordahl, 1994), pursuit and evasion (Reynolds, 1994), and to nding robust game strate-
gies in, for example, Tic-Tac-Toe (Angeline & Pollack, 1993), backgammon (Pollack,
Blair, & Land, 1996) and Texas Hold’em Poker (Noble & Watson, 2001).
This thesis is primarily concerned with competitive coevolution between two popula-
tions; the simplest and most commonly used N -population competitive algorithm, with
inter-population assessment. Such competitive coevolutionary algorithms have been suc-
cessfully applied to discovering minimal-length sorting networks (Hillis, 1990; Juill·e,
1995), nding CA rules to solve the density classication task (Juill·e & Pollack, 1998b,
1998a), designing articial neural networks for robot control (Floreano & Nol, 1997a),
pursuit and evasion (Cliff & Miller, 1995), and the domains of 3-D Tic-Tac-Toe and Nim
(Rosin & Belew, 1997). For a more comprehensive list of successful coevolutionary ap-
plications refer to section 3.3.
3.2 Defining Coevolution
Often, the signicance of a rigorous denition of coevolution is overlooked. When ex-
clusively utilising coevolutionary algorithms for problem solving, a rigorous denition
may be largely perceived as irrelevantif it works, it works, no matter what you call it.
Thus, articial coevolution is sometimes considered more a subset of machine learning
than a realistic extension of biological coevolution.1 However, whilst this approach may
not inhibit problem solving, it is unlikely to produce insight into the general principles of
coevolution.
Without a strict denition, it becomes difcult to distinguish between what is and what
is not coevolution. Potentially, this can lead to a situation in which anything evolutionary
can be considered coevolutionary in some sense. Consequently, the term becomes moot.
As a preventative measure, this section endeavours to formulate a denition of coevolu-
tion that is consistent with both biological and articial systems, as generally described.
1Following his talk entitled “Beyond competition (& co-operation): A new principle for progress”—
presented on September 17, 2003, at the European Conference on Artificial Life, Dortmund, Germany—
Jordan Pollack appeared to support a similar view. When asked whether the work performed under his
supervision in the DEMO lab (Brandeis University, MA) should fall under the classification of coevolution,
Pollack replied that the biological definition is probably not entirely consistent with his work, concluding
that it may be more appropriately paralleled by the machine learning approach of self-play.
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It is hoped that a rigorous denition will allow greater knowledge transfer between evo-
lutionary biology and evolutionary computing: a potential benet to both elds.
3.2.1 The Standard Definition of Coevolution
Towards the end of the 1970s it become clear that without a universally accepted deni-
tion, coevolution was in danger of losing practical signicance. Having been manipulated
by various authors to t a multitude of disparate phenomena, the term coevolution be-
gan to encompass virtually all biological interactions. As such, the distinction between
coevolution and non-coevolution (or evolution in general) gradually disappeared.
The original, broad denition of the word coevolution, introduced by Ehrlich
and Raven. . . embraces all evolution resulting from biological interactions
(Stanley, Van Valkenburgh, & Steneck, 1983).
. . . adaptation to an effectively constant feature of the biotic environment does
not differ from adaptation to a constant feature of the abiotic environment.
Coevolution, too broadly dened, becomes equivalent to evolution (Futuyma
& Slatkin, 1983, introduction).
As a direct backlash, Janzen (1980) produced a short paper entitled When is it coevo-
lution? Explicitly designed to construct a strict denition, Janzen dismissed the common
misuse of coevolution as synonomous with interaction, symbiosis and mutualism.
Today, Janzen’s denition (in some form) is readily accepted by the majority of biologists.
‘Coevolution’ may be usefully dened as an evolutionary change in a trait
of the individuals in one population in response to a trait of the individuals
of a second population, followed by an evolutionary response by the second
population to the change in the rst . . . ‘Diffuse coevolution’ occurs when
either or both populations in the above denition are represented by an array
of populations that generate a selective pressure as a group (Janzen, 1980).
Janzen’s denition has been extended to include spatiality. Thompson’s geographic
mosaic theory considers local coevolutionary interactions on a background of geograph-
ically distributed species. As such, the geographic mosaic theory allows a diverse set of
interactions that are overlooked by Janzen’s denition. In particular, where Janzen speci-
es pairwise and diffuse interactions, Thompson is keen to acknowledge the multitude of
potential interactions that fall between these catchall denitions.
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[The] geographic view of interactions allows us to replace the catchall phrase
‘diffuse coevolution’ with more-specic, testable hypotheses on reciprocal
change among groups of species (Thompson, 1994, p2).
Thus, the generalisation of diffuse coevolution is replaced with the more specic con-
ceptualisation of a set of spatially distributed, locally interacting (and potentially over-
lapping) pairwise coevolutionary systems. Taken together, Janzen (1980) and Thompson
(1994) represent the standard denition of coevolution.
Unfortunately, whilst the standard denition effectively restricts the boundary of co-
evolution, it excludes interactions that many biologists would ideally like to consider (see
below). Indeed, Janzen’s strict coevolution is unlike the vast majority of interactions
found in nature. As such, his denition is often relaxed in order to encompass a greater
variety of interactions. The majority of denitions used by biologists, either implicitly or
explicitly, can be covered in this way (Futuyma & Slatkin, 1983, introduction).
In general, articial coevolution is classied either by vague notions of competitive
tness environments (for example, Hillis, 1990; Angeline & Pollack, 1993; Reynolds,
1994), or alternatively, as the simultaneous evolution of multiple populations with cou-
pled tness (e.g., Kauffman & Johnsen, 1991; Rosin & Belew, 1997; Nol & Floreano,
1998). However, nothing approaching the preciseness of Janzen’s denition exists for
articial coevolution; indeed, when a strict classication appears necessary, Janzen’s def-
inition is occasionally borrowed (e.g., Bullock, 1995). Yet, derived specically for bio-
logical coevolution, it should come as no surprise that Janzen’s denition fails to classify
synthetic coevolution sufciently.
3.2.2 The Coevolutionary Continuum
In this section, the standard denition of coevolution is repeatedly relaxed in order to
produce a continuum of coevolution, with strict coevolution at one end and strict non-
coevolution at the other (see gure 3.1). The standard denition with no relaxations is
situated at one extreme (far left, gure 3.1); relatively few such systems exist. Each time
the denition is relaxed, more systems are included. Once fully relaxed, systems ideally
considered non-coevolutionary become encompassed (far right, gure 3.1).
Using the standard denition of coevolution (section 3.2.1), a coevolutionary sys-
tem must adhere to Janzen’s strict requirements: there must be two populations, with
each reciprocally evolving specic adaptations and counter-adaptations in response to the
other. Utilising Thompson’s extension, coevolution can also come in the form of local
pairwise interactions between geographically distributed populations; with each popula-
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Figure 3.1: The coevolutionary continuum. By repeatedly relaxing Janzen’s (1980) deni-
tion, a continuum between strictly coevolutionary and strictly non-coevolutionary systems
is formed. Example systems are positioned as far left as possible; articial systems are
boxed. Once reciprocity is relaxed, systems are no longer considered coevolutionary (see
section 3.2.3). Refer to text for details.
tion potentially engaged in multiple (local) pairwise interactions throughout their spatial
range. Systems tting the standard denition of coevolution are classied strictly coevo-
lutionary. On the continuum of coevolution (gure 3.1), no system exists that is more
coevolutionary than these.
Strictly Coevolutionary
Given the rigorous requirements of the standard denition of coevolution, very few sys-
tems can be classied as strictly coevolutionary: only symbiosis and two-population
articial coevolution t comfortably.
Encompassing parasitism, commensalism and mutualism, symbiosis has been dened
as a condition in which organisms of different species live together in a state of mu-
tual inuence (Ehrman, 1983). The term symbiosis implies a period of ongoing in-
teractions (perhaps for an entire lifetime) between two organisms; unlike predator-prey,
plant-herbivore and competitive coevolution in which organisms only interact briey.
[The most intimate of the symbiotic associations] is endosymbiosis; in which
one of the organisms incorporates the otheran intricate co-habitation of two
species in which a symbiont exists in the cells of a host for at least a discrete
portion, if not all, of its partner’s life cycle (Ehrman, 1983).
Parasitism. A symbiotic relationship is parasitic if one species lives at the expense of
another. Batesian mimicry (Bates, 1862)where a palatable species mimics the
coloration of an unpalatable species in order to gain protection from predationis
a well documented example of parasitism and can be observed in many species of
buttery and snake. Whilst the mimic gains from the protection of coloration, the
model suffers from greater predation.
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Commensalism. If one species benets from a symbiotic association whilst the other is
neither harmed nor beneted, then commensalism has occurred. Having no effect
upon one species, commensalism can be difcult to prove. Most interactions have
some effect, however small. One example given in nature is the mutual grooming
or licking between termitophilous beetles and termites; the beetles having become
strongly dependent on the microclimate and food sources provided by the termite
nest. This relationship is regarded as commensal rather than mutualistic because
termitophiles are relatively rare, with many nests lacking them entirely (Mitter &
Brooks, 1983).
Mutualism. If both species benet from association, then symbiosis is mutualistic. Like
parasitism, mutualism is much more pervasive than commensalism, and can often
result in highly specialised adaptations. A convincing example of mutualism can
be found in lichens, which consist of two organisms, an alga (the phycobiont) and
a fungus (the mycobiont), in close association.
Lichens can be found in virtually all terrestrial habitats from the polar
regions to the tropics [often in] habitats where algae and fungi would
nd difculty in surviving alone. (Barrett, 1983).
Endosymbiosis. The intimate nature of endosymbiosis can produce such specialised
adaptations that species can eventually merge into one lineage. It has been pos-
tulated that eukaryotes (organisms with nucleated cells) emerged through the incor-
poration of free-living prokaryotes (now represented by mitochondria and chloro-
plasts) by a host cell (Margulis, 1970). In evolutionary terms, this example of
endosymbiosis is immensely important (previously mentioned in section 1.3.1).
Relaxing Inter-Specificity
Strict coevolution demands that coevolving traits must lie within different populations,
species, or reproductively isolated groups. Relaxing interspecicity allows traits to coe-
volve within one species, or population, and thus includes coevolution between the sexes
(sexual selection), parent-offspring conict, the sub-organismic coevolution of genes (e.g.,
meiotic drive), and single-population articial coevolution through self-play.
Sexual selection. Sexual selection, or coevolution of the sexes, occurs between traits
that are expressed either in females or males, but never both. While male and
female traits are represented on the same genome, they are never simultaneously
expressed: sexual dimorphism results. The classic example of sexual selection
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is the peacocks tail. Displaying sexual quality, the peacocks exuberant tail has
coevolved in response to female mate preference.
Parent-offspring conflict. A more counter-intuitive example of intra-specic coevolu-
tion is parent-offspring conict (see Parker & Macnair, 1979; Parker, 1979). Here,
offspring coevolve antagonistically with parents; demanding more investment than
parents can afford give. In response, parents counter-act offspring by suppressing
their demand. Since parent and offspring traits are never expressed simultane-
ously, coevolution can occur.
Sub-organismic coevolution. Biological systems (and to some extent, the articial sys-
tems that are based upon them) are inherently hierarchical: genes determine protein
structures which in turn form cells; a collection of cells make up an organism; re-
lated organisms form a family or kin group and the collection of all kin groups make
up a species. Due to the complexity of interactions between each layer, it is virtu-
ally impossible to consider one in isolation without losing vital information. Thus,
whilst evolution has (at some time) been said to act either at the level of the gene,
the individual, kin, social group and species, none of these are exclusively correct.
In some respect, evolution acts at all levels.
Below the level of the individual, the genetic replicators have been considered the
fundamental unit of selection (see Dawkins, 1976, 1982). However, genes are as-
sessed not directly, but via the phenotype of the individual (or vehicle in Dawkin’s
terminology) that they inhabit. Given the complex phenomena of dominance (one
of a pair of heterozygous alleles suppresses the expression of the other), pleiotropy
(one allele affects multiple phenotypic traits) and epistasis (loci interact such that
one may mask the effect of another), at the level of the genes, cooperation, com-
petition, and antagonism abounds. To be successful, an allele must be able to
out-compete alleles challenging for the same loci whilst cooperating with others.
Hence, whilst a system may appear evolutionary at the level of the individual, from
a genetic perspective the interaction of alleles may be better considered coevolu-
tionary.
Empirical evidence suggests that genetic evolution can occur without reliance on
phenotypic testing; hence, purely selsh genes that impart no phenotypic advan-
tage can thrive. Meiotic drive genes are one such example. During normal meio-
sis a haploid gamete is produced through the unbiased segregation of the diploid
chromosome; hence, each allele is transmitted with 50% probability. Meiotic drive
genes alter this process such that there is excess transmission of one allele over its
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alternative form of heterozygote. Thus, meiotic drive genes that favour their own
transmission can successfully propagate without necessarily beneting the pheno-
type of the organism they inhabit.
In meiotic drive, there is selection for a particular gene, but possessing
that gene need not be a causal factor in the survival and reproduction
of organisms. Here is genic selection without an organismic benchmark
(Sober, 1984).
Relaxing Specificity
Relaxing specicityenabling one population, or trait, to coevolve with a suite of sev-
eral othersallows diffuse coevolution (a term rst used by Gilbert & Ehrlich, 1975).
Diffuse coevolution covers the majority of predator-prey, plant-herbivore and competi-
tive interactions observed in nature. In addition, the evolution of economies and multi-
population (usually co-operative) articial coevolution are both encompassed once speci-
city is relaxed.
Predator-prey and plant-herbivore. Perhaps the most familiar coevolutionary interac-
tions are those of predator-prey and plant-herbivores; in which an asymmetric re-
lationship exists such that one species feeds upon another. These interactions are
often non-specicthere may be several species involved. Lions of the Serengeti,
for example, prey not only upon wildebeest, but also zebra, buffalo, giraffe, etc.,
and hence coevolve in response to the adaptations of each. However, predator-
prey and plant-herbivore interactions are often more specic (involve fewer species)
than competitive coevolutionary interactions in which entire ecosystems may be in-
volved. Some detailed studies into the specic interactions between predators and
prey of two species have been conducted; for example the coevolution of chemi-
cal cues (for predator detection) and foraging behaviour (ambush) between noctur-
nal, rock-dwelling, velvet geckos and elapid snakes. To reduce scent distribution,
snakes remain sedentary in rock crevices for days or weeks, waiting to ambush
geckos (Downes & Shine, 1998).
Competitive coevolution. In the words of Futuyma (1979, p455), two species may com-
pete if both use at least some of the same resources. Consequently, competition in
nature is ubiquitous, and the resulting literature is extensive.
The modern literature on competitive coevolution began with Lack’s (1947) work
on a genus of primarily ground-feeding nches in the Gal·apagos islandsDarwin’s
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nchesand remains a prime example of character displacement.2 Lack observed
that on islands inhabited by only one species of this genus, bill depth is approxi-
mately 10mm. However, if two (or more) species inhabit an island, the smallest bill
depth is approximately 8mm and the next smallest 12mm; the 10mm form does not
exist. Thus, with bill depth presumed to be related to the size and thickness of the
seeds a nch eats, these results suggest that, as a direct consequence of evolutionary
competition, the species are utilising different resources (see Roughgarden, 1983a).
In many competitive coevolutionary systems, it is likely that multiple species are
interacting.
Economic evolution. Like biological systems, economies evolve as organizations learn,
adapt and innovate. The global economy can be modelled as a coevolutionary sys-
tem containing a suite of national economies, each reciprocally evolving in response
to adaptations in the others. In the same way, each national economy can also
be considered a diffuse coevolutionary system, with multiple coevolving orga-
nizations; each an economy in its own right. The multiple-hierarchical levels of
coevolution observable in the global economy is reminiscent of that observed in
biological systems (refer to sub-organismic coevolution, above).
Relaxing Simultaneity
The simultaneity constraint requires that both populations or traits evolve at the same
time; there should be no temporal gaps between evolution and response. By relaxing
simultaneity, long periods of stasis can occur. Given that specicity is also relaxed, multi-
lineage coevolutiona discrete series of adaptations and counter-adaptations between
unrelated species inhabiting a similar nichebecomes coevolution. Arguably, language
evolution falls into this category.
Multi-lineage coevolution. Multi-lineage coevolution describes a discrete series of evo-
lutionary adaptations and counter-adaptations each occurring in an unrelated species.
For example, today’s plant defences may have evolved in response to insects from
the Cretaceous period. However, the feeding habits of many of today’s insects may
have evolved much more recently (Futuyma & Slatkin, 1983, introduction). Hence,
whilst plant defences and insect feeding habits may have coevolved as a series
of responses, modern and Cretaceous insects may not be of one lineagemodern
2Competition between species may produce, at places where their ranges overlap, a displacement in
the characters of each species from those of the other species. Such a phenomenon—termed “character
displacement” (Brown & Wilson, 1956)—is likely to bring an end to the competitive interaction between
species, with each diversifying into a separate niche devoid of competition.
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insects are not necessarily direct ancestors of the Cretaceous insects that fed on the
same plants. As such, the coevolutionary sequence of adaptation and response is
not simultaneous; a long period of stasis occurred during the intervening period be-
tween the extinction (or shift in feeding behaviour) of Cretaceous insects, and the
evolution of modern insect counter-adaptations.
Language evolution. Continually mutating, speciating, and eventually becoming extinct,
it is clear that languages evolve. Languages adapt in response to other languages
they come into contact with (historically, via the movement of people). Some words
and grammatical forms are adopted, some are lost and others are mutated: poten-
tially, one language may drive the other extinct. However, such coevolution is not
continuous. Historically, languages compete during the invasion and occupation of
one group by another. Once occupation has ended, languages evolve in relative
isolation until another invasion occurs. Such coevolution is nonsimultaneous and
potentially multi-lineage. With increasing globalisation, however, the dynamics of
language evolution have changed dramatically since the industrial revolution.
Relaxing Reciprocity
Reciprocity demands that both traits evolve; it is not sufcient for only one trait to evolve
in response to the other. For example, reciprocity discounts evolutionary adaptations to
static abiotic features of the environment (such as altitude, or temperature), since these
features do not counter-adapt in response. Relaxing reciprocity allows short-term coevo-
lution in which one trait, or population, has not had time to reciprocally evolve. For ex-
ample, consider Batesian mimicry. Over a short time-period, whilst the mimic may begin
to converge upon the model, it is possible for the model to be unresponsiveselection
pressures may not be strong enough to produce an adequate counter-adaptation in the
given time-frame. Standard one-population articial evolutionindividuals assessed
against a non-evolving tness function is considered coevolutionary once reciprocity is
relaxed.
Relaxing Evolutionary
The coevolutionary continuum is completed once the standard denition of coevolution
is fully relaxed, so as to include non-evolutionary systems. Included in the classication
strictly non-coevolutionary are non-evolutionary complex systems, such as the weather.
Whilst weather systems display interesting dynamics and can be modelling using pop-
ulations of local interactions, they do not evolve in any biological sense. There is
neither competition for resources, nor any analogue of mutation, selection, or lineage.
Classifying such systems as coevolutionary is clearly absurd.
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To successfully categorize coevolution in a meaningful way, the coevolutionary con-
tinuum must be appropriately partitioned.
3.2.3 When is it not Coevolution?
By repeatedly relaxing the standard denition of coevolution, a coevolutionary continuum
is created (gure 3.1). With no relaxations, only tightly coupled pairwise interactions,
such as symbiosis, are included. However, when fully relaxed, every complex system is
included, whether evolutionary or not! Clearly, any workable denition of coevolution
must fall somewhere between these two extremes. But where?
Considering articial evolutionary systems, it is important for standard evolution to
be distinguished from articial coevolution (single-pop, 2-pop, or multi-pop). This sug-
gests that, in general, reciprocity should not be relaxed. By maintaining reciprocity (and
thus also evolutionary), non-evolutionary complex systems become non-coevolutionary.
Also, coevolution in general becomes non-coevolution over time-scales so short that pop-
ulations are unable to make evolutionary responses; and thus more closely resemble fea-
tures of the abiotic environment.
If simultaneity is required, then multi-lineage coevolution becomes non-coevolution.
From the perspective of evolutionary computation, the requirement of simultaneity has no
effect upon the classication of articial systems. As such, from the perspective of EC,
simultaneity is irrelevant.
If specicity is required, then diffuse coevolutionincluding multi-population ar-
ticial coevolution, often used in co-operative coevolutionary systemsbecomes non-
coevolutionary. In addition, the biological interactions of predators and prey, plants and
herbivores, and competitive coevolution in general, each become non-coevolutionary.
This is not ideal. Nor are further requirements of specicity and inter-specicity.
Therefore, from the perspective of evolutionary computation, to classify not coevo-
lution, the continuum should be partitioned to the left of reciprocity (highlighted on g-
ure 3.1 by the dotted regions). Throughout this thesis, systems to the left of the boundary
shall be considered coevolutionary and those to the right non-coevolutionary. Hence,
if an evolving population is not adapting in response to a reciprocally evolving population,
then the evolutionary system is not coevolutionary.
In section 3.2.5 this informal distinction is formalised via a new denition of coevo-
lution. First, tness propensity and tness realization must be introduced.
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3.2.4 Fitness Propensity and Fitness Realization
Survival of the Fittest: Rejecting the Charge of Circularity
Paradoxically, tness is a central concept in evolutionary theory and yet it is surprisingly
vague. Often, a shorthand interpretationequating tness with reproductive success
is utilised to avoid the challenging formulation of a consistent denition. Whilst this
approach is acceptable in many circumstances, confusion prevails. Consequently, debate
over the tautological nature of the phrase survival of the ttestthose best at surviving
are the ones who survivehas raged for well over a century.3
Attacking the traditional denition of tness, Mills and Beatty (1994) reject the
charge of circularity by suggesting that the simplied use of tness as a post hoc mea-
sure of reproductive success is the source of confusion. Clearly, any such denition is
purely descriptive; not explanatory. In response, Mills and Beatty (1994) equate t-
ness with the ability of an individual to survive and reproduce in a given environmenta
propensity analysis of tness that is non-circular.
We believe that the confusion involves a misidentication of the post facto
survival and reproductive success of an organism with the ability of an or-
ganism to survive and reproduce. We believe that tness refers to the abil-
ity . . . Thus, we suggest that tness be regarded as a complex dispositional
property of organisms. Roughly speaking, the tness of an organism is its
propensity to survive and reproduce in a particularly specied environment
and population . . . In general, we want to rule out the occurrence of any en-
vironmental conditions which separate successful from unsuccessful repro-
ducers without regard to physical differences between them (Mills & Beatty,
1994).
Consider identical twins, A and B. Imagine both live in the same local environ-
ment and interact with the same conspecics. Each leads a similar existence until one
stormy day a chance lightning strike kills (a still immature) twin A. Twin B, however, is
unharmed in the storm and goes on to lead a successful life, eventually siring 10 grand-
children. Under the traditional denition of tness, twin B is considered far tter than
twin A. However, any workable denition must surely equate them: if genetic clones
vary in tness, then what exactly does it tell us? The approach of Mills and Beatty (1994)
3First introduced by Herbert Spencer (1864, p444-445), the term “survival of the fittest” is superficially
circular when fitness is defined purely in terms of survivability and reproductive success. To attribute type
A as fitter than type B is purely to say that type A on average leaves more offspring than type B. However,
this cannot be explained by the difference in fitness between A and B, since fitness is defined in terms of
reproductive success; i.e., after the event (see Mills & Beatty, 1994).
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circumvents this problem. As identical twins, A and B share an equal tness ability, or
propensity to survive and reproduce in their particular environment. The chance death
of A in immaturity does not change this. Irrespective of the eventual outcome, both twins
(if placed in the same environment and population) begin with equal reproductive poten-
tial.
Thus, using the dispositional tness of Mills and Beatty (1994), survival of the
ttest can be more accurately rephrased as genes with the greatest propensity to survive
and reproduce in the current environment are those most likely to propagate. The charge
of circularity is rejected.
Propensity and Realization
Continuing the reasoning of Mills and Beatty (1994), let us dissect tness into two parts:
tness propensity (fP ), the complex dispositional property of an organism to survive
and reproduce in a given environment; and tness realization (fR), the actual reproduc-
tive success of an organism, calculated post facto.4 Then, fP (x) is the expected repro-
ductive success of x, determined prior to the event, and fR(x) is the actual reproductive
success of x, determined after the event.
With two measures of tness, it becomes possible to account for contingency. Con-
sider identical twins A and B once again. If placed in the same environment, each has
identical tness propensity fP . Any variation in tness realization fRthe actual repro-
ductive success of each twinmust be a result of contingent events such as lightning
strikes.
In articial evolutionary systems, fP (x) directly equates to the tness score at-
tributed to x following assessment. Each generation, the probability of reproduction is a
monotonically increasing function of tness (refer to 2.2.1). Hence, the tness score of
x is the propensity to reproduce, fP (x). In contrast, fR is calculated by the actual number
of offspring; determined by the (deliberately) stochastic process of selection. Articial
twins A and B, if placed in the same environment, have identical tness propensity,
fP (A) = fP (B). The stochastic nature of selection, however, makes it possible (indeed
probable) that fR(A) 6= fR(B). Articial lightning strikes and other contingent phe-
nomena occur in the selection phase of articial evolution. Since fP is directly observ-
able in articial systems, using the values of fP (x) and fR(x), it is possible to ascertain
whether individual x underachieved or not. In biological systems, this is a much harder
proposition.
4Given Hamilton’s (1964) concept of inclusive fitness, it is perhaps more correct to talk in terms of
genes rather than individuals. Refer to section 1.3.5.2.
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f  (x)P
f  (x)R varies with make up of Pf  (x)R
Notation Description
individual x in environment E
individual x in population P
Fitness ``realization'' of
Fitness ``propensity'' of
Evolution Coevolution
E reciprocally evolvesE fixed
Figure 3.2: Fitness propensity and tness realization in articial systems. In both evo-
lutionary and coevolutionary systems, fR(x) varies depending upon the make up of the
population x is in. However, fP (x) only varies under coevolution. In standard evolution-
ary systems the effective environment of x is xed.
Evolution and Coevolution
In articial systems, tness propensity and tness realization can be used to distin-
guish evolution from coevolution (refer to gure 3.2). fP (x) denotes the propensity of
individual x to survive and reproduce in a particular effective environment E. In arti-
cial evolutionary systems, environment E is determined by the assessment functionthe
process used to calculate the tness score of individuals. Let f TrP (x) represent the (per-
haps unknowable) true tness propensity value of x, given E.
In standard evolutionary systems, E is xedthe assessment of individuals does
not vary through time. Thus, for deterministic assessment, fP (x) = fTrP (x). However, if
assessment is probabilistic, fP (x) is distributed with mean fTrP (x). In articial evolution,
variation in fP (x) is a direct result of stochasticity in the assessment function E. Since E
does not vary, fTrP (x)the true tness propensity of individual x in effective environment
Eis xed for all time.
Contrastingly, in coevolutionary systems, E does varythe assessment function re-
ciprocally adapts in response to adaptations in P , the evolving population. As E varies,
so too does fTrP (x). Thus, if fTrP (x) varies with respect to a reciprocally evolving E, one
can classify the system as coevolutionary. For each E, stochasticity in assessment ensures
that fP (x) is distributed with mean fTrP (x).
The selection process biases reproduction in favour of individuals with (relatively)
high tness propensity fP . fR(x) denotes the tness realization (number of offspring)
of individual x in population P . Due to the stochasticity of selection, fR(x) is normally
distributed with mean value fR(x). In addition, fR(x) varies with the make up of Pthe
population x is a member of. Depending upon whether fP (x), given E, is high or low
relative to other individuals in the population, fR(x) will vary accordingly. This is true in
both evolutionary and coevolutionary systems, and is a direct consequence of the struggle
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for scarce resources underpinning all evolution.
3.2.5 A New Definition of Coevolution
This thesis advances the following reciprocal denition of coevolution:
A system is considered coevolutionary if and only if f TrP (x)the true t-
ness propensity of each evolving individual (or trait), xvaries with respect
to other reciprocally evolving individuals (or traits).
Considering the continuum of coevolution (section 3.2.2; gure 3.1) the reciprocal
denition of coevolution classies everything to the left of reciprocity as coevolution-
ary, and everything to the right as non-coevolutionary. Hence, the reciprocal denition
is equivalent to the standard denition of coevolution (section 3.2.1) with inter-specicity,
specicity and simultaneity relaxed. Reciprocity, however, is still required.
Considering biological systems, the reciprocal denition classies (amongst others)
symbiosis, sexual selection, diffuse predator-prey interactions and multi-lineage co-
evolution as coevolutionary. Of articial systems, single-, 2-, and multi-population
competitive (and cooperative) coevolutionary systems are all classied coevolutionary.
Standard evolutionary systems, however, are not. The reason for this can be highlighted
by considering an evolving system containing only one population, P .
If individuals within P are assessed via a static function, then f TrP (x) of each individ-
ual, x, is independent of every other individual. Whilst f TrR (x) is free to vary depending
upon the make up of P , f TrP is not. As such, the system is non-coevolutionary. If in-
dividuals within P are assessed through competition with either xed, or randomly cho-
sen (non-evolving) opponents, then the system is again classied non-coevolutionary.
Whilst fP (x) may vary with opponents, opponents do not evolve in response. Hence,
fTrP (x) does not varythe effective environment, E, does not evolve. However, if indi-
viduals within P are assessed through competition with other (evolving) members of P ,
then the system is coevolutionaryf TrP (x) varies with reciprocally evolving opponents.
3.2.6 Relativism versus Absolutism
Consider an articially evolving population, P . Then ∀x ∈ P , if f TrP (x) varies relative
to other (reciprocally) evolving individuals, let us say that the tness propensity of x is
relative; denoted f relP (x). Elseif the effective environment of P is not reciprocally
evolvingsay that the tness propensity of x is absolute; denoted f absP (x). Using the
reciprocal denition of coevolution (page 3.2.5), one can now classify systems that assess
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relative tness propensity (f relP ) as coevolutionary, and those assessing absolute tness
propensity (f absP ) as non-coevolutionary. This terminology is similar to that generally
used in the EC literature, since relative tness and absolute tness are sometimes
used to distinguish coevolution from non-coevolution (e.g., Watson & Pollack, 2001).
However, such terms are vague (and potentially ambiguous) and thus benet from the
rigorous treatment of tness performed throughout section 3.2. Henceforth, the concise
terminology of relative tness (meaning relative tness propensity, f relP ) and abso-
lute tness (meaning absolute tness propensity, f absP ) shall be used throughout this
thesis.
Absolute tness functions measure tness against some objective yardstick that does
not vary over time. However, this approach becomes difcult when the qualities that are
desired in an optimal solution are poorly understood, difcult to dene ahead of time, or
hard to operationally assess.
Faced with these problems, it is often attractive to dene tness in relative terms.
Rather than create some yardstick metric, it is sufcient to dene rules of contest that
award individuals the status of winner and loser. Search should then be biased in favour
of winners and against losers. Rather than attempting to dene and measure the quality
of being a good tennis player, one merely needs to count the number of victories that a
player achieves, and use this as a proxy for tennis-playing ability.
It is quite possible to prepare, ahead of time, a xed set of opponents. This has the
advantage of allowing comparison between different players on the basis of how they
fare against this test-set. However, for this approach to work, it is critical to choose
effective opponents against which a player is assessed. A xed test-set must be capable
of effectively discriminating all the players that the search process encounters. Two kinds
of problem immediately arise. First, if the test set is too easy, or too difcult, it may not
discriminate between players of differing quality. Second, if the test-set exhibits a bias
(the players are all right-handed, for example), tested players may achieve many wins
through exploiting this bias, rather than approximating an optimal generalist strategy.
It turns out that determining the properties of an effective xed test set in advance is
equivalent to the problem of dening an absolute tness function.
Considering this, the term relative tness measure is reserved for situations in which
the test set evolves in response to the performance and character of the players we are
searching through. For example, letting one evolving population provide the test set for
a second, and vice versa, ensures that measures of success are truly relative.5 Each in-
5This approach was used by Hillis (1990, refer to section 3.1). However, for the definition of relative
fitness used throughout this thesis, it is acceptable for there to be only one evolving population from which
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dividual’s quality is judged on the basis of its performance relative to a set of transient
opponentsa group of contemporaries that may never be reassembled during the rest of
the search process.
This set up cleverly avoids the second of the problems mentioned above. Any ex-
ploitable bias that might have stymied a standard evolutionary search algorithm is unlikely
to remain around for very long. Individuals who are exploited in this way lose contests
and are selected out of the population as a result. However, the coevolutionary approach
does nothing to prevent the rst problemthat of playing a set of opponents that are ei-
ther all too easy or all too difcultand, moreover, brings with it several new problems
(see section 3.4).
As a warning to the reader, the terms absolute and relative used in this section
should not be confused with the mathematical modelling usage often employed in classic
models of evolution; described below.
Let l be the probability that a zygote survives to adulthood and let m be the fertility of
an adult (where m equals half the number of gametes that eventually become incorporated
into zygotes). Then the absolute tness, in numbers of individuals, is W = ml, where
w ≥ 0. Relative tness is calculated as w = ml
Wmax
, where Wmax is the highest absolute
tness that any individual has, hence 1 ≥ w ≥ 0 (see Roughgarden, 1983b).
3.2.7 Moving Mountains: A Dynamic Landscape
Since its introduction in the 1930s the concept of a tness landscape has been a useful tool
for visualizing evolutionary processes (Wright, 1932, 1967). Assuming that every point
on a hyper-plane denotes a possible genotype, then attributing a height proportional to
the tness propensity of the genotype at each of these points produces a tness landscape
with good individuals residing near the tops of peaks and poor individuals in valleys. An
evolving population can then be thought of as something like a set of competing hill-
climbers.
Under an evolutionary framework, the tness landscape is considered static, since the
mapping from genotype space to tness scores is constant. It makes sense to represent
a genome’s quality as a point on the tness landscape, since this landscape depicts the
nature of certain constraints that are imposed on the outcome of competition between
genomes. This is despite the fact that the reproductive success of a genome is dependent
not solely on its tness, but on the relationship between this value and the tness scores
opponents are drawn.
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of those genomes with which it is currently in direct competition.
Consider two genomes, g0 and g1 with tness scores f absP (g0) and f absP (g1), respec-
tively. At different times, these same tness scores may translate into different degrees
of reproductive successfR(g0) and fR(g1)depending on the make-up of the popula-
tion that g0 and g1 nd themselves in. However, under a standard evolutionary scheme,
if f absP (g0) > f absP (g1), then g0 will tend to enjoy greater success than g1 whatever the
make-up of the population. The shape of the tness landscape imposes an ordering on
the success of genomes it depicts, without specifying the magnitude of this success. The
altitude of a single point in the landscape provides no information concerning the repro-
ductive success that might be experienced by the associated genome. However, a differ-
ence in altitude between two points on the landscape represents the relative difference
in reproductive success that these genomes would experience should they ever directly
compete.
Under a coevolutionary regime, this interpretation must be radically reworked. Since
relative tness measures ensure that the mapping G 7→ F from genotype space to tness
values is free to vary over time, it is quite possible that f relP (g0) > f relP (g1) at time, t0,
whilst at some other time, t 6= t0, the opposite inequality holds. As a result, no single
static tness landscape can depict the distribution of tness (propensity) values across
the space of possible genotypes for all time. Rather, the landscape must be represented
by a dynamic scene, continually undulating as tness values change. Thus, continually
ebbing and owing, the coevolutionary tness landscape is perhaps better analogised
as a tness seascape.
The ability of an evolving population to reach optimal or near-optimal solutions is dra-
matically affected by the shape of a tness landscape. The ideal landscape for evolution
contains one high peak with gently sloping sides, such that from any initial position the
evolving population is able to climb a continuous gradient towards the desired solution.
This is sometimes termed a Mt. Fuji landscape. In contrast, the worst landscapes
for evolution are highly rugged with many small peaks. With little correlation between
mutationally adjacent genotypes, the evolving population wanders aimlessly, continually
changing direction (and repeatedly getting stuck). In general, landscapes fall somewhere
between these two extremes.
When setting up an evolutionary algorithm, the static tness landscape is entirely
determined by the particular assessment function, genetic encoding and genetic operators
chosen. Unfortunately, understanding how to mould the desired tness landscape for a
particular problem is often as difcult as solving the problem itself. Hence, guesswork
and chance play a major role in the success of any evolutionary algorithm.
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In comparison, whilst implementation choices also play a key role in coevolutionary
algorithms, the continual deformation of the landscape during run-time dramatically re-
duces the signicance of such design issues. In conjunction, dynamic landscapes offer a
means of circumventing the traditional problem of premature convergence at a local opti-
mum. Once an evolving population reaches a local peak in the static landscape, it can only
escape by a large mutation that can effectively jump the population across a tness valley
and onto an alternative (higher) peak.6 Obviously, the greater the mutational distance, the
more unlikely the required mutation is. Although practical methods for tackling prema-
ture convergence abound (see Goldberg, 1989), the problem still receives much attention
from the EC community.
The dynamic landscapes of coevolution circumvent the problem of local optima; with
tness peaks being continually eroded, local optima often exist for only short periods.
Thus, the dynamic landscape of coevolution offers a potentially great advantage over
evolution. However, whilst there is reason to believe that the move to coevolution is as-
sociated with some attractive benets, it also introduces a number of important problems
that threaten to overwhelm them. These are detailed fully in section 3.4.
3.2.8 The Nature of Objective Fitness
Depending upon the presence, or absence, of some (external) objective measure of tness,
all coevolutionary systems fall into one of the following two categories:
1. Although it may be difficult to define, some objective fitness measure exists. When
engaged in coevolutionary optimisation, computer scientists always have some con-
cept of objective tness. The very nature of optimisation means that it must be true
that some solutions are regarded as better than others.
2. No objective fitness measure exists. In nature, there is no concept of objective t-
ness: the tness of individuals is implicitly realised through life-time survival.
Thus, one cannot assert value-judgements on the outcome of biological evolution:
if a species becomes extinct, for instance, then objectively it is neither a good nor
bad outcome.
6An alternative paradigm of “neutral networks” has been proposed; rather than hill-climb across the
landscape, a population is thought to drift along connected networks of equal fitness. Such networks per-
meate genetic space. Through occasional jumps between networks it is thought that, given enough time,
any possible fitness value can be obtained. If correct, the scenario of a population trapped on a local peak
disappears (Barnett, 1998, also refer to chapter 8).
Chapter 3 54 Coevolutionary Computation
To some readers it may appear that, between these two extremes, there is a third
category covering the hazy middle-groundperhaps including some open-ended arti-
cial life simulations. However, it is the author’s belief that no middle-ground exists;
only confusion. This confusion arises because researchers haven’t decided which cate-
gory their simulations fall into. They may hope to just run the simulation and see what
happens, however, if there is no concept of objective tness, then it becomes impossible
to talk about disappointment when regarding results. Before designing a simulation,
practitioners need to decide upon which side of the fence they will sit.
3.3 The Success Stories
Having rst been applied to problem solving in the early 1990s, coevolutionary algorithms
have rapidly grown in popularity. In this section a brief (and by no means exhaustive)
review of the more successful coevolutionary applications is given. Hopefully, this should
give the reader an appreciation of coevolution’s current versatility and pervasiveness.
Hillis’ (1990) seminal work proved by example how articial coevolution can be ap-
plied to optimisation problems. Hillis chose to design minimum comparison sorting net-
works, a domain with a long and competitive history that has resulted in the current record
of sixty comparisons to sort sixteen elements, achieved by hand in 1960 by M. W. Green
(Knuth, 1973). Initially, using randomly generated inputs as test sets, Hillis evolved the
sorting networks on a static tness landscape, resulting in a minimal network of 64 com-
parisons. He found that two factors were preventing the evolution of shorter networks.
Firstly, the classical problem of local maxima made it difcult for the system to progress
once a reasonable solution had been found. Secondly, the test process proved inefcient
after a few generations most of the inputs were fully sorted by the vast majority of net-
works. To compensate for these problems, Hillis allowed the test cases to coevolve with
the sorting networks, giving them complementary tness functions and thus producing
an articial host-parasite system. This allowed the lists to evolve towards punishing the
weaknesses of suboptimal networks, whilst dramatically reducing the number of redun-
dant teststhose too easy to sort. Using this method, Hillis discovered a 61-comparison
network, a much better solution than previously evolved and only one comparison longer
than the best known solution.
Hillis’ success has since inspired a whole spectrum of research utilising coevolution
for practical problem solving. Though coevolution has been applied to a diverse range
of domains, sorting networks have continued to attract attention (e.g., Juill·e, 1995; Ols-
son, 1996; Rosin, 1997). Most impressively, Juill·e’s Evolving Non-Determinism (END)
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model improved upon a 25-year-old record by discovering a network of 45 comparisons
for list inputs of 13 elements. Currently, this remains the shortest known solution (Knuth,
1998).
In 1994, Sims (1994a, 1994b) coevolved a population of virtual creatures in a physi-
cally simulated three-dimensional environment by engaging individuals in pairwise com-
petition for a common resource. In this pioneering work, both morphology and neural
controllers (encoded as directed graphs) were genetically determined, allowing bodies
and behaviour to coevolve simultaneously. As a result, Sims produced a set of oddly
familiar morphologies and behaviours that included walking, swimming, hopping and
following. Further success on body-brain coevolution has been achieved by Hornby and
Pollack (2001, 2002). Rather than encapsulate the genetic encoding as directed graphs,
Hornby and Pollack utilise the generative encoding of L-systems (originally introduced
by Lindenmayer, 1968, to model the development of relatively simple multicellular organ-
isms, such as algae), producing hierarchies of regularity which allow reuse. The resulting
designs have been transferred successfully into reality (Hornby, Lipson, & Pollack, 2001).
Coevolution has been most widely applied to game-playing. The Iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma (IPD) is a two-player non-zero-sum game designed to study cooperation in
game theory and extensively applied in politics, economics, psychology, biology and AI
(Axelrod, 1984). Each round, players have a choice of either defecting or cooperating;
whilst the greatest total payoff comes from mutual cooperation, the temptation each round
is to defect. Coevolutionary algorithms have been successfully applied to the IPD, reach-
ing the unstable equilibrium of mutual cooperation (Axelrod, 1987; Lindgren & Nordahl,
1994). Coevolution has also been applied to more realistic extensions of the IPD: the
continuous IPD, where a range of intermediate choices between full co-operation and
full defection are offered (Darwen & Yao, 2000, 2001); and the multiple-player NIPD
(Yao, 1997). Following TD-Gammon (Tessauro, 1992)a backgammon program that,
through self-play, became one of the best players in the worldbackgammon strategies
have been successfully discovered using simple coevolutionary hill-climbing algorithms
(Pollack et al., 1996; Pollack & Blair, 1998). However, it is thought that the fantastic suc-
cess of coevolution in this domain may be due to the inherent properties of backgammon,
especially the stochastic dice roll and reversibility of the game. As such, whilst coevo-
lution has achieved fair success when applied to other games, the results have not been
as outstanding as those with backgammon. Those worth mentioning include the interac-
tive video-game Tron (Funes, Sklar, Juill·e, & Pollack, 1998; Funes, 2001), the ancient
Chinese board game Go (Rosin, 1997; Lubberts & Miikkulainen, 2001), checkers (Fogel,
2000), Tic-Tac-Toe (Angeline & Pollack, 1993; Rosin & Belew, 1997), Texas Hold’em
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Poker (Noble & Watson, 2001) and Nim (Rosin & Belew, 1997).
The pursuit and evasion of predators and prey has been a successful (and popular)
domain for coevolutionary research; in abstract (Koza, 1991; Ficici & Pollack, 1998b),
in agent simulation (Miller & Cliff, 1994b; Reynolds, 1994; Cliff & Miller, 1995, 1996)
and in physical robots (Floreano & Nol, 1997a, 1997b; Floreano, Nol, & Mondada,
1998; Nol & Floreano, 1998). Coevolution has been successfully applied to classica-
tion tasks, including the neural network pattern classication of intertwined spirals (Juille
& Pollack, 1996) and the density classication problem of 1-D cellular automata (Pare-
dis, 1997; Juill·e & Pollack, 1998a, 1998b; Ficici & Pollack, 2001), as well as function
optimisation (Potter & De Jong, 1994; Paredis, 1995; Pagie & Hogeweg, 1998). Finally,
other interesting elds include the development of communication (Werner & Dyer, 1992;
Ficici & Pollack, 1998b), job shop scheduling (Husbands & Mill, 1991), room painting
(Puppala et al., 1998) and robot football (Østergaard & Lund, 2003).
3.4 Critique
By utilising relative rather than absolute tness assessment, coevolution manages to cir-
cumvent some of evolution’s more debilitating problems (refer to section 3.2.6). How-
ever, the extra dimension of dynamical complexity introduced through relative tness is
a double-edged sword. While there is reason to believe that this move is associated with
some attractive benets, it introduces a number of important problems that threaten to
overwhelm them. These are detailed below.
3.4.1 Visualization
Though coevolutionary systems exhibit several unwanted behaviours (see sections 3.4.2-
3.4.5), the predominant problem regarding coevolution does not directly involve a sys-
tem’s dynamics. Rather, when utilising coevolution for problem solving, perhaps the
greatest challenge comes when attempting to accurately visualize a system’s dynamical
behaviour. It is inherently difcult to visualize progress in a coevolutionary system be-
cause of the relative tness functions they incorporate (section 3.2.6); the move from
absolute to relative tness immediately renders some standard visualization techniques
redundant. However, deciphering the trajectory of coevolution blindly (i.e., without an
adequate visual tool) is highly problematic. Thus, in the implementation and analysis of
coevolutionary systems, visualizations are a key component; in order to avert the onset of
problematic dynamics, it is necessary to rstly identify their occurrence.
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The progress of an evolutionary algorithm has traditionally been measured using the
graphical representation of tness over time. This appears legitimate when considering
evolution: if average population tness increases over time, we can be reasonably con-
dent that random individuals chosen from later generations will tend to be of higher qual-
ity than their ancestors. However, when considering coevolutionary algorithms, graphs
of tness over time are far more problematic. It is widely recognised that the manner in
which the distribution of tness changes over generational time is no indicator of partic-
ular trends in population quality. Increases in tness may be the result of one population
improving at the expense of the other, or both populations improving (or regressing) at
different rates. Indeed there is no guarantee that a trend in quality will be reected in any
way by a population’s tness scores. This stems from the fact that tness values recorded
at generation t are incomparable to those recorded at some other time; the variable plotted
for generation 0 is simply not the same variable as the one plotted for generation 1. To
label the ordinate of such a graph tness is to invoke a non-category; unsurprisingly,
such graphs are uninformative and alternatives have been sought.
The simplest way to visualize coevolutionary progress is to plot some externally im-
posed objective measure over time. This method was used by Hillis (1990) during his
seminal work coevolving sorting networks; at the end of each generation, the elite sort-
ing network (that with the greatest sorting success and, hence, highest relative tness)
was exhaustively tested by the complete set of potential input lists. Progress was then
monitored by plotting the percentage of all lists the elite network from each generation
was able to sort. However, whilst this approach worked well for the domain of sorting
networks, such an evaluation function demands a nite, discrete space of test inputs that
can be exhaustively generated in a reasonably short period of time. Thus, in complex,
real-world domains, the option of exhaustive testing is often unavailable.
As an alternative, one may contrive an objective measure by competing, or testing,
coevolved solutions against a (small) fixed set of benchmark trials. This approach was
successfully used by Pollack et al. (1996) to test the ability of their coevolved backgam-
mon strategies; Tessauro’s expert linear evaluation function PUBEVAL was used as
a yardstick. By removing the strict requirements of exhaustive testing, using xed op-
ponents is a much more versatile alternative. However, this method will only measure
progress as long as the test set can adequately discriminate between the evolved solu-
tions. In conjunction, it is possible that the design of a suitable test-set may be as difcult
as the problem one is trying to coevolve solutions for; this is particularly true if the system
is symmetrical. As such, this method will only sufce in a small subset of domains.
In the absence of an objective yardstick, entirely new visualizations become neces-
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sary. Often, these are created ad hoc and rely heavily upon the idiosyncrasies of the spe-
cic domain they were designed for. As such, very few generic visualization tools exist.
Evolutionary activity plots (originally Bedau & Packard, 1992) are a possible exception.
Although not originally designed for coevolution, these plots are able to visualize the rate
at which useful genetic innovations are absorbed into an evolving population without re-
quiring an objective assessment function. By tracing the lineage of adaptively signicant
genotypes, evolutionary activity plots highlight useful genetic adaptations from periods of
random drift. However, whilst evolutionary activity plots afford insight into the underly-
ing genetics of a coevolutionary system, they fail to sufciently highlight coevolutionary
progress in the necessary manner.
As far as the author is aware, the rst generic tool specically designed to visualize
progress in coevolutionary systems was the current individual against ancestral oppo-
nent (CIAO) plot (Cliff & Miller, 1995). Entirely removing the need for an objective
measure, CIAO plots display the relative performance of the elite individuals from each
generation; as coevolution unfolds, the best individual from each generation is pairwise
assessed against the best individual from each ancestral generation. The results of each
competition are plotted on a 2-dimensional grey-scale matrix, where darkness represents
success and the co-ordinate of each point reects the generation of each elite competitor
(see section 7.2.1). Hence, CIAO plots visualize the relative quality of coevolved solu-
tions, and are thus able to distinguish coevolutionary progress (smooth gradient from light
to dark) from cycling (diagonal banding) and stasis (a homogeneous plot). Since their in-
troduction, CIAO plots have been successfully used in a number of domains; however,
they suffer from unexpected ambiguities and should be used in conjunction with other
techniques (refer to chapter 7).
In recent years dominance plots have been proposed as an extension of the CIAO
plot (Stanley & Miikkulainen, 2002). Using information from ancestral-opponent con-
tests, dominance plots are drawn by marking generations in which the current elite dom-
inates all previous dominant elites.7 The resultant graph produces a bar-code style pat-
tern, with each black line representing the appearance of a new dominant individual.
Let dj be the jth dominant strategy to appear over evolution. Then dominance is
dened recursively as follows:
• d1 is the elite of generation 1
• where j > i, dj is an elite such that ∀i < j, dj beats di
7Here, “dominance” is similar, but not identical, to pareto dominance; section 3.4.2.
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Dominance plots are used to identify a sequence of increasingly more sophisticated
strategies. By ignoring comparisons between non-dominant elites, noisy uctuations in
progress are ignored. Whilst this offers an advantage over CIAO plots, dominance plots
discard so much information that they risk throwing the baby out with the bathwater. For
caution, practitioners are advised to use dominance plots in tandem with CIAO plots,
rather than as an exclusive alternative.
3.4.2 Overspecialisation
Throughout the evolutionary process, adaptive traits are gradually acquired over time,
each a specic adaptation to the environment they inhabit; as a result, populations gen-
erally become highly specialised. However, whilst this phenomenon has produced the
breathtaking abundance of biological diversity we observe around us, when utilising co-
evolution (or evolution) for problem solving, specialisation can prove problematic.
The subjective concept of overspecialisation occurs when coevolving populations be-
come too focused. By exploiting the idiosyncratic weaknesses of their opponents, pop-
ulations may evolve in an unexpected (and perhaps unwanted) direction. For example,
when coevolving tennis players, one population may begin to exploit the slow reactions
of the other population by hitting the ball harder. Through time, there may be a continu-
ous escalation in the power of individuals at the expense of all other facets of the game,
such as agility, accuracy and stamina; the resulting tennis players are left ill-equipped to
tackle more generalist all-round strategies. Overspecialisation potentially results in brittle
solutions that are unable to generalise (Darwen & Yao, 1995; Watson & Pollack, 2001;
Bucci & Pollack, 2002, 2003).
Whilst coevolutionary interactions vary greatly in specicity, from fairly generalist
predator-prey interactions to highly specic endosymbiosis, it is generally erroneous to
characterize a species as overspecialised. Unless specialisation directly results in catas-
trophe (extinction), one cannot regard it as problematic; the inherently value-free nature
of biology makes it impossible for us to determine what is and is not overspecialised (refer
to 3.2.4). As such, the problem of specialisation exists purely within articial coevolution
and has no discernable analogue in biology.
The problem of overspecialisation is associated with the more traditional machine
learning problem of over-tting.8 In coevolution, over-tting (overspecialisation) may
be avoided by maintaining diverse training and rule sets (the evolving populations) and is
8A machine learning algorithm is said to over-fit when it adapts so well to a specific training set that the
learning model treats noisy idiosyncrasies in the data as meaningful.
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achieved by maintaining genetic diversity within the coevolving populations (Darwen &
Yao, 1997).
Evolutionary computing is littered with diversity maintenance (or niching) techniques
(for a review, see Goldberg, 1989). Approaches range from standard and determinis-
tic crowding (where competition is restricted to genetically similar individuals; De Jong,
1975; Mahfoud, 1995, respectively), to spatial embedding (where competition is restricted
by spatial locality; rst used in a coevolutionary context by Hillis, 1990) and islands mod-
els (where populations are split into multiple demes that interact through migration only;
originally Wright, 1932). Fitness sharing (rst proposed by Goldberg & Richardson,
1987) has been perhaps the most successful; tness is shared among genetically similar
individuals, thus rewarding those that are genetically unique. However, tness sharing is
sensitive to the radius of similarity; a parameter dening the volume of genetic sub-
space deemed similar. As such, tness sharing has been extended to remove the denition
of a radius parameter (Smith, Forrest, & Perelson, 1993). Here, individuals bid for the
pay-off of discrete objects; those scoring the highest sharing the reward. Further exten-
sions have enabled tness sharing to be applied to coevolution: an individual receives a
payoff when it has the best score against an opponent; draws are shared. First introduced
as competitive tness sharing (Rosin & Belew, 1995),9 this technique has also been
adopted as implicit sharing (Darwen & Yao, 1996) and resource sharing (Juill·e &
Pollack, 1998b); however, the details of each are similar. Probably the most descriptive
term, resource sharing will be used throughout this thesis.
Resource sharing maintains genetic diversity in a population by encouraging niching;
individuals are rewarded for being able to solve tests that few others can. This idea has
been extended to coevolutionary scenarios where opponents are treated as a commodity
or resource. Rather than gain a tness point for each victory against an opponent (simple
tness), one tness point is shared among all the competitors that beat a particular indi-
vidual. Thus, individuals are rewarded less for how many opponents they beat and more
for who they beat; rewarding phenotypic diversity and maintaining genetic diversity. By
niching the population into specic sub-populations, resource sharing not only counter-
acts focusing, but also raises the potential for multi-objective optimisation (MOO); whilst
each niche is inherently specialised, the population as a whole forms a generalist set ca-
pable of mastering several objectives.
9In conjunction with competitive fitness sharing, Rosin and Belew (1995; Rosin, 1997) also proposed
shared sampling; a method for choosing diverse opponents worth beating. Rather than sample opponents
at random, shared sampling purposely selects a sub-set of parasites that challenge all segments of the host
population; based upon the previous generation’s performance. Shared sampling may produce some of the
same effects as competitive fitness sharing.
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As a recently introduced alternative to niching, pareto coevolution10 offers a way of
preserving useful (though perhaps idiosyncratic) adaptations by explicitly treating the
performance against each player in the population as a dimension for MOO (Ficici &
Pollack, 2001; Noble & Watson, 2001; Bucci & Pollack, 2003; De Jong & Pollack, 2004).
Individuals compete against all others in a set of pairwise competitions. Any individual
that is pareto-dominated by another (i.e., scores equal or less against all opponents) is
destroyed; those that are non-dominated are preserved. Novel individuals are created
from parents randomly chosen from the front.
Definition (Pareto-Dominance): Let a = (ai, . . . , ak) denote the scores of individual
A against each of k opponents (objective dimensions) and let b = (bi, . . . , bk) denote
the scores of individual B against the same k opponents (objective dimensions); then A
pareto-dominates B if and only if A performs at least as well as B in all dimensions and
better than B in at least one, hence:
a  b ⇐⇒ ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, ai ≥ bi ∧ ∃i ∈ {1, . . . , k} : ai > bi
By preserving all non-dominated individuals, pareto coevolution ensures that any po-
tentially useful adaptation is not lost; making it unlikely for the population as a whole to
overspecialise along one particular dimension. However, pareto coevolution introduces
some new problems: the pareto front is expensive to calculate; the size of the front may
grow very large and be fairly unchanging; and it is not obvious how the nal front should
be combined as a solution set, i.e., which should be chosen when? In conjunction, the con-
trived nature of pareto coevolution makes it an unrealistic tool for biological modelling,
thus restricting usage to purely problem-solving domains.
3.4.3 Cycling
In Nature
Ever since coevolution emerged as an independent discipline in the 1970s, cyclic coevolu-
tionary trajectories have been anticipated (see Maynard Smith, 1982; Futuyma & Slatkin,
1983). Dawkins and Krebs (1979) suggest that (in asymmetric systems) cycling may be
common both between and within species. They illustrate this by highlighting the genetic
model of parent-offspring conict postulated by Parker and Macnair (1979) and Parker
(1979). A dominant conictor gene causes offspring to demand more investment than
the parental optimum. This is countered by the spread of a suppressor gene in parents
10Perhaps more accurately termed pareto hill climbing due to the elitist nature of the pareto front.
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which causes them to invest equally in offspring, irrespective of demand. Assuming that
the conictor behaviour has a cost, then the direction of selection on children is reversed
once suppressor genes are frequent amongst parents: non-conictor genes spread and the
cycle starts again.
Dawkins and Krebs (1979) also present an example in the context of predator-prey
coevolution. Each individual pays a cost of size: predators pay the cost of growing big
enough to swallow prey and prey pay the cost of growing big enough to prevent being
swallowed. Hence, there ensues a coevolutionary race as each species’ body size grows
until their upper limit is reached; the size at which cost outweighs reward. Given the
life-dinner principle,11 prey are likely to invest more in getting bigger (and thus have a
higher limit) than predators, which are equally likely to divert scarce resources towards
other adaptations (sexual attractiveness, for example). The side that can afford to pay the
highest cost will do so; at which point selection will favour a rapid reduction in the cost
paid by the other side. Any return to the start state may result (after some possibly unpre-
dictable period of time) in a repeated bout of escalation. Maynard Smith (1996) describes
such cycles as sawtooth oscillations and suggests that they can occur in general when a
variable, such as size, can vary continuously with no ESS: hence, size may increase grad-
ually until a threshold is reached, when the population can be invaded by much smaller
individuals.
Sawtooth oscillations have been observed in Anolis lizard populations of the Caribbean
islands (Roughgarden, 1983a). The insects on which Anolis lizards feed have food value
proportionate to their size (the bigger the better, as long as they can be swallowed), and
abundance inversely proportional to size (smaller insects are more common). A relation-
ship between lizard size and insect size exists such that larger lizards on average take
larger prey. On all islands inhabited by only one species, lizards have an equilibrium
solitary size of approximately 50mm length in females and 60mm length in males.
Where two species exist, however, one population is generally much larger than the soli-
tary size whilst the other is always smaller. Where two species compete, it is assumed that
the larger species exerts a stronger pressure on the smaller species than vice versa: large
lizards take more food away; disputes over territory favour large lizards. To t this data,
Roughgarden (1983a) proposed the coevolution-invasion turnover hypothesis, suggest-
ing that through a series of invasions and extinctions, the lizard populations cycle in body
length (see gure 3.3, adapted from Roughgarden, 1983a). On islands containing only
one species, lizard lengths approximate the optimum solitary size; because of the asym-
11The life-dinner principle states that coevolving species may be subject to asymmetric evolutionary
pressures. For instance, consider foxes and rabbits: “The rabbit runs faster than the fox, because the rabbit
is running for his life while the fox is only running for his dinner” (Dawkins & Krebs, 1979, after Aesop).
Chapter 3 63 Coevolutionary Computation
Carrying capacity as
function of body size
Best body size
for invasion smaller body size
Evolution towards
Resident population at
solitary size (ss)
Resident becomes
extinct towards solitary size
Invader evolves 
Po
pu
la
tio
n 
Si
ze
Body Size ss ss ss
(A) Solitary island before invasion (B) Two−species island after invasion (C) During competitive coevolution
Figure 3.3: Invasion-extinction cycles in Anolis lizards of the Caribbean islands. (A)
Islands containing one resident population evolve to the equilibrium solitary size. (B)
Lizard populations with larger body size are able to invade. Both populations evolve
towards smaller body size. (C) The resident population becomes extinct, leaving the
invaders to evolve to the solitary size. The cycle is complete (adapted from Roughgarden,
1983a).
metry in competition, only a larger species can invade (gure 3.3.A). After invasion, the
species coevolve as competitors. The resident’s body size reduces to avoid competition
from the invader; an example of character displacement. The invader’s body size also
reduces to take advantage of the greater resources left by the retreating residents (gure
3.3.B). Finally, the resident species is driven to extinction by competitive exclusion. The
invaders approach the optimum solitary size and the system has completed one full cycle
(gure 3.3.C).
Since the example of the Anolis lizards requires species replacement (an intraspecic
cycle of the same nature would require invasion by an implausibly large mutant), Maynard
Smith (1996) suggests that the rst example of a population cycle arising from intraspe-
cic interactions is that reported relatively recently in side-blotched lizards (Sinervo &
Lively, 1996). Side-blotched lizards exhibit three alternative male mating strategies, each
associated with a distinctive phenotypic trait: blue-throated males mate-guard females
and are territorial; yellow-throated sneaker males are non-territorial and roam about
freely, looking to copulate with the females of others; and aggressive orange-throated
males are polygynous and maintain large territories. Whilst blue-throated lizards avoid
cuckoldry by yellow-throated sneakers, they are easily overpowered by orange-throated
males, which cosire offspring with their females. Yellow-throated males are able to sire
offspring via secretive copulations with the females of orange-throated males and often
share paternity of offspring within a female’s clutch (Zamudio & Sinervo, 2000). Sinervo
and Lively (1996) showed that the frequencies of the three male morphs were found to
oscillate over a six year period.
The tnesses of each morph relative to other morphs were non-transitive in
that each morph could invade another morph when rare, but was itself in-
Chapter 3 64 Coevolutionary Computation
vadable by another morph when common. Concordance between frequency-
dependent selection and the among-year changes in morph tnesses suggest
that male interactions drive a dynamic ‘rock-paper-scissors’ game (Sinervo
& Lively, 1996).
Using quantitative measures of the reproductive success of males adopting each strat-
egy, Zamudio and Sinervo (2000) conrmed that the morphs were indeed playing RPS.
The relative tness of each strategy during dyadic interactions conrmed this.
Intransitive RPS dynamics have also been observed in populations of the bacteria
Escherichia coli (Kerr, Riley, Feldman, & Bohannan, 2002). Colicinogenic bacteria (C)
possess a ‘col’ plasmid, a toxin that kills colicin-sensitive (S) bacteria. A third strain (R)
is resistant to the colicinogenic bacteria. In some cases, the growth rate of R cells will
exceed that of C cells, but be less than the growth rate of S cells.
In such cases, S can displace R (because S has a growth-rate advantage), R
can displace C (because R has a growth-rate advantage) and C can displace
S (because C kills S). That is, the C-S-R community satises a rock-paper-
scissors relationship (Kerr et al., 2002).
Conrming the predictions of their simulation model, empirical observations of E. coli
(constrained to local interactions in a petri dish) demonstrated the cyclical coexistence of
all three strains, with R outperforming C, C outperforming S and (a suggestion of) S
chasing R across the plate (refer to chapter 7 for further discussion of E. coli ).
Using the public goods game (applicable to theoretical biology), cycling has also been
demonstrated in experimental economics; both in theory (Hauert, De Monte, Hofbauer,
& Sigmund, 2002) and in practice (Semmann, Krambeck, & Millinski, 2003).
Semmann et al. (2003) demonstrate that voluntary participation in the game can lead
to cooperation amongst sizable groups; despite anonymity, random assortment and non-
repetition of interactions. Three strategies exist within a population: defectors (D) and
cooperators (C), both willing to engage in the public goods game and speculate on the
success of a joint enterprise; and low-risk loners (L) who choose to reject participation
and settle for a small, but guaranteed, return. From time to time, groups of individuals are
offered the choice to compete in a public goods game; loners will always refuse.
In every group, defectors outperform cooperators, but if all cooperate, they are better
off than if all defect. Whilst it is better to be a loner than in a group of defectors, it is better
still to be in a group of cooperators. Hence, in a well-mixed population, strategies display
a RPS cycle. If most play C, then it is better to play D, but if most play D, then it is better
to play L. However, if most play L, then small groups can form, increasing the chance of
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mutual cooperation. Thus, C dominates if group size is small, D dominates if group size
is large, and the option to be a loner preserves a balance between the two options: the
system cycles (Hauert et al., 2002). An empirical study involving 280 students playing a
57-round strategy game conrmed these results (Semmann et al., 2003).
In Artificial Systems
Having been long predicted and observed in nature, it is unsurprising that cycling has re-
ceived much attention in the articial coevolutionary literature (e.g., Cliff & Miller, 1995;
Rosin, 1997; Shapiro, 1998; Juill·e & Pollack, 1998a; Ficici & Pollack, 1998b; Bucci &
Pollack, 2002). Cycling occurs as a direct consequence of relative tness: as individuals
are only rewarded for out-performing contemporary opponents, it is possible for earlier
adaptations to be lost through time. The resulting lack of evolutionary momentum may
lead to cycling. Other effects, such as intransitive superiority relationships (i.e., rock-
paper-scissors) and repeated arms races and crashes (like that described by Dawkins &
Krebs, 1979), can also trap a system in a repetitive cycle. As the system stops progressing
in any objective sense, the result can be disastrous for problem-solving.
Forming a direct lineage back to the evolutionary selection method of elitism (origi-
nally De Jong, 1975, see section 2.2.4), many techniques have been developed to combat
coevolutionary cycling; each an attempt to install evolutionary memory and momentum.
Elitism preserves the best individuals within a population by copying them unchanged
into the next generation. Whilst not specically developed for cycling (or for coevolu-
tion) elitism has since been adapted as a coevolutionary technique. The rst to utilise
elitism for relative tness assessment was Sims (1994a). When coevolving 3-dimensional
morphologies and behaviours, Sims chose to assess each individual against the same op-
ponent, thus reducing sampling error (a potential hazard of random opponents) whilst still
reducing computational cost (one assessment is cheaper than many). The ttest individual
from the preceding generation was chosen for assessment each time. This installed some
extra coevolutionary direction, with individuals forced to perform well against the same
opponents that outperformed many of their parents.
Sims’ approach was repeated successfully by Reynolds (1994) and again by Cliff and
Miller (1995), who referred to it as LEO (Last Elite Opponent) evaluation: using a two-
population system, Cliff and Miller (1995) evaluated each individual against the previous
generation elite from the opponent population. Floreano and Nol (1997b) increased the
memory and momentum (and hence stability) of LEO by testing each individual against
the best competitors of the previous 10 generations.
Further extending LEO contests to their ultimate extreme, Rosin (1997) produced the
Hall of Fame (HoF). Whereas Cliff and Miller (1995) had collected information on rel-
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ative success across generations and presented it to the observer (in the form of CIAO
plots), Rosin’s (1997) coevolutionary algorithm used the same information (in the form
of a Hall of Fame) to guide its assessment of individuals. Every generation the best
individual from each population is retained in the HoF. Each successive generation, indi-
viduals compete not only against a sample of opponents from the coevolving population,
but also against a sample from the HoF. In this way individuals are selected to not only
out-compete current opponents, but also to out-compete ancestral opponents. The idea
is to provide a coevolutionary memory in order force progress in a particular direction
and thus stop cycling. However, unlike the LEO predecessors, HoF is computationally
expensive.
Rosin’s HoF was extended by Olsson (2001) with the Asymmetry Handling Host-
Parasite Algorithm (AHHPA). Olsson’s extension aimed to improve computational ef-
ciency. Rather than add the best individual from each generation to the HoF, a host, for ex-
ample, is only added to the host HoF if it can beat all the current individuals in the parasite
population and all the individuals in the parasite HoF. Hosts evolve against a static para-
site population until such a successful host is found. This host is added to the host HoF
and the host population is frozen whilst the parasites evolve until one is found that can
beat every host in both the current and HoF populations. Thus, the HoF only grows each
time an unbeatable individual is found. As such, it is much smaller (and less computation-
ally expensive) than Rosin’s Hall of Fame. In conjunction with computational efciency,
the AHHPA is intended to reduce redundant assessment due to asymmetry. Suppose that
a coevolutionary system is much easier for parasites than hosts. For instance, this could
be because parasites have much smaller genomes, thus making genotype space smaller
and solutions easier to nd. With Rosin’s Hall of Fame method hosts and parasites evolve
at the same rate. However, if hosts are nding it harder than parasites, they may benet
from more generations of evolution than their parasitic competitors. AHHPA reduces the
number of wasted generations by allowing the host (or parasite) population to have more
evolutionary generations than parasites (hosts). Thus, in the face of asymmetry, AHHPA
allows coevolution to use computational time more effectively.
The Hall of Fame has been demonstrated to improve optimisation in several domains
(Rosin, 1997; Rosin & Belew, 1997), however, a serious problem exists. Over time, the
HoF grows with respect to the contemporary population of evolving individuals. As a
result, tness assessment becomes relatively more static through time: as a proportion of
the HoF, the number of reciprocally evolving opponents tends to 0. Thus, as a run pro-
gresses, coevolution with the HoF tends towards standard evolution (assessment against a
non-evolving function).
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. . . as the process goes on, there is less and less pressure to discover strategies
that are effective against the opponent of the current generation and greater
and greater pressure to develop solutions capable of improving performance
against opponents of previous generations (Nol & Floreano, 1998).
The memory HoF adds to coevolution becomes so great that not only are cycles pre-
vented, but relative tness ceases altogether. At such times, the coevolutionary system
is better represented by evolution; with the problem of local optima re-emerging (for a
similar argument see Luke & Wiegand, 2002).
3.4.4 Mediocre Stability
During a coevolutionary arms race, it is possible for the system to stabilise at a sub-
optimal equilibrium: a problem analogous to convergence at a local optimum in evolution
(see Angeline, 1994; Pollack et al., 1996; Juill·e & Pollack, 1998a; Ficici & Pollack,
1998a; Pollack & Blair, 1998; Bucci & Pollack, 2002). Interspecic collusion is often
cited as the cause of mediocre stability. This can be highlighted with a simple example.
Imagine two chess-playing populations are coevolving. Individual chess strategies are
assessed through a series of matches, with each taking alternate turns to play white. In
this scenario, individuals can improve their chances of reproduction in two ways. Firstly,
they can play as well as possible in order to win and receive high tness. Secondly, they
can throw every game they play black: if an opponent does the same, collusion guarantees
both 50% of victories. Whilst the rst scenario leads to progress, the second results in
mediocre stability that can be difcult to escape.
Intraspecic collusion is also possible. Imagine a population of coin toss predictors
is coevolving against a population of coin toss generators. The required optimum is a
random set of generators (50% heads, 50% tails) and a population of predictors guessing
each outcome with equal probability. However, a mediocre stable state also exists. At
the global optimum, each individual is, on average, winning 50% of competitions. But,
this state can also be reached if the predictors diversify into two separate niches, one
always guessing the outcome heads and the other always guessing outcome tails. At this
mediocre stable state, the generators and predictors still score 50% each, but the outcome
is undesirable as the coin toss predictors are each highly brittle.12 Unfortunately, escaping
12Whilst individuals within each niche are themselves brittle, the population as a whole does contain
information necessary to produce generalist strategies. As Yao, Liu, and Darwen (1996) discuss, when
using (co)evolution for learning (rather than optimisation), information from the whole population should
be retained. Integrating these strategies, however, is far from trivial.
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from this sub-optimal equilibrium may be difcult (for further discussion of these issues
see section 6.2).
A famous example of collusion occurred in the trenches of the Western Front during
World War I. Whilst locked in stalemate, Allied and German troops both refrained from
killing enemy soldiers unnecessarily. Rituals were adopted by both sides: artillery was
red at the same time each day and mealtimes were particularly avoided. Collusion was
only ended when ofcers demanded a series of changes: troops were regularly rotated,
and small-party raids into enemy trenches were ordered (Axelrod, 1984).
Generally, mediocre-stability is difcult to classify in biology. As previously dis-
cussed (refer to 3.2.4), one cannot determine objectively whether a biological system is at
a sub-optimal equilibrium or not.
As far as the author is aware, no technique has been specically developed to combat
mediocre stability. Amongst the problems of coevolution (discussed here), this makes
mediocre stability an exception. Under some circumstances, however, other techniques
may combat mediocre stability as a benecial side-effect.
3.4.5 Disengagement
Coevolving populations can be considered as a coupled dynamical system with each pop-
ulation evolving over a dynamic tness landscape that continually uctuates in response to
perturbations from the other (see discussion of NKC landscapes in Kauffman & Johnsen,
1991). It is this interactive dynamic that drives the selection pressure between popu-
lations, continually eroding the adaptive advantage of each population (the Red Queen
Effect, van Valen, 1973) and potentially resulting in an evolutionary arms race. Disen-
gagement occurs when a coevolutionary system decoupleseach population no longer
perturbs the other, thus not only eliminating feedback between the coevolving popula-
tions, but eradicating any means of relative tness assessmentresulting in evolutionary
drift (for a more extensive denition of disengagement, refer to 3.4.5.1).
Disengagement occurs when one population outcompetes the other to the extent that
different individuals are not discriminated from their contemporaries in tness terms, i.e.,
oor or ceiling effects (e.g., Watson & Pollack, 2001). Often, coevolutionary systems
are asymmetrichosts and parasites may differ genetically (in terms of encoding) or
behaviourally (in terms of goal strategy). Such asymmetry may result in an inherent
advantage for one population. When coevolving pursuers and evaders, for example, it is
often much easier, at least initially, to be a successful evader (Cliff & Miller, 1995). Given
that disengagement results from one population outcompeting the other, it is intuitive
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that an inherent asymmetrical advantage favouring a particular population will encourage
coevolutionary disengagement.
Consider an asymmetrical host-parasite system in which parasites enjoy an inherent
advantage. Let us assume that the system is nearing disengagement, with the majority
of parasites scoring maximally in the majority of competitions against hosts. The few
parasites that some hosts are able to beatthose that discriminate hostswill receive rel-
atively low tness and as such will have few progeny. In contrast, the parasites able to
beat all current opponentsand thus unable to discriminate among hostsreceive high
tness, thus leaving many offspring. In such a situation, it is likely that subsequent para-
site generations will tend to comprise increasing numbers of individuals capable of beat-
ing all current opponents i.e., there will be less discrimination among hosts despite any
genetic and phenotypic diversity. Eventually the populations will disengage, with every
host achieving the same poor score, and every parasite achieving the same high score. At
this point, both populations will drift.
Although disengagement has entered the terminology of coevolutionary computing
relatively recently (Bucci & Pollack, 2002; Cartlidge & Bullock, 2002), the phenomenon
has previously been recognised. Coevolutionary coupling, or engagement has been de-
scribed as maintaining a gradient for selection with which to discriminate individuals
(Watson & Pollack, 2001), coevolving an ideal training set with which to supply feed-
back (Juill·e & Pollack, 1998a, 1998b), maintaining learnability (Ficici & Pollack, 1998a,
1998b) or providing pedagogical stepping stones (Rosin, 1997). The decoupling of co-
evolutionary populations is problematic and as such there have been several attempts to
produce a technique to circumvent it. Methods proposed to counter-act disengagement
are discussed below.
The phantom parasite (Rosin, 1997) inhibits the reproductive inuence of unbeatable
individuals (gure 3.4, left). Used in conjunction with competitive tness sharing (Rosin
& Belew, 1995), this anti-elitist innovation has no effect on individuals who achieve a
less than perfect score. However, any individual that scores perfectly automatically has its
score reduced slightly. This punishment is glossed in terms of interactions with an ideal
phantom parasite: ‘Hosts that lose to some current parasite defeat the phantom parasite.
Hosts that defeat all current parasites lose to the phantom parasite’ (Rosin, 1997). Ef-
fectively, the phantom parasite transforms the tness function of parasites as shown in
gure 3.4, left. Individuals winning N − 1 contests receive an equivalent score to those
winning N contests. The aim is to discourage parasites from performing too well, how-
ever, it remains in the best interests of an individual parasite to win as many competitions
as possible.
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Figure 3.4: The phantom parasite function (left). Individuals that beat all real opponents
lose to the phantom parasite. Individuals that lose to at least one real opponent beat the
phantom parasite. The Φ function (right)tness of an IC is 0 if classied correctly, f
otherwiseproduces a stabilising selection pressure favouring ICs that are neither too
easy, nor too hard, to classify (see equation 3.1).
The friendly competitor (Ficici & Pollack, 1998b, 1998a) attempts to coerce a coevo-
lutionary arms race through utilising a three population system. A parasite population
coevolves with two host populations, one friendly and one hostile. Parasites are rewarded
for being an easy challenge for friendly hosts whilst simultaneously being a difcult chal-
lenge for hostile hosts. When coevolving sorting networks, for example, a parasite list
would be rewarded for simultaneously being unsorted by hostile host networks and sorted
by friendly host networks. In this way, parasites are punished for becoming too difcult
for all hosts. The friendly competitor is designed to maintain a selection gradient for
hosts, however, it is a complicated technique that requires the introduction of a third pop-
ulation and assumes that it is possible for parasites to simultaneously be both competitive
and cooperative. To enable versatility, a simpler approach is required, such as that of the
entropy measure, discussed below.
The entropy measure (Juill·e & Pollack, 1998a, 1998b), later adapted as Pagie’s Φ
function (Pagie & Hogeweg, 2000; Pagie & Mitchell, 2002), utilises domain-specic
knowledge for the density classication task for cellular automata (CAs) to reduce disen-
gagement in that specic domain (gure 3.4, right). The aim of the density classication
task is to coevolve CA rules for classifying the density of an initial condition (IC)a
binary stringas greater (or less) than 0.5 depending upon whether the IC contains more
(or less) than 50% 1s (see Mitchell, Crutcheld, & Hraber, 1994). Having an inherent ad-
vantage, parasite initial conditions are known to become increasingly difcult to classify
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as their density approaches 0.5. Thus, in order to encourage ICs to be challenging, with-
out becoming too difcult, engagement is maintained by utilising the Φ function, where
Φ(IC) gives the tness of an initial condition (Pagie & Mitchell, 2002).
Φ(IC) =

 0 if classified correctly|density(IC)− 1
2
| otherwise
(3.1)
As parasite ICs are encouraged to be unclassiable, it is likely that IC density will
approach 50%the most difcult to classify. However, the Φ function counteracts this
by simultaneously rewarding ICs for deviating from 50% density. Thus, optimal ICs are as
easy as possible to classify whilst still being unclassiable. The Φ function performs well,
but is domain-specic. Although Juill·e and Pollack (1998a) state that they would like to
produce heuristics to make this technique domain-general, both the entropy measure and
the Φ function rely heavily upon domain-specic knowledge.
In summary, although disengagement is a recognised hindrance to coevolution, few
techniques have been proposed to counteract it. Those that have suffer from problems
such as domain-specicity or lack of versatility. The only real domain-general solution
that has been proposed is the Phantom Parasite, however, this has rarely been used (also,
see chapter 6).
3.4.5.1 Classifying Disengagement
To the author’s knowledge, while there exists a general conceptual understanding of disen-
gagement, no rigorous classication exists. To rectify this, the following classications
to be used throughout this thesisare proposed (also Cartlidge & Bullock, 2004a).
Full disengagement occurs when selection cannot distinguish between individuals ir-
respective of which sample of the current opponent population each individual plays.
When assessment is noisy, although individuals in disengaged populations will achieve
different scores, selection will not be able to distinguish between them on any systematic
(i.e., non-random) grounds. In this situation, a coevolutionary algorithm has no basis upon
which to preferentially select certain genomes for reproduction. Coevolutionary drift en-
sues, allowing deleterious mutations to accumulate in each population. Typically, in the
course of running a coevolutionary algorithm, episodes of full disengagement will be dif-
cult to distinguish from a much weaker kind of contingent disengagement. In this
case, although each member of a population achieves identical, or near-identical tness
scores, they could have achieved different scores had they played alternative members
of the current opponent population. We will use the term disengagement to refer to the
complete lack of selective discrimination that results. The degree of disengagement, mea-
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sured by how far (in terms of novel mutations) the populations are away from re-coupling,
allows us to determine the likelihood of a re-engagement event.
Asymmetrical disengagement occurs when one population, P1, reaches the global opti-
mum whilst the other, P2, drifts through sub-optimal space, resulting in asymmetric selec-
tion pressure: whilst P2 drifts, sub-optimal mutants from P1 are selectively punished. An
example of asymmetrical disengagement can be observed in the coevolutionary optimi-
sation of sorting networks and test-lists. Once the sorting networks reach optimality, the
selection pressure upon test-lists disappearsas all lists are sortable, each is equivalent.13
However, the sorting networks are under pressure to remain at optimality as sub-optimal
mutants may be punished by test-lists14. Alternatively, asymmetrical disengagement
may be observed in the coevolution of poker players. Players giving away information for
freevia either verbal or physical signalsare disadvantaged. As opponents gain from
correctly interpreting the signals that they receive, the optimal strategy for a player is to
not signal at all. However, once a player stops signalling, all receiver strategies become
equally redundantthere is no benet in attempting to read any cues. Asymmetrical
disengagement occurs when players reach the non-signalling optimum. Whilst receivers
drift, any signaller deviationi.e., starting to signalmay be punished.
Collusive disengagementsimilar to mediocre stability (section 3.4.4)occurs when
intra-population collusion produces inter-population disengagement. For example, once
again consider coevolving populations of coin toss generators and coin toss predictors.
Collusion between predictors is possible: by dividing into two niches, one always pre-
dicting heads and the other always predicting tails (assuming generators are unbi-
ased) each predictor will be correct approximately half the time. As a result, predictors
and generators become indistinguishable through tness alonethere is disengagement.
However, unlike full or asymmetrical disengagement, neither population is free to drift;
since mutations away from each niche are punishable the status quo is likely to be pre-
served (refer to section 6.2).
13Whilst asymmetrical disengagement—the scenario of “perfect sorters”—is desirable here, it will not
always be so.
14Asymmetrical disengagement may rapidly become full disengagement. Considering sorting network
coevolution, the drifting list population is likely to become easier to sort in some absolute sense, thus
reducing the selective pressure upon networks and enabling the accumulation of deleterious mutations.
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In biology, when disengagement occurs in pairwise coevolutionary systems (e.g., sym-
biosis), at least one population is likely to go extinct. If there is a strong mutual depen-
dence, both species may be driven extinct. Consider the interaction between myxoma
and rabbits. If the myxoma virus ever becomes so deadly that rabbits are driven extinct,
having no alternative host, the myxoma population is destined to follow.
However, disengagement does not necessarily result in extinction. Using the geo-
graphic mosaic theory (Thompson, 1994, also refer to section 3.2.1), it may be possible
for populations to disengage locally but remain engaged (perhaps with other species)
across their geographic range. Evidence for disengagement in biology can be observed
in the invasion-extinction cycles of Anolis lizards (section 3.4.3; gure 3.3). Disengage-
ment occurs each time a resident population goes extinct.
The fossil records of large cursorial predators (those that pursue prey for long dis-
tances over at terrain) and their cursorial prey (usually ungulates, which respond to
attack by eeing at high speed) have been analysed (Bakker, 1983). Such analysis is
possible because the functional anatomy of running on at surfaces is well understood.
Since most ungulate species rely entirely on ight for defence, the expected coevolution-
ary response from prey (with deer-like body forms) should be toward the longest, swiftest
limb form possible. Likewise, predators should follow a parallel trend for increasing
speed. However, over much of the last 60 million years, predators have lagged behind in
evolutionary terms. Predators and prey have not evolved at the same pacethere is an
evolutionary gap. This suggests some degree of disengagement. In the multi-lineage
coevolution between cursorial predators and ungulate prey, prey are generally winners.
Rather than corroborating the notion of quick optimisation and congruent co-
evolution, the fossil record of distance-pursuit predators shows that predators
fell behind their prey in the arms race of locomotor advancement (Bakker,
1983).
3.4.5.2 Coevolutionary Neutrality
Search-space neutrality occurs when many genotypes share the same tness, perhaps as
a result of redundancy in the genetic encoding. A neutral set contains all the genotypes
that achieve a particular tness score, while a neutral network comprises evolutionarily
adjacent members of a neutral set. It has been argued that the presence of neutral networks
may have profound consequences for the dynamics of evolutionary search. For instance,
the neutrality exhibited by natural RNA search spaces has been demonstrated to be of
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a potentially useful kind, allowing more efcient search (Huynen, Stadler, & Fontana,
1996). More generally, neutrality of the right kind is thought to reduce the chance of
premature convergence (Harvey & Thompson, 1996; Barnett, 1998).
In a coevolutionary system, since the tness scores of individuals are calculated rela-
tive to reciprocally evolving individuals, the topology of neutrality is continually shifting:
genotypes may be neutral in one environment, but not another. During full disengage-
ment, since individuals cannot be discriminated, each population forms a neutral sub-set
of equivalent tness. The system drifts until re-engagement occurs. However, unlike
useful neutral-drift, where the quality of genotypes is preserved (i.e., genotypes are
equivalent in some meaningful sense), drift during disengagement is effectively random
and thus potentially degrading. Often, neutrality resulting from disengagement is not
useful.
For an in-depth treatment of disengagement and the related phenomenon of coevolu-
tionary neutrality, refer to chapter 8.
3.5 Classroom Analogies
To exemplify the problems discussed in the previous section, coevolutionary theory is
applied to trends in exam results in England and Wales over the last three decades.
Visualization issues. A-level pass-rates have risen for 21 consecutive years (Harrison,
2003). Depending upon political bias, this can either suggest that students are get-
ting progressively better (a victory for the education system) or that exams are get-
ting progressively easier (a dumbing down of the A-level gold-standard). In truth,
the relative nature of assessmentexams adapt in response to changes in the teach-
ing syllabusunsubstantiates both claims on the basis of this data alone. For the
same reasons that simple coevolutionary tness over time graphs are moot, com-
paring A-level results over time is uninformative. To investigate whether students
have improved in real terms, it is necessary to use other methods of comparison.
Perhaps a xed (and secret) benchmark exam could be taken each year by a small
subset of A-level students. More objective comparison between these results and
the A-levels students subsequently obtain would then be possible. For example,
if benchmark results were shown to remain fairly constant whilst A-level results
continue to rise, then a strong case for dumbing down could be presented.
Overspecialisation. The education department is under continuous political pressure to
improve the average exam performance of students. Since the raison d’eˆtre of ex-
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ams is to indicate a student’s all-round ability in a given subject, a general im-
provement in exam grades is often assumed a reection of improving education
standards. However, it is possible for students to improve exam results by over-
specialising upon the specic exams they will face. In such circumstances, exam
results lose accuracy as an indicator of general ability: students are good at pass-
ing exams, but not much else. It has recently been suggested that teaching to the
test may be exacerbating overspecialisation, with students trading general ability
for specic results. Specialization has grown as a result of national targets: ‘If it
appeared in the tests, then it was important. If it didn’t, it was a luxury’ (Baker,
2002a).
Cycling. Directed by government policy, education strategy (and related testing) contin-
ually adapts to full the political requirements of the nation. Imagine there is a
dearth in European language skills, for example. As a result, education funds are
likely to be channelled into modern languages, perhaps to the detriment of other
subjects, such as the sciences, say. Before long, the adapting student population
will possess more language skills, but fewer scientists. The change in political de-
mand reverts education strategy, returning to a focus on science. Language skills
decline and the system cycles.
Such cycling can be observed in England and Wales over the past two decades.
Having been biased towards the three Rs (reading, writing and arithmetic) for many
years, education policy was radically re-worked in 1989 with the introduction of the
national curriculum. Demanding a broad range of ten discrete subjects, the national
curriculum was designed to give creative, practical and academic skills to students.
However, employers’ protests over falling standards in the key-skills has led to a
more recent drive for literacy and numeracy. Mike Tomlinson, the chief inspector
for Ofsted (Ofce for Standards in Education) suggests that in half of all schools,
English has now commandeered between a quarter and a third of all lesson time
(Baker, 2002a).
Mediocre stability. In 1995, the introduction of SATs (standard assessment tests) her-
alded the much anticipated arrival of school league tables. Forcing schools into
direct competition, it was hoped that the publication of SAT results would rejuve-
nate the education system and allow poor performers to be targeted. However, it
seems much more likely that a state of collusion has been reached. Unlike GCSEs
and A-levels, SATs are much more of a performance indicator for teachers, rather
than studentsif SAT results are poor, a school’s league table position may directly
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affect the job security of its teaching staff. Thus, to secure their job, a teacher has
two choices: work harder for no extra pay and no guarantee of reward; or cheat.
Given that other teachers are in the same dilemma, game theory (multi-player pris-
oners dilemma) suggests that defection (cheating) will be widespread. Teachers are
likely to collude with students, inuencing the results of their SATs through the use
of visual cues, coaching, or direct alteration. In 2001, 11 primary schools had their
results annulled after investigations revealed that they could not be sure the pupils’
work was their own. One head teacher admitted altering answers (Baker, 2002b).
Disengagement. Universities discriminate between students on the basis of their A-level
results: if entry grades are satised, a student is usually offered a place. For this
process to succeed, A-level grades must be informativethere must be a spread of
results within the student population. However, in recent years, A-levels exams and
students have begun to disengage. With the continual rise in grades, many students
are now outperforming the exam. In August 2003, 38.9% of mathematics students
received an A grade at A-level (Harrison, 2003). As a result, it has become in-
creasingly difcult for universities to differentiate between the best students. Some
institutions are considering the revival of entrance exams.
3.6 Summary
A system is classied coevolutionary if and only if each evolving individual is assessed
against a reciprocally evolving function. The dynamic tness landscape that results can
circumvent some of the traditional problems of non-coevolutionary (or standard evolu-
tionary) algorithms, such as premature convergence at a local-optimum. As a result, co-
evolution has been successfully applied in many problem domains. However, the relative
tness seascape of coevolution also introduces several new problems: visualization;
overspecialisation; cycling; mediocre-stability; and disengagement. Each of these can be
observed in the real-world coevolution between students and exams.
Throughout this thesis the problems of coevolution are teased apart and considered
in isolation, thus allowing experimental factors to be more easily isolated whilst making
empirical analysis more tractable. However, it may be objected that, if the problems of
coevolution are highly inter-related, then the process of understanding and tackling them
in isolation is potentially futile. Yet, because of the immaturity of research in this area
this thesis is perhaps the rst extended attempt to solve one of coevolution’s problemsit
is too early to know whether or not this methodological gambit is a high risk strategy.
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Hence, taking the only sensible approach available, it is presumed that, for the sake of
argument, teasing apart the problems of coevolution will afford an eventual synthesis of
knowledge.
Chapter 4
Research Statement
4.1 Objective
To improve the application of coevolutionary algorithms to complex problem solving, this
thesis pursues two simultaneous goals: (1) to further theoretical understanding of coevo-
lutionary algorithms; (2) to propose novel techniques for improving the performance of
coevolutionary algorithms. More specically, the following sub-goals are pursued:
Definitions
• To rigorously classify coevolution in both biological and articial systems, allow-
ing theory crossover between evolutionary biology and evolutionary computation
(already developed; chapter 3).
• To classify coevolutionary disengagement (already developed; chapter 3).
Disengagement
• Investigate disengagement in a variety of coevolutionary systems. Further under-
standing of the causes and ultimate effects of disengagement.
• Develop a novel technique capable of combating coevolutionary disengagement.
• Investigate the effects of this novel technique. Compare performance with current
state-of-the-art approaches.
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Visualization
• Investigate the suitability of current coevolutionary visualization techniques.
• Propose alternative/novel visualizations capable of furthering the theoretical under-
standing of coevolutionary dynamics.
Neutrality
• Highlight the role of neutrality in coevolutionary systems, emphasising the relation-
ship between neutrality and disengagement.
• Outline a novel framework for investigating coevolutionary neutrality.
4.2 Justification
In the late 1970s it became clear that, without a universally accepted denition, the term
coevolution was in danger of losing practical signicance in evolutionary biology (re-
fer to section 3.2). Today, a similar situation faces evolutionary computing. Whilst co-
evolution is often discussed, no rigorous classication exists. The development of a
new classication scheme capable of encompassing both biological and articial systems
would not only offer a strict theoretical framework within which to study coevolution, but
would also offer potential crossover between evolutionary biology and evolutionary com-
puting (underpinning this thesis, a novel classication of coevolution has already been
introduced; section 3.2). Similarly, coevolutionary disengagement is a phenomenon that
is often hinted at, but that has no formal denition. As before, a strict denition is re-
quired before disengagement can be adequately studied (again, previously introduced;
section 3.4.5.1).
Although several authors have observed the detrimental effects of disengagement, the
phenomenon has never been studied in detail (section 3.4.5). Though techniques have
been proposed to combat disengagement, they are often domain dependent and poorly
tested. In general, work in this area is lacking. Based on a rm theoretical understanding
of the causes and effects of disengagement, a novel technique capable of counteracting
disengagement is needed.
To gain insight into the dynamics of coevolutionary systems, appropriate visualiza-
tions are crucial. However, since coevolution renders standard visualizationssuch as
simple graphs of tness over timeredundant, novel techniques are required (refer to
section 3.4.1). CIAO plots are perhaps the only visualization specically developed for
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coevolutionary systems and, as such, they are widely used. However, having received
little critical investigation, the limitations of CIAO plots are not well understood: this
situation must be rectied. Alternative visualization tools, offering greater insight into
coevolutionary behaviour, are required.
In general, no distinction is made between coevolutionary neutrality and neutrality in
non-coevolutionary systems (such as RNA folding landscapes; section 3.4.5.2). However,
there is a fundamental difference: coevolutionary neutrality can vary through time and is
intrinsically linked to disengagement. To fully understand disengagementin particular,
why it is that disengagement is detrimentalit is necessary to consider coevolutionary
neutrality. As yet, there has been little work in this area; indeed, there is currently no
available framework within which to study coevolutionary neutrality.
4.3 Prospects
In the natural world, since no species has evolved in complete isolation, coevolution is
responsible for much of the complexity observed in plants and animals. To be able to
harness a fraction of coevolution’s power using coevolutionary algorithms is a tremen-
dous prospect, with barely imaginable potential for the future of intelligent systems.
Yet, despite a number of problems (section 3.4), coevolutionary algorithms have already
achieved success in a number of problem domains (section 3.3). If these problems
visualization (3.4.1), overspecialisation (3.4.2), cycling (3.4.3), mediocre stability (3.4.4)
and disengagement (3.4.5)were better understood (and ultimately solved), the full po-
tential of articial coevolution may start to become a more realistic prospect; in con-
junction, novel insights may also shed light on the behaviour of natural coevolutionary
systems. Thus, fullling the objectives of this thesis (section 4.1) has the potential to
further not only evolutionary computing, but evolutionary biology as well.
Chapter 5
Reduced Parasite Virulence
Designed to encourage arms race dynamics, conventional coevolutionary algorithms re-
ward the best performing individuals of each generation with reproductive success.
With each new innovation expected to outperform the last, it is generally accepted that
a series of adaptations and counter-adaptations will ensue.
However, in this chapter, it is argued that the conventional approach to selection is
slightly misguided: on occasion, the best way to encourage arms races may be to punish
successful individuals; not reward them. Inspired by the virulence of natural parasites,
reduced parasite virulence is developed; a novel technique designed to improve the per-
formance of competitive coevolutionary algorithms by prolonging arms race engagement.
5.1 Rationale
5.1.1 Here Today, Gone Tomorrow
Escalating arms races (Dawkins & Krebs, 1979) are the Holy Grail of articial coevolu-
tion. With competing populations continually striving to gain an upper hand, arms race
dynamics are expected to compel individuals towards ever more rened adaptations; re-
sulting in accelerated evolution and, ultimately, a population of sophisticated solutions.
To induce an arms race, individuals best able to outperform opponents are selectively
biased in favour of reproduction. The successful adaptations contained within these indi-
viduals are preserved in their progeny. Unsuccessful adaptations are discardedlosing
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individuals are unlikely to reproduce. Hence, over evolutionary time, each population
becomes better able to exploit the idiosyncratic weaknesses of the other. However, whilst
this approach is designed to encourage arms races, the following problems threaten to
destroy them.
Thrashing. Under the conventional coevolutionary approach, genes conferring the great-
est advantage over contemporary opponents are those most likely to propagate.
Conversely, the very opponents that successful individuals are able to beat are un-
likely to be represented in proceeding generations. If individuals are highly spe-
cialised (perhaps overspecialised; section 3.4.2), successful adaptations in one gen-
eration may be effectively worthless in the next: particularly if a strategy is only
successful against the competitors it has driven extinct. As a result, the system may
thrash about; repeatedly shifting evolutionary direction. Saw-tooth oscillations
may follow.
Disengagement. Exploiting the weaknesses of opponents may also lead to disengage-
ment (section 3.4.5). When an individual in population A discovers an adapta-
tion, α, capable of exploiting individuals in population B, the successful adapta-
tion quickly spreads. If every member of A inherits α before a suitable counter-
adaptation is discovered by population B, then disengagement will occur. All the
members of population A (thanks to α) are able to beat all the members of popu-
lation B. Individuals can no longer be discriminated, selection pressures disappear
and the system drifts.
Since exploitable opponents in one generation may be absent from the next, biased
selection in favour of the best individuals may discourage coevolutionary arms races. To
encourage an arms race, both populations must contain adaptations capable of beating not
only today’s opponents, but tomorrow’s opponents as well.
5.1.2 Don’t Bite the Hand that Feeds You
Coevolving populations are mutually inter-dependent. Since opponents are relied upon
for success, even in competitive systems coevolution is not entirely antagonistic (sum-
zero). The conventional selection methodology should reect this dependence; however,
it does not. To reduce the likelihood of thrashing and disengagement, selection should
encourage the preservation of some exploitable strategies.
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Here, a novel selection method (Reduced parasite virulence) is proposed: individ-
uals are only rewarded for moderate victoriesexcessive victories are punished.1 Thus,
rather than succumb to the temptation of biting the hand that feeds them, individuals
are encouraged to adopt a more Machiavellian approach to competition:
. . . in most cases, so long as you do not deprive them of either their property
or their honour, the majority of men live happily; and you have only to deal
with the ambition of a few (Machiavelli, 1998, p61).
In many political, economic and biological systems, an analogous trade-off exists
short term gains may be relinquished for long term advantage. The following section
details some examples.
5.2 Analogies
5.2.1 Parasite Virulence
Following Janzen (1980; also refer to section 3.2.1), one can distinguish between true
coevolution, consisting of two populations, and diffuse coevolution, consisting of multi-
ple populations, each reciprocally evolving. Often pairwise, articial coevolution is most
accurately categorised as true coevolution. In particular, the mutual inter-dependence
between articially evolving populations strongly resembles that between symbiotic part-
ners (especially hosts and parasites; given the antagonistic nature of competition).
[When considering symbiosis, because] the individuals of different species
are physically associated with one another for a long time, the survival of at
least one member of the association depends upon the survival of the other
member. Hence, the tness of an individual depends on the fitness of its
associate. (Roughgarden, 1983b, original italics).
Thus, the best biological analogy of articial (two-population competitive) coevolu-
tion is host-parasite coevolutionone population (the parasite) is typically considered
to pose problems for the other (the host). However, in nature, direct evidence of host-
parasite coevolution is exceptional. Rare examples include the tight step-for-step coevo-
lution observed between the myxoma virus and rabbits (Fenner & Ratcliffe, 1965, also
1Upon first reflection, it may appear that the introduction of “virulence” in artificial systems is an unnat-
ural addition to the coevolutionary algorithm. However, utilising an analogy of parasite virulence is no less
realistic than Hillis’ (1990) original model. Nevertheless, virulence is not introduced to add realism, but to
improve algorithm performance.
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section 5.2.1.1); and the appearance of strains of the Hessian y (Mayetiola destructor)
that are able to attack a series of sequentially planted strains of wheat (Gallun, 1977).2
Coevolutionary algorithms typically differ from natural systems in the way that they
deal with parasite virulence (here dened as ‘parasite-mediated morbidity and mortality
in infected hosts’; Levin, 1996). In order to ensure survival long enough to reproduce,
it is not always in the best interests of a biological parasite to be as virulent as possible
(Futuyma & Slatkin, 1983; Maynard Smith, 1989; Combes, 1991; Maley, 1994; Hood,
1997). As a result, virulence varies dramatically between systems (compare, for instance,
cholera and the common cold), and over time within a particular system (e.g., the his-
tory of the myxoma virus in Australian rabbit populations, Fenner & Ratcliffe, 1965, also
section 5.2.1.1). However, when parasites are used in articial coevolution, they are gen-
erally encoded to be maximally virulenttheir tness varies inversely with the success
of the hosts that they compete against.
Whilst a parasite gains from using a host’s resources, incapacitating a host can greatly
reduce a parasite’s chances of reproducing. For this reason, a parasite’s virulence and
dispersal distance are strongly linked (Maley, 1994). A parasite that greatly relies on
the mobility of a particular host is likely to have relatively mild virulence. In contrast,
parasites that are easily transmitted from one host to another, irrespective of host mobility,
are likely to remain highly virulent. Using mosquitoes as a transmission vector, malaria
can afford to fatally damage hosts without hindering propagation. Indeed, a host rendered
unconscious is more susceptible to mosquito bites, ultimately aiding transmission. In
stark contrast, as the common cold spreads via host-host contact, it benets from keeping
hosts active and sociable.
The virulence of natural parasites strongly affects the coupling between host and par-
asite populations. Extremely virulent parasites may ultimately push their hostsand con-
sequently themselvesto extinction, resulting in a decoupling of the system. As persis-
tent high virulence can result in the disengagement of natural host-parasite systems, we
enquire as to whether reduced parasite virulence could reduce the effects of disengage-
ment in articial coevolutionary systemsmight coevolutionary algorithms benet from
treating parasites more naturally?
In the following section, myxomatosis-rabbit coevolution is detailed to illustrate the
dynamics of parasite virulence in biological systems. It is demonstrated that the opti-
mum (evolutionarily stable strategy, or ESS) value of virulence depends upon the in-
tricate nature of the system. Unless otherwise stated, all data is taken from Fenner and
2However, in this case, the wheat “evolved” according to a controlled plan, rather than as a natural
response to the evolution of the fly.
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Ratcliffe (1965) and May and Anderson (1983).
5.2.1.1 Myxomatosis: An Illustrative Example
For the purpose of sport hunting, Thomas Austin introduced two dozen pairs of European
rabbits (Oryctolagus cuniculus) into Australia in 1859. Extremely prolic and having no
natural predators, rabbit numbers quickly exploded; reaching an estimated 300 million
by the mid-twentieth century. Plaguing the entire continent, rabbits devastated Australian
ecology and agriculture.
In a bid to control rabbit populations, the myxoma virus was deliberately introduced
into Australia from South America in 1950. Exceedingly virulent, rabbit populations
were decimated, with myxomatosis initially killing more than 99% of infected rabbits.
However, in subsequent years, the severity of symptoms in rabbits and the proportion
killed decreased (Lewontin, 1970). A similar pattern emerged when the same virus was
introduced into France (1952) and Great Britain (1953).
To discover why rabbit deaths had diminished, an extensive series of laboratory tests
were performed. Two primary factors emerged. Firstly, rabbit resistance had increased:
injecting 1950 grade South American virus into 1957 Australian rabbits resulted in fewer
deaths than 1950 Australian rabbits had suffered (Fenner & Ratcliffe, 1965). Secondly,
the virulence of the virus had decreased: injecting 1957 Australian virus into 1957 South
American rabbits resulted in fewer deaths than the 1950 virus had caused (Fenner &
Ratcliffe, 1965). Whilst rabbit evolution towards increased resistance is unsurprising, to
understand the less intuitive decrease in myxoma virulence, one must consider the strong
coupling between the parasite’s virulence and transmission.
Evidence suggests that high myxoma virulence is typically associated with an abun-
dance of open lesions in infected rabbits. Such lesions enable transmission vectors
mosquitoes in Australia and France; eas in Great Britainto more easily bite infected
wounds and acquire the virus. Low virulence is correspondingly associated with poor
transmission. In general, parasites evolve to maximise their own transmission. Thus,
by trading ease of transmission for a greater window of opportunity, the myxoma virus
evolved towards the ESS level of moderate virulence.
It is understandable why this intermediate grade of virulence may be best:
too high an α [virulence] kills off hosts too fast, diminishing their capacity to
transmit the infection; too low an α is associated with a very quick recovery
time, so that again transmission is relatively weak (May & Anderson, 1983).
Transmission vectors play a critical role in the evolution of virulence. Since mosquitoes
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are more effective than eas at reaching the blood supply of rabbits, eas rely more heav-
ily upon open sores. With higher virulence producing more open sores in infected rabbits,
ea-transmitted myxoma has equilibrated at a higher level of virulence (i.e., a higher inci-
dence of more virulent strains) in Great Britain than the mosquito-transmitted Australian
and French strains.
Transmission by eas is thought to be less efcient because the longer and
larger mouthparts of mosquitoes enable the latter vector to transmit lower
virulence grades of the virus more effectively (May & Anderson, 1983).
In biology, virulence evolves to the level that optimises parasite transmission. This
varies between systems and over time. However, in articial coevolution, the virulence of
parasites is always high: parasites are encouraged to debilitate (beat in competition) a host
as much as possible. Articial analogues of the trade-off between ease of transmission
and window of opportunity are not considered. As a result, articial parasites are more
likely to disengage from hoststhe equivalent of (sustained) high virulence myxomatosis
driving rabbits extinct. In the event, both populations suffer.
5.2.1.2 A Case of Group Selectionism?
Several authors have attributed the myxoma virus’ decrease of virulence to group selec-
tion (e.g., Lewontin, 1970; Slatkin, 1983). Claiming that reduced virulence cannot be
explained by individual selection alone, Lewontin (1970) argues the position that group
selection must be invoked. Following the reasoning that each rabbit is a deme from the
standpoint of the virus, he suggests:
. . . there is a tremendously high rate of deme extinction, with the result that
those demes are left extant that are least virulent. This causes a general trend
toward avirulence of the pathogen despite the complete lack of selective ad-
vantage of avirulence within demes (Lewontin, 1970).
Though highly unfashionable (refer to section 1.3.5.2), attributing the evolution of
reduced myxoma virulence to group selection is not entirely unjustiable.
Numerous theoretical studies have shown that group selection is theoretically
possible when populations are extensively subdivided and local extinction is
reasonably common [a dynamic particularly observed in parasites] (Slatkin,
1983).
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However, whilst group selection is theoretically plausible, Lewontin’s (1970) argu-
ment remains unfounded. Firstly, the mathematical models of May and Anderson (1983)
demonstrate that individual selection can be exclusively used to explain the reduction in
virulence. Secondly, the general trend toward avirulence is a false assumption. Whilst
it is true that myxoma virulence fell, far from becoming avirulent, virulence stabilised
at an intermediate valueeven today, less than 10% of the UK’s wild rabbits fully re-
cover from myxomatosis. Finally, if each virus is considered as a deme in its own right
(deme size tends to one), one should still see a reduction in virulence. Thus, since the
(co)evolutionary process is unaffected by groups, by the principle of parsimony group
selection should not be invoked.
Encouraging articial parasites to sacrice short-term advantage over hosts for the
long-term good of both species, the arguments presented in this chapter (section 5.1) ap-
pear nakedly group selectionist. However, whilst this is true to some extentreducing
the virulence of articial parasites is designed to encourage coevolutionary engagement
one can also consider the virulence of articial parasites to be analogous to the trans-
missibility and infectiousness of biological parasites; but with the intricate couplings and
complexities abstracted away.
Fortunately, when coevolutionary algorithms are applied to problem-solving, charges
of group selectionism levied against reduced parasite virulence are largely irrelevant.
The issue only becomes important if coevolutionary algorithms are used to simulate real
host-parasite systems. In such cases, by directly adding parasite infectiousness and trans-
missibility to the model, parasite virulence should emerge.
5.2.2 The Laffer Curve
Describing the counterintuitive potential of government to increase revenue by reducing
taxes, the infamous Laffer curve (gure 5.1) of macro economic theory exemplies how
short-term advantage can be sacriced for long-term gain in socio-economic (people-state
coevolutionary) systems.
Developed in the 1970s by Arthur Laffer, a Professor of business economics at the
University of Southern California, the Laffer curve (as subsequently denominated by
Jude Wanniski, then associate editor of the Wall Street Journal; Wanniski, 1978b) ush-
ered in the supply-side economics that would provide the foundation for the Reagan-
Thatcher revolution of the 1980s. At its core, the Laffer curve challenged Keynesian
scal policy by suggesting that (under some circumstances) an increase in taxation may
reduce government revenue. Making extensive usage of Wanniski (1978a), the principle
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Figure 5.1: The Laffer curve showing the relationship between tax rate and revenue.
At points A and B, the electorate desires more goods and services and is thus willing to
pay more tax. At points C and D the electorate desires more private goods and services
and thus wishes to pay lower tax rates. At point E, the optimum tax rate T ∗ returns the
maximum tax revenue. Varying with the desires of the electorate, T ∗ may approach 100%
during times of war (adapted from Wanniski, 1978a).
logic of the Laffer curve is described below.
Laffer noted that in any economy, ‘there are always two tax rates that yield the same
revenues’ (Wanniski, 1978a). When tax rate is 100%, all production ceases in the mon-
etary economy; thus, government revenue is 0. Existing largely to escape taxation, how-
ever, the barter economy will thrive (point D on the curve; gure 5.1). Conversely, if there
is a 0% tax rate, there can be no government (since revenue is again 0). A state of anarchy
exists (point A). At all taxation levels between these extremes, revenue is non-zero.
In between lies a curve. If taxation is reduced to a level less than 100% (point C,
say), some level of the barter economy will be able to gain from the efciencies of being
in the monetary economy, despite the near-conscatory tax rates. At the bottom end of
the curve, if the people decide that some level of government is needed, a marginal tax
rate will be introduced (point B, say). However, with the small loss of income from
tax outweighing the efciencies of being in the monetary economy, some segment of the
economy will shift to barter. From the perspective of government, the optimal value of
taxationthat which acquires the greatest revenueis T ∗ (gure 5.1). Above this value
taxation should be reduced; below this value it should be increased.
The optimal value of taxation, T ∗, can be thought analogous to the virulence of bi-
ological parasites. However, rather than arising from the need for transmissibility and
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Figure 5.2: Parasite tness, fP , is a function of both parasite score, x, and virulence
parameter, λ, (see equation 5.1). For convenience, the labels maximum, moderate and null
virulence have been used for λ values 1.0, 0.75 and 0.5 respectively (left); however, there
exists a continuum of possible virulence curves, producing a surface in three dimensions
(right).
infectiousness, T ∗ results from the trade off between peoples’ need for security versus
self-gain. Like virulence, T ∗ varies through time and between economies.
During times of war, for instance, T ∗ can approach 100%. Through the siege of
Leningrad (8th September 1941 until 27th January 1944) the city produced for 900 days
at tax rates of nearly 100%; soldiers and civilians worked to their limits in return for the
basest of rations. Had citizens not wished to be taxed at high rate, the city would have
fallen to Nazi Germany (Wanniski, 1978a).
When war stops, T ∗ falls rapidly; mirroring the electorate’s reduced demand for mil-
itary goods and services. Following World War I, for example, having left wartime tax
rates in place, the USA fell into recession in 1919-20. Running for President under a
slogan promising a return to normalcy, William G. Harding was elected in a landslide
victory. The subsequent tax rate reductions ushered in the economic expansion of the
roaring twenties (Wanniski, 1978a).
In the following section, the analogies of biological virulence and the Laffer Curve
are used to implement reduced parasite virulence; a novel technique designed to pro-
mote arms race engagement in articial coevolutionary systems.
5.3 Implementation
Throughout this thesis, the term scoreoften calculated as the total number, or propor-
tion, of victories in competitionis used to refer to the ability of an articially coevolving
individual to defeat the competitor(s) it is pitted against. Canonically, individuals receive
tness propensity, fP , in proportion to their score. Here, however, this relationship is
changed: to encourage coevolutionary engagement, parasites are encouraged to defeat
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only λ ∗ 100% of host opponents; additional victories are punished.3
Parasite scores are normalised with respect to the maximum score achieved that gen-
eration such that the best current parasite always achieves a score of 1. Parasite tness,
fP , is then calculated as a function of score, x, and virulence, λ (0.5 ≤ λ ≤ 1.0), such
that:
fP (x, λ) =
2x
λ
−
x2
λ2
(5.1)
Thus, a parasite achieves optimum tness by winning a proportion of contests equal
to a fraction, λ, of that achieved by the best parasite. By varying λ, parasites can be en-
couraged to be more, or less, virulent (see gure 5.2). Although there exists a continuum
of possible curves, throughout this thesis three values of λ are used most often. These are
labelled as follows: Maximum virulence (λ = 1.0, the equivalent of canonical parasites)
where parasites are encouraged to beat as many hosts as possible; Moderate virulence
(λ = 0.75) where parasites are encouraged to achieve a win-rate three-quarters that of
the highest scoring current parasite; and Null virulence (λ = 0.5), where the ttest par-
asites achieve half the win-rate of their highest-scoring conspecics. Notice that a value
of lambda less than 0.5 would encourage cooperation between parasites and hosts; with
parasites continually striving to achieve more losses than wins.
It is important to emphasise at this point that drawing inspiration from natural systems
does not make reduced virulence more theoretically grounded than alternative approaches
(such as the phantom parasite or Φ function; section 3.4.5, gure 3.4); nor does it imply
that biological systems necessarily optimise. As an alternative analogy, reducing viru-
lence can be thought of as maintaining a gradient for selection; forcing parasites to evolve
in difculty at a similar speed to hosts. For example, in order to maximise pupils’ learn-
ing, teachers must teach material that is neither too difcult nor too easy. Rather, teaching
material should be presented on a smooth, continuous gradient of difculty, consistent
with the current academic requirements of pupils (e.g., Sklar & Pollack, 2000).
5.3.1 Maintaining Relative Fitness Diversity
Since disengagement occurs when individuals can no longer be discriminated on the basis
of tness alone, an immediate question arises: in order to produce discriminatory para-
sites, why not encourage them to maximise tness variation in hosts? Rather than utilise
reduced virulence, why not directly equate parasite tness with the standard deviation of
opponent hosts’ scores? This section suggests an answer.
3“Reduced virulence” may be applied to either coevolving population (or both). However, for brevity,
assume here that it affects only one population: the “parasite” population.
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Firstly, reduced virulence and direct tness diversity encouragement may often behave
similarly. For instance, assume parasite P records win, draw, loss against three hosts;
then (assuming λ = 0.5 and at least one parasite wins all competitions), P is optimal un-
der both schemes. Yet, whilst both schemes similarly encourage tness diversity, whether
implicitly or explicitly, reduced virulence is (usually) less computationally expensive to
implement.
More importantly, λ enables reduced virulence to be tuned, as desired, to t the
requirements of each particular coevolutionary system.4 It is not immediately obvious
how direct diversity encouragement could effectively incorporate such ne control. As a
result, reduced virulence offers a major advantage over tness diversity encouragement.
5.3.2 Asymmetry
Often, coevolutionary systems are asymmetric: populations may differ genetically (in
terms of encoding) or behaviourally (in terms of goal strategy). Such asymmetry may re-
sult in an inherent advantage for one population. When coevolving pursuers and evaders,
for example, it is often much easier, at least initially, to be a successful evader (Cliff &
Miller, 1995). Given that disengagement results from one population out-performing the
other, it is intuitive that an inherent asymmetrical advantage toward a particular population
will encourage the likelihood of coevolutionary disengagement.
However, if parasite virulence were reduced, this trend could be reversed. By reward-
ing parasites capable of discriminating hoststhose that occasionally losewith more
offspring, asymmetrical advantage may be reduced; thus reducing the likelihood of dis-
engagement. As such, the optimum level of virulence for each system will vary with
the nature of asymmetry: large asymmetries may require low virulence, and vice versa.
Critically, preventing disengagement will improve coevolutionary optimisation if a reduc-
tion in periods of degrading coevolutionary drift can be achieved without sacricing the
selection pressure that ensures progress.
5.4 Summary
Inspired by the virulence of natural parasites, reduced parasite virulence, a novel tech-
nique designed to prevent disengagement, has been presented.
4λ has the potential for self-adaptation (refer to section 6.4) and may even be evolved.
Chapter 6
Combating Disengagement
Disengagement (introduced in detail in section 3.4.5) is a detrimental phenomenon that
hinders the progress of coevolutionary systems. Occurring when individuals are unable
to be discriminated on the basis of tness aloneusually due to one population outper-
forming the otherdisengagement removes the selection pressures on each population,
producing (random) coevolutionary drift. Often, such drift is derogatory; particularly
when disengagement occurs once populations contain above average solutions.
Inspired by the behaviour of natural host-parasite systems, the previous chapter intro-
duced reduced parasite virulence, a technique specically designed to combat coevolu-
tionary disengagement. By reining in the inherent advantage one population (the para-
sites) may hold, reduced virulence attempts to stop the out performance of one population
(the hosts) by another (the parasites). If successful, within-population tness diversity is
maintained and selection pressures persist: coevolutionary progress results.
In this chapter, the ability of reduced virulence to combat coevolutionary disengage-
ment is analysed through a series of experiments in a number of problem domains. The
reader should be aware that the aim of these experiments is to tease out the general effects
reduced virulence has on the underlying dynamical behaviour of each system: there is
no attempt to nd novel solutions to specic optimisation problems; particular solutions
are unimportant in themselves. However, it is hoped that any conclusions drawn will be
generalisable to other domains.
92
Chapter 6 93 Combating Disengagement
6.1 The Numbers Game
6.1.1 Background
First introduced by Watson and Pollack (2001), the numbers game (also referred to as the
counting ones problem; e.g., Cartlidge & Bullock, 2002, 2003) was initially developed
to demonstrate the potential for minimal evolutionary substrates to exhibit the detrimental
coevolutionary dynamics of disengagement, overspecialisation and cycling.1 By stripping
away unnecessary domain complexity, Watson and Pollack (2001) produced a valu-
able coevolutionary substrate that is both simple to visualize and analyse, yet capable of
exhibiting a range of complex dynamics. As a result, the numbers game has quickly be-
come established as a standard coevolutionary modelling domain (adopted by Cartlidge
& Bullock, 2002; Bucci & Pollack, 2003; Ficici & Pollack, 2003; De Jong & Pollack,
2004).
The numbers game, as implemented by Watson and Pollack (2001), has three alter-
native formats, each designed to highlight a different coevolutionary dynamic. However,
for disengagement, only the simplest 1-dimensional game is required. Here, the goal is
to maximise an evolving integer value, n. Each generation, individuals receive a relative
tness score based upon the proportion of opponents (randomly sampled) they are able to
beat: victories are awarded if an individual’s n value is greater than that of the opponent.
With individuals each encoded as a 100 bit binary string, the n value of each is calculated
as the total number of 1s in the string. Thus, the maximum value of n is 100. Surprisingly,
whilst this integer maximisation problem is trivial for standard evolutionary approaches
consider an objective tness function f(x) = n, for examplecoevolutionary systems
can fail. This allows interesting system dynamics.
In this section, an adaptation of the numbers game is utilised to demonstrate the ef-
fect that reducing virulence has upon disengagement when there exists an asymmetrical
advantage favouring one coevolving population. As discussed in chapter 5, it is often the
case that one side of a coevolutionary contest has an (at least temporary) advantage over
the other in terms of the ease with which successful counter-adaptations are discovered.
To create asymmetry, one population (the parasites) is given a favourable mutation bias
such that each point mutation is more likely to produce a 1 than a 0; the other population
(the hosts) mutates to either bit with equal likelihood. As such, it is easier for parasites to
evolve higher values of n.
In complex coevolutionary systems asymmetrical advantage is free to uctuate in am-
1To the author’s knowledge, this was the first successful visualization of disengagement to appear in the
coevolutionary literature.
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plitude and shift between populations. However, in order to aid analysis, the asymmetry
introduced into the numbers game, in this section at least, is xed throughout each run.
Although xed asymmetry may not be representative of coevolutionary asymmetry in
general, it affords greater simulation control whilst behaving in a manner similar (for the
purposes of this thesis) to more realistic asymmetry.
6.1.2 Investigating Engagement
6.1.2.1 Set Up
Two reproductively isolated populations of size 25 are coevolved. Individuals in each
population consist of binary strings containing 100 bits, with each bit initialised to 0 in
generation 0. As discussed above, the goal of the numbers problem is to evolve strings
containing as many 1s as possible. Of course, in this toy domain, as observers we can
assess the absolute tness or objective quality of each individual by counting its 1-alleles.
This affords a useful way of measuring progress. However, it should be noticed that the
coevolutionary algorithm does not make use of this absolute measure, only having access
to the relative tness measure described below.
Members of one population are selected to play a set of pair-wise contests against a
random sample of 5 opponents from the competing population. During each contest, the
individual with the genotype containing the greatest number of 1-alleles receives a tness
point. Each opponent receives half a tness point for contests resulting in a draw. Indi-
viduals in both populations reproduce asexually with parents chosen through tournament
selection (tournament size 5; winner reproduces). Offspring have a small probability of
mutation, m. Unless specied otherwise, the probability of mutation at each locus, m, is
0.03.
An asymmetry was introduced by varying mutation bias Bpar (0 ≤ Bpar ≤ 1) in
favour of one population, henceforth classied as the parasites. Given mutation at a
particular parasite locus, the substitution of a 1 or 0 occurs with probability Bpar and
1 − Bpar, respectively. In contrast, the coevolving host population substitutes a 0 or 1
with equal likelihood whenever mutation occurs. We thus see that if Bpar > 0.5, there
is a bias in favour of evolving parasites with more onesan asymmetry that favours the
parasite population.
Two parasite mutation bias values and two parasite virulence levels were tested over a
series of runs; Bpar = 0.75, 0.9 and λ = 0.75, 1.0: Moderate and Maximum virulence, re-
spectively (refer to section 5.3). Unless otherwise stated, the value of λ remained constant
throughout each run.
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Figure 6.1: Typical numbers game coevolution (Bpar = 0.75 and m = 0.03), using the
same initial conditions each run. With Maximum virulence parasites (left) there are two
periods of disengagement. The second period may be prevented by switching to Moderate
virulence at generation 250 (centre). Populations remain engaged throughout the entire
run when Moderate virulence is utilised from the beginning (right).
6.1.2.2 Results
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 each display three typical runs, using a parasite mutation bias, Bpar,
of 0.75 and 0.9 respectively. The large graphs display the n value of each individual
each generationparasites are shown light grey, hosts are darkallowing progress to be
easily monitored. The two smaller graphs, below, display the mean relative tness of
each population: the average number of victories individuals in each population secure
each generation. Whilst these graphs afford less insight into coevolutionary progress, they
accurately reect the information available to the coevolutionary algorithm, and present
an illustrative example of the inherent difculties of using standard (relative) tness over
time graphs to visualize coevolutionary progress (refer to section 3.4.1 for a detailed
discussion). This style of graph (inherited directly from Watson & Pollack, 2001) will be
used several times throughout this chapter.
When employing maximally virulent parasites (gure 6.1, left) the populations have
a tendency to disengage. This can be observed between generations 150− 175 and again
between 250− 500. During these periods of disengagement the populations drift back to
their relative baseline performance, equal to the mutation bias, Bpar = 0.75 and Bhost =
0.5. Only once the populations re-engage by chance is there an improvement in absolute
tness. Repeating the run with the same random seed, the second period of disengagement
depicted in gure 6.1 is prevented if Moderate virulence (λ = 0.75) is introduced at
generation 250 (gure 6.1, centre). Notice that the left and centre graphs are identical until
generation 250the point at which parasite virulence is changed to Moderate. In contrast
to Maximum virulence, when Moderate parasites are used from the start (gure 6.1, right),
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Figure 6.2: Typical numbers game coevolution (Bpar = 0.90 and m = 0.03), using the
same initial conditions each run. With Maximum virulence parasites (left) the populations
disengage within 50 generations and fail to re-engage. Switching to Moderate virulence
during disengagement (centre) has no effect. Utilising Moderate virulence from the be-
ginning of a run (i.e., before the occurrence of disengagement) enables the populations to
remain engaged throughout the run (right).
the populations remain engaged throughout the entire run, achieving a continuously high
level of performance.
With a parasite mutation bias of 0.9, the increased asymmetry exacerbates the effects
of reducing virulence. Typical of all runs, gure 6.2, left, shows that a bias of 0.9 is too
great for the host population to remain engaged with maximally virulent parasites after the
initial 50 generations. However, runs employing Moderate virulence maintain population
engagement despite the underlying asymmetry (gure 6.2, right). It should be noted,
however, that whilst Moderate virulence helps to prevent disengagement from occurring,
it does not encourage populations to re-engage. Switching to Moderate virulence during
coevolutionary disengagement has no affect (gure 6.2, centre; see also section 6.1.3.3).
These results are sensitive to variation in both population size and the number of
opponents played by each individual. As either parameter increases, the probability of
disengagement decreases due to the increased frequency of meeting varied opponents.
However, there remains a chance of disengagement even when sample and population
sizes become very largethe phenomenon does not disappear. The results observed in
this section are qualitatively robust to mutation rate, m = [0.005, 0.05], and tournament
size, T = [2, 15].
The results displayed in gures 6.1 and 6.2 clearly demonstrate that reducing parasite
virulence in asymmetric coevolution can reduce the effects of disengagement. In par-
ticular, the greater the inherent asymmetry, the greater the effect reducing virulence has
upon results. The asymmetry imposed in this model gave the biased parasite population
a great advantage over the coevolving host population. Purely by stochastic effects one
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would expect individuals from parasite populations to contain more 1s than those from
host populations. This is observed in gures 6.1 and 6.2. The difference in the speed
with which the two populations initially move through the genotype space (resulting from
the different mutation biases) ensures that disengagement occurs rapidly, and once it has
occurred the same mutation biases tend to restrict each population to a different portion of
the genotype space. Mutation bias pushes each population towards a particular ratio of 1s
to 0s, i.e., 0.5 for hosts and, dependent upon mutation bias, 0.75 or 0.9 for the parasites.
As a result, both populations will remain disengaged until the gap between them is, at
least temporarily, bridged by the occurrence of a very large number of mutation events,
e.g., gure 6.1, left, generation 500.
The rst generation of parasite offspring will on average contain many more 1s than
that of the host population. However, under reduced virulence, any parasite that beats
all opponents is less t than those parasites that lose a small percentage of contests. In
this way, acceleration is decreased as the parasites resist their mutation bias. Moderate
virulence parasites appear to actively prevent disengagement. Using the continued selec-
tion pressure ensured through engagement, hosts evolve to a higher objective quality than
would otherwise be possible. It should not be overlooked, however, that Moderate para-
sites gain from this relationship too, as both populations evolve to a greater standard than
either would alone (gure 6.2, right). However, as parasite virulence is decreased there
is a tendency for coevolution to stagnate at a sub-optimal but highly engaged uid local
optimum. In order to push populations to optimal solutions, stronger selection pressure is
required (see section 6.1.3.2, below).
6.1.3 Further Investigations
In the previous section, the ability of reduced virulence to combat disengagement in the
numbers game was tested. In this section, further investigations are performed in order
to uncover exactly when reduced virulence is benecial, how the value of λ should be
chosen and how a reduction in virulence compares to alternative engagement-maintenance
algorithms. Throughout this section, unless otherwise stated, a mutation bias for parasites
Bpar = 0.75, and per locus mutation rate m = 0.03 is used. Once again, unless otherwise
stated, the sample size of opponents is 5 and tournament size for selection T = 5 (winner
always chosen to reproduce).
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6.1.3.1 Comparing the Phantom Parasite
Of the engagement-maintenance techniques discussed in section 3.4.5, the only domain-
independent algorithm versatile enough to t the two-population coevolutionary model
used for the numbers game is the Phantom Parasite (Rosin, 1997, gure 3.4, left). This
section compares reduced virulence with the Phantom Parasite to observe the behaviour
of both algorithms when subject to varying levels of asymmetry, mutation and selection
pressure. Maximum virulence (λ = 1.0), Moderate virulence (λ = 0.75), Null virulence
(λ = 0.5) and the Phantom Parasite were each tested over a series of 50 runs; with
parameter values Bpar = [0.5, 0.99], m = [0.005, 0.050], and T = [5, 15]. Figure 6.3
displays the mean number of disengaged generations occurring each run.
Each graph clearly demonstrates the relationship between asymmetry and disengage-
ment; irrespective of the engagement-maintenance technique, greater asymmetry (parasite
bias) produces more disengagement. In contrast, disengagement occurs less frequently as
virulence is reduced. Thus, reducing virulence is particularly benecial when asymmetry
is high. As the mutation rate increases, the effects of asymmetry are exacerbated: given
that the inherent asymmetrical advantage in favour of parasites is a mutational bias, any
increase in mutation rate directly increases asymmetry. Similarly, an increase in selection
pressure in favour of parasites (Tp − Th) also exacerbates the effects of asymmetry, since
weaker individuals are less likely to breed.
As one would expect, the Phantom Parasite performs better than canonical parasites
(λ = 1.0) across all levels of asymmetry, mutation and selection pressure. However, it can
be observed that the Phantom Parasite is sensitive to mutation raterather than exhibit-
ing a monotonic relationship between disengagement and mutation rate, disengagement
increases as m diverges from 0.020. The Phantom Parasite thus behaves less predictably
than reduced virulence, perhaps due to the discontinuity in the gradient of the tness curve
(see gure 3.4, left). In contrast, the Phantom Parasite is not as effective as Moderate or
Null virulence in reducing disengagement when asymmetry is high. Again, this is as we
would expect. The Phantom Parasite is most like reduced virulence with λ = N−1
N
(thus
sensitive to sample size N , here N = 5); with the exception that it is always best to win
all competitions. As such, the Phantom Parasite, here similar to λ = 0.80, performs better
than Maximum but worse than Moderate and Null virulence.
Thus, in comparison with the Phantom Parasite, reduced virulence acts more pre-
dictably (is less sensitive to coevolutionary parameters), produces less disengagement
(assuming λ has been chosen adequately) and is more exible (i.e., λ can be varied as
required).
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Figure 6.3: The average of 50 runs (each 600 generations) of the numbers game, with
mutation rate ranging between m = 0.005 (far left) and m = 0.050 (far right). From
top to bottom, selection pressure is increased in favour of parasites (top: host tournament
size Th = 15, parasite Tp = 5; middle: Th = 5, Tp = 5; bottom: Th = 5, Tp = 15). As
expected, an increase in Bpar, m, or Tp−Th, increases the likelihood of disengagement. In
general, reducing virulence succeeds in reducing the number of disengaged generations:
in particular the greater the asymmetry, the greater virulence should be reduced. The
phantom parasite performs less well and is clearly sensitive to mutation rate.
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6.1.3.2 The Engagement-Optimality Trade Off
The reduced virulence technique has been observed to limit the effects of disengagement,
however, the effect upon performance (in this case, the total number of 1-alleles within
the genome of the best host) has not been considered. As reducing virulence directly
interferes with the selection pressure upon parasites, it is likely that the performance of
the coevolutionary system will be affected in some way.
Figure 6.1 hints at an answer. When utilising Maximum virulence parasites (g-
ure 6.1, left), the system briey reaches near optimal performance (generations 100-150)
before disengaging. However, when using Moderate virulence parasites (centre and right),
maximum performance is sub-optimal, despite being much more stable. Since Maximum
virulence parasites result in the strongest selection pressure upon hosts, the following hy-
pothesis is proposed: given that a coevolutionary system can maintain engagement for a
sufcient period of time, Maximum virulence will, on average, push a system to a greater
level of performance than can be achieved by parasites with reduced virulence.
This hypothesis was tested by forcing populations to remain engaged throughout a
run. In a variant of the numbers game, each member of a single population is assessed
against a random sample of opponents drawn from the same population. In this way,
to the extent that the population remains phenotypically diverse, it must remain engaged
with itself over evolutionary time.2
For each virulence level, 30 runs were performed (population size 25). After approx-
imately 100 generations the coevolutionary system settled into equilibrium at its highest
level of performance. With a 95% condence limit, at generation 600, the population
mean level of performance for each virulence scheme was: Maximum 99.1 ± 0.38%,
Moderate 94.8 ± 1.50% and Null 75.1 ± 2.59%. It appears that, if engagement can be
guaranteed, maximum performance increases with virulence.
Thus, performance is maximised by setting virulence to be as great as possible, with-
out sacricing engagement. The trade off between engagement and performance must
be balanced by choosing the optimal level of virulence, λ. However, once a system has
disengaged, it is not obvious which virulence level is optimal. This is discussed in the
following section.
2This is true since the numbers game, as stated, is 1-dimensional. With multiple dimensions, it is
possible for certain dimensions to disengage; perhaps leading to overspecialisation (section 3.4.2).
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6.1.3.3 Re-engagement
The results in section 6.1.3.1 show that reducing virulence can limit the propensity for
asymmetric populations to disengage. However, as yet, no insight has been gained into
the effects that parasite virulence has upon populations that are already disengaged. Is it
possible that certain virulence functions increase population diversity and so encourage
populations to re-engage? To test this hypothesis, populations were forced into disengage-
ment at the start of each run. This was achieved by initialising every individual in the host
population to a genotype consisting of 0s, whilst initialising individuals in the parasite
population to have some integer, n > 0, number of 1s in their genomes. In each run, the
number of generations until rst engagement was recorded across a range of values of n.
Using the same initial conditions (i.e., same random seed), 30 runs were performed using
Maximum, Moderate and Null virulence parasites. Results demonstrated absolutely no
difference in the time to re-engagementthe time until populations rst engage is inde-
pendent of virulence: it is purely a stochastic process. The host and parasite populations
drift until an instance arises when at least one parasite does not score maximally against
at least one host. This is a re-engagement event.
Although the time to rst engagement is independent of parasite virulence, the be-
haviour of the system henceforth most certainly is not. Imagine a situation where every
parasite but one scores maximally and every host but one scores minimally. With a Mod-
erate or Null virulence scheme the non-maximal scoring parasite would be rewarded with
greater reproductive success. The same would be true of the non-minimal scoring host.
Effectively, the populations would be drawn together and engagement would be encour-
aged. With a Maximum virulence scheme, however, the situation would be very different.
Rather than be rewarded with progeny, the non-maximum scoring parasite would be un-
likely to have any progeny at all whilst every other parasite would produce marginally
more offspring than before. Effectively, we would see the populations bounce apart
disengagement is likely to re-occur the very next generation.
6.1.3.4 Random Parasites: Canonical Evolution
This section considers how coevolution compares to canonical evolution in the num-
bers game. Canonical evolution is implemented by evolving a population of solutions
(hosts) against non-hereditary test-problems (parasites), randomly selected at the begin-
ning of each generation with a uniform distribution of densities (total number of 1s in the
genome).
Figure 6.4 displays the output of one typical run. As can be seen, the host population
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Figure 6.4: Random parasites with no heredity. Although most parasites are either up-
per or lower parasites, the likelihood is that some parasites will fall within the set
of strategies capable of discriminating between hosts. This produces a small selection
pressure encouraging the objective quality of the host population to uctuate around 10%
higher than that achieved by mutation bias alone.
uctuates in performance around 60% 1-alleles10% higher than the population would
tend to by mutation aloneimplying Random parasites are exerting some selection pres-
sure. Consider those parasites that fall above the host population: the upper parasites.
By denition, each competition between a host and upper parasite will result in victory
for the parasite. Conversely, consider those parasites falling below the host population:
the lower parasites. In this case the reverse will be true. Each competition will result in
a win for the host. Thus, how strong or weak a host is in relation to other hosts cannot
be discerned on the basis of competitions with either upper or lower parasites. The host
population is disengaged from the upper and lower parasites.
It is likely, however, that some parasites will engage with the host population: dis-
criminating parasites. These individuals are able to discern, to some degree, the relative
strength of hosts, thus producing systematic selection pressure. However, due to the rel-
atively tight distribution of hostsin terms of possible distributions, the host population
is relatively convergedonly a small proportion of parasites are able to discriminate. As
such, Random non-hereditary parasites exert a constant, but relatively weak, selection
pressurethe system has a small degree of engagement.
The impetus behind coevolving test-problems with solutions derives from the desire
to automatically sample tests at the required difculty, reducing the necessary number
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of tests and resulting in computational efciency. The effectiveness of coevolution in
improving performance can be observed by comparing gure 6.1, right, and gure 6.4:
coevolving hosts uctuate around 30% higher than those evolving with Random parasites.
However, the occurrence of disengagement drastically changes this relationship. Dis-
engaged populations experience no selection pressure and thus drift to their respective
base-line levels of performance. Fluctuating at around 50% 1-alleles, disengaged hosts
perform worse than hosts assessed through standard evolution. However wasteful Ran-
dom parasite populations are in terms of discriminatory ability per parasite, the small but
continuous selection pressure they exert is better than long periods with no selection pres-
sure at all. Although coevolution may have the ability to outperform standard evolution
in certain domains, long episodes of disengagement can easily reverse this advantage.
6.1.4 Conclusions
Several conclusions can be drawn from the numbers game experiments, however, one
cannot assume that these are true in general. Firstly, there exists a trade off between
reducing virulence to encourage engagement and increasing virulence to improve perfor-
mance. Secondly, disengagement can reduce the performance of coevolutionary algo-
rithms to below that of standard evolution, even if the domain is particularly suited to a
coevolutionary approach. Once disengagement has occurred, the level of virulence is ir-
relevant; re-engagement occurs stochastically. Nevertheless, reducing virulence increases
the likelihood of prolonging re-engagement once it occurs. Finally, reduced virulence
outperforms its closest competitor, the Phantom Parasite.
6.2 The Coin Toss Game
6.2.1 Diversity Maintenance
Disengagement occurs when intra-population tness diversity reduces to zero. Moderat-
ing virulence counter-acts disengagement by selecting, for reproduction, parasites that are
occasionally beaten. This preserves a selection gradient for hosts which, in turn, main-
tains relative tness diversity in both populations.
A tendency towards reduced population diversity (and the associated problem of pre-
mature convergence) has long been a major concern of the evolutionary computation
research community. As such, a suite of diversity maintenance techniques have been
proposed, including e.g., deterministic crowding (De Jong, 1975), explicit tness shar-
ing (Goldberg & Richardson, 1987), competitive tness sharing (Rosin, 1997; Rosin &
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Belew, 1997), resource sharing (Juill·e & Pollack, 1998b), and spatial embedding (e.g.,
Hillis, 1990). These approaches are attempts to maintain genetic diversity on the assump-
tion that a loss of diversity can be harmful to optimisation as it may restrict search to local
optima (for a more comprehensive overview refer to section 3.4.2).
Resource (or competitive tness) sharing maintains genetic diversity in a population
by encouraging niching: individuals are rewarded for being able to solve tests that few
others can. This idea has been extended to coevolutionary scenarios where opponents
are treated as a commodity or resource. Rather than gain a tness point for each victory
against an opponent (simple tness), one tness point is shared among the competitors
that beat a particular individual. Thus, individuals are rewarded less for how many oppo-
nents they beat and more for who they beat, rewarding phenotypic diversity and maintain-
ing genetic diversity.
Since disengagement is associated with a loss of diversity, could it be prevented by
simple diversity maintenance approaches? Perhaps reducing virulence is only preventing
disengagement by mimicking these existing techniques? If so, it is largely superuous.
The following study contrasts reduced virulence with resource sharing in order to explore
whether they are effectively the same, or different, in some fundamental sense.
6.2.2 Set Up
To compare the inuence of parasite (and host) resource sharing with that of reduced
parasite virulence, the numbers game does not offer enough complexity. Specically, to
develop niching, resource sharing requires multiple dimensions of play. Here, a simple
(novel) evolutionary domain is presented: the coin toss game. Like the numbers game,
the coin toss game is deliberately designed to be simple to analyse and visualize, whilst
allowing potentially complex coevolutionary dynamics to occur; including cycling, over-
specialisation, disengagement and mediocre stability. The coin toss game is antagonistic.
Parasites each toss a coin; the result of which is probabilistically determined by the ge-
netic structure of the parasite. Depending upon the result of the toss, a host opponent is
rewarded for matching either Head-alleles, or Tail-alleles, of the parasite. If matched, a
parasite is punished.
Games with this type of dynamic often suffer from coevolutionary cycling, as hosts
chase parasites through the strategy space. Although desirable generalist strategies exist,
populations are easily diverted from them as they exploit the temporary idiosyncrasies of
their opponents. Resource sharing is one way of discouraging this type of short-termist
behaviour. By maintaining a diverse strategy-base in each population, the value of ex-
Chapter 6 105 Combating Disengagement
ploiting idiosyncrasies is reduced; encouraging generalists. Unfortunately, an alternative
mediocre stable scenario is possible in which populations speciate such that they ex-
hibit a number of different sub-optimal strategies that together form a stable combination:
collusive disengagement (refer to section 3.4.5.1). In this sense, the game is similar to
any number of scenarios in which a generalist strategy is desirable (from the perspective
of the observer), but difcult to evolve in practisee.g., scissors-paper-stone, immune
systems, etc.
Two distinct populations of size 50 are coevolvedhosts and parasites. Individuals
in each population consist of binary strings containing 100 bits, initialised randomly in
generation 0. Each generation, members of the host population are selected to play a set
of pair-wise contests against a random sample of 10 opponents from the parasite popula-
tion. The aim for hosts is to match as many parasite alleles as possible. Antagonistically,
parasites aim to mismatch host alleles. Both populations breed asexually, with each indi-
vidual having a small probability of unbiased mutation per locus, m = 0.03. Tournament
selection is used (tournament size 5) with the winner of each tournament always chosen
to reproduce.
Not all loci are involved in allele matching. For parasites with many H-alleles, allele
matching tends to involve only those loci at which the parasite possesses H-alleles. For
parasites with many T-alleles, the game tends to involve only those loci at which the par-
asite possesses T-alleles. Whether H-allele loci or T-allele loci are involved is determined
probabilistically. The probability, p(Head), a parasite will toss a Headthus forcing
host opponents to match H-allelesincreases with the total number of H-alleles, x, in the
parasite’s genotype, such that:
p(Heads) =
1
2
{
1 + tanh
(
x− 50
7
)}
(6.1)
Once the coin has been tossed, a host wins by matching alleles in at least M = 30
loci, else the parasite wins (see gure 6.5).
Having several antagonistic points of attraction, the coin toss game is designed to
exhibit interesting coevolutionary dynamics. Mutation bias attracts both populations to-
wards genotypes containing 50% H-alleles and 50% T-alleles. However, given a parasite
tosses Heads (or Tails), it is advantageous for the host to have as many H- (or T-) alleles
as possible. Thus, the host population is attracted towards homogeneous genotypes (all
Hs or all Ts). The direction of attraction for hosts (towards either 100% H- or T-alleles)
depends upon the frequency with which the parasite population tossed either Heads or
Tails. This occurs with increasing frequency the further parasite genotypes vary from a
50% H/T mix. Thus, parasites are also attracted away from a 50% mix, but in the opposite
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Figure 6.5: The probability p(Heads) of parasites tossing Heads (left, see also equa-
tion 6.1). Depending upon whether parasites toss Tails or Heads, hosts attempt to match
either T- or H-alleles (right). If matches ≥ M then the host wins, otherwise the parasite
wins.
direction to hosts. Parasites deviating too far from 50%, however, become too predictable.
In general, the most difcult parasites to match are those having approximately 50% H-
and 50% T-alleles.
This matching game resembles the density classication task for 1-D cellular au-
tomata, for which Juill·e and Pollack (1998a, 1998b) and Pagie and Hogeweg (2000)
utilised a method of virulence reductionthe Φ function (refer to section 3.4.5). The
density classication task for cellular automata is difcultno rule set exists which can
correctly classify all ICs (Land & Belew, 1995)as such, consistently coevolving two
populations towards continuous improvement is problematic (Paredis, 1997). Whilst co-
evolving CA rules, Juill·e and Pollack found it necessary to reduce the virulence of ICs
in order to stop disengagement; despite the use of resource sharing. Here, the contribu-
tion of two approaches to improving coevolutionary optimisationresource sharing and
reduced parasite virulenceare teased apart.
Two λ values were tested over a series of runs; λ = 1.0 (Maximum) and λ = 0.5
(Null). The value of λ remained constant throughout each run. Runs were performed
under four conditions: Maximum virulence without resource sharing (i.e., standard co-
evolution); Maximum virulence with resource sharing; Null virulence without resource
sharing; both Null virulence and resource sharing. Under each condition, the degree of
niching or genotypic diversity within each population was calculated using a linkage dis-
equilibrium measure (e.g., Barton & Gale, 1993; Falconer, 1996) particularly sensitive to
the effects of resource sharing.
Linkage Disequilibrium:
Linkage disequilibrium is a quantitative genetics measure used to determine a popula-
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tion’s distance from equilibrium. Under normal conditions, a well mixed (sexual) popula-
tion will tend towards (equilibrate at) random combinations of genes, in Hardy-Weinberg
proportions. Disequilibrium occurs when traits are strongly associated, perhaps arising
from intermixture of populations with different gene frequencies, or by selection favour-
ing one combination of alleles over another (Falconer, 1996).
Here, linkage disequilibrium is used (for the rst time, as far as the author is aware)
to measure niching. Although there are many standard techniques for measuring genetic
diversity, often a unimodal (normal) distribution of alleles is assumed, whilst allele as-
sociations are ignored. Linkage disequilibrium is an exception: particularly sensitive to
allele associations and ignoring underlying genetic variation, linkage disequilibrium is an
excellent measure of niching. Assuming n loci and N individuals, linkage disequilibrium
is calculated as follows (taken from Barton & Gale, 1993). For each individual i, let zi be
the proportion of loci at which allele A (allele 1 for the coin toss game) is found. For
each loci l, let pl be the proportion of individuals at which allele A is found. Then, let
mean and variation of zi be z and var(z), respectively. Also, let mean and variation of pl
be p and var(p), respectively. Then, average pairwise linkage disequilibrium, D, is:
var(z) =
1
2n
(
z(1− z) − var(p)
)
+
1
2
(
1 −
1
n
)
D (6.2)
6.2.3 Results
Figure 6.6 displays four typical graphs resulting from the four test conditions of the coin
toss game. The large graphs display the number of H-alleles each individual contains each
generation; with hosts shaded dark and parasites light. The smaller graphs, below, show
the linkage disequilibrium of genotypes within each population; roughly approximating
the amount of niching. Clearly, both resource sharing and reduced parasite virulence
affect the dynamics of coevolution.
Under condition oneMaximum virulence with no resource sharing, i.e., typical co-
evolutionary optimisation (gure 6.6, top left)the system exhibits cycling. After the
initial generations, hosts may begin to recruit more H-alleles in order to defeat parasites
tossing Heads. However, as parasites counter-adapt, by recruiting more T-alleles, they in-
crease the likelihood of tossing Tails. In response, hosts appear with a greater proportion
of T-alleles, with the entire population eventually switching strategy, in order to concen-
trate on winning the T-allele half of the game. Subsequently, parasites again regain the
upper-hand by tossing Heads more frequently, and so on. Under these conditions, the
coin toss game is inherently easier for the parasite population. Hosts nd it difcult to be
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Figure 6.6: Typical coevolution of the coin toss game. Maximum virulence without re-
source sharing produces cycling as hosts repeatedly alternate strategy (top left). Maxi-
mum virulence with resource sharing leads to mediocre stability with half the host pop-
ulation focusing upon each strategy (top right). Null virulence without resource sharing
encourages hosts to become generalists, capable of matching some parasites whatever re-
sult is tossed (bottom left). Null virulence with resource sharing initially pushes hosts into
two specialist niches, before funnelling the population into generalists (bottom right).
successful generalistsincapable of matching parasites along both dimensionsand are
encouraged to become brittle specialists. As a result, maximally virulent parasites win the
majority of competitions and occasionally win all competitions, resulting in disengage-
ment (indicated by crosses).
Under condition twoMaximum virulence with resource sharing (gure 6.6, top
right)the system reaches mediocre stability, or collusive disengagement. At the be-
ginning of the run, hosts immediately niche into two groups, each specialising on one
half of the matching game. In order to be as unpredictable as possible, parasites tend
towards 50% of each alleleany deviation from this distribution will be punished by
one of the specialist host niches. At this mediocre equilibrium the host population as a
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whole achieves roughly 50% victories over parasites; but each individual host is extremely
vulnerable to parasites tossing the opposite result. In contrast, parasites tend to become
maximally unpredictable, tossing Heads and Tails with roughly equal probability.
Under condition threeNull virulence (λ = 0.5) without resource sharing (gure 6.6,
bottom left)the system stabilises with generalist hosts. After the initial generations,
the host population settles into generalist strategies capable of matching some parasites
whichever result is tossed. Moderate virulence ensures that parasites are rewarded when
occasionally matched, thus allowing hosts to succeed without having to concentrate on
winning one half of the coin toss game. It should be noticed that reducing virulence
does not result in host-parasite collusion, which would tend to result in homogeneous
parasites; the simplest to match. Rather, parasites remain challenging and unpredictable.
Any deviation from a 50% mix is quickly punished by the generalist hosts. As such,
both hosts and parasites engage in competition in the most difficult regions of space.
This is equivalent to discovering the play random strategy in scissors-paper-stone, or a
generalist immune system capable of defeating a wide range of intruders.
Under condition fourNull virulence (λ = 0.5) with resource sharing (gure 6.6, bot-
tom right)the system initially achieves mediocre stability (collusive disengagement),
before hosts become generalists, strongly engaged with parasites. Early in the run re-
source sharing encourages the host population into two niches, each concentrating on one
half of the game. In this way, the system reaches mediocre stability with hosts and para-
sites sharing victories. However, unlike condition two, mediocre stability does not persist.
Recall that Null virulence encourages parasites to achieve a win-rate half that of the high-
est scoring parasite. This scheme lures parasites away from the mediocre equilibrium at
which they achieve a 50% win-rate. As parasites become more easily matched, they re-
duce the pressure upon hosts to concentrate on one half of the matching game. In this way
hosts are steered towards more generalist strategies. Hosts engage parasites in a difcult
region of space, unattainable without a reduction in parasite virulence. This funnelling
effecthosts initially diversify into specic niches before funnelling into generalists
suggests great scaffolding potential for more complex problems, introducing otherwise
unattainable intermediate strategies. As far as the author is aware, this is the rst time
such an effect has been observed.
Results clearly demonstrate that imposing reduced virulence on parasites alters coevo-
lutionary dynamics in a fundamentally different way to that achieved by resource sharing.
Whilst resource sharing encourages within-population genetic (and phenotypic) diversity,
observable as niching in the host population, reduced virulence encourages diversity in
relative fitness (i.e., a between-population phenomenon).
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See section 7.5 for further (CIAO plot) visualization, and discussion, of these results.
6.2.4 Caring versus Sharing
Resource sharing encourages a population to diversify into separate niches, thus reducing
the likelihood of over-focusing. In this way, coevolutionary cycling may also be avoided.
However, niching may produce mediocre stability (or collusive disengagement) whereby
niches share success. In contrast, reducing virulence does not encourage intra-population
diversity and, rather, encourages engagement: the extent to which coevolving populations
interact.
Resource sharing adds a second layer of coupling between conspecics. In addition to
the standard competition that conspecics experiencestriving to beat more opponents
than each otherthey are forced to share their success with one another. This encourages
individuals to beat different opponents; i.e., to be different from one another. Niching
results from this additional intra-population coupling.
In contrast, reducing parasite virulence increases inter-population coupling: it ensures
that individuals in one population care about the success of individuals in the other. In par-
ticular, through attempting to achieve moderate success, parasites care about the variation
in relative tness achieved by their opponents: they are selected to cause a range of scores
in their opponents. However, this is not achieved through niching, or genetic diversity per
se. Rather, it is a direct consequence of the moderation that maintains engagement.
It is true that increased genetic diversity has some relationship with coevolutionary
engagement. If genetic diversity reduces to zero, populations will disengage (individuals
will achieve equivalent scores).3 However, the converse is not true. Genetic diversity does
not ensure engagement. Both populations may feature a diverse array of phenotypes, yet
still suffer disengagement if each and every phenotype in one population defeats each
and every phenotype in the other. Indeed, periods of disengagement often increase ge-
netic diversity through random drift, without necessarily increasing engagement. While
this coevolutionary coupling (engagedness) is affected by genetic diversity (and noise,
sampling error, etc.), it is not determined by it. Further, niching may directly lead to
collusive disengagement: with each niche sharing results, individuals once again become
indiscriminable.
These considerations ensure that reducing virulence and resource sharing are com-
plementary, rather than exclusive, tools. It is not necessary to choose one over another.
3Attentive readers of a biological disposition may note that some genetic diversity, but no phenotypic
diversity, will also lead to disengagement. However, the argument presented here does not benefit from a
discussion of genotype-phenotype mappings.
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Indeed, the greatest success may result from using diversity and engagement maintenance
techniques in conjunction (as observed by Juill·e & Pollack, 1998a, 1998b).
6.3 Sorting Networks
Investigations in the simple numbers and coin toss domains have gathered evidence to
support the hypothesis that reducing parasite virulence can encourage coevolutionary en-
gagement. However, it is not obvious that these results generalise to other, more complex,
domains. In order to address this issue, reduced parasite virulence is applied to the coevo-
lution of minimal length sorting networks; a domain that has historically attracted interest
from the coevolutionary computing community (refer to section 3.3). The aim is to design
the shortest xed network of comparisons that can sort, into numerical order, any input
list containing a specic number of elements. Comparisons exist in the form if a > b then
swap, else do nothing.
6.3.1 Background
Conveniently, xed length sorting networks may be represented graphically. Figure 6.7,
left, displays a 5-comparison network that can sort all 4-element input lists. List elements
move through the network from left to right. At each comparison (represented by a ver-
tical bar) if the top integer is larger than the bottom, then list elements are swapped, else
they are left alone. Here, the sorting network compares elements (1,2), (0,3), (0,1), (2,3)
and (1,2) in 4 parallel steps: the network has depth 4. Whilst each step must be per-
formed in strict order, multiple comparisons within one stepe.g., (0,1) and (2,3) at step
3can be performed in either order, or at the same time. When hard coded as a parallel
algorithm, the depth of sorting networks is very important (though not considered in this
section).
Figure 6.7, right, shows an example list [4,9,8,2] being input into the network. Since
9 > 8, step 1 swaps elements 1 and 2, leaving [4,8,9,2]. Step 2 swaps integers 4 and
2, leaving [2,8,9,4]. Since 2 < 8, step 3 leaves elements 0 and 1 in position, but swaps
integers 9 and 4, leaving [2,8,4,9]. Finally, step 4 swaps integers 8 and 4, outputting a
fully sorted list [2,4,8,9]. Following this procedure, any 4-element list will be sorted.
In this section, 45-comparison networks are evolved to sort 13-element input lists.
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Figure 6.7: Left: standard graphical representation of a 4-element sorting network with 5
comparisons. Right: example list input [4,9,8,2] is sorted, producing output [2,4,8,9].
6.3.2 Set Up
For historical reasons4, 13-element sorting networks have been chosen to coevolve. Rather
than attempt an assault on the minimal length record, however, the aim is to observe the
difference in performance that varying parasite virulence induces.
The model used here is loosely based upon Hillis’ original scheme, however, as Hillis
was primarily interested in optimisation, several changes are implemented. Hillis utilised
very large populations (of the order of 106 individuals), sexual recombination, and seeded
initial populations with the butterfly5 (Rosin, 1997). As the primary aim is not to nd
an optimal network, Hillis’ (1990) model is simplied by using asexual populations of
reduced size, and by initialising individuals at random (i.e., no buttery seeding). In
order to test the effects of spatial embedding, runs are performed under two conditions:
with spatial embedding and without spatial embedding. Under both conditions, hosts and
parasites evolve on a toroidal grid, with exactly one host and one parasite occupying each
location and playing each other.
With Spatial Embedding For each grid location, g, a tournament is played between indi-
viduals in the Von Neumann neighbourhood (i.e., centre square and 4 nearest neighbours;
North, East, South, West). The highest scoring host and parasite leave (perhaps mutated)
progeny in the centre square, g, the following generation.
Without Spatial Embedding For each grid location, a host and a parasite are chosen from
two tournaments of 5 individuals each, randomly selected from across the gridhighest
scoring individual always choseneach leave (perhaps mutated) progeny at g.
Host networks consist of 45 pairs of integers, with each pair representing list elements
to be compared and, if necessary, swapped. Host mutation occurs at each loci with prob-
ability 0.02, producing a random integer in the range 1 to 13. Parasites each contain 40
unsorted 13-element lists. In order to preserve lists as permutations of the integers 1 to
4The shortest network currently known for this problem was discovered using a coevolutionary algo-
rithm (Juille´, 1995).
5The first 32 exchanges (the butterfly) in Green’s 60-comparison network are known to sort the vast
majority of inputs. As such, Hillis seeded every initial individual with the butterfly in order to encourage
optimisation.
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13, parasite mutation consists of swapping two elements of the listthis occurs at each
loci with probability 0.02. Both parasite and host population sizes are identical, with each
host attempting to sort exactly one parasitethat which shares the same grid location.
Without spatial embedding, therefore, parasites and hosts are essentially paired at random
each generation, however, with spatial embedding, specic host and parasite lineages are
more likely to meet repeatedly over multiple generations. Both hosts and parasites are
asexual.
A host is rewarded with tness proportional to the number of parasite lists that are
completely sorted. Reciprocally, parasites are rewarded for possessing lists that remain
unsorted. Maximum, Moderate and Null virulence and the Phantom parasite were each
tested. In conjunction, Random parasites with no heredity were also tested so as to com-
pare the coevolutionary results of each virulence scheme against what is effectively stan-
dard evolution. In order to collect accurate statistics, 30 runs were carried out for each
condition with population sizes ranging from 25 to 225. An advantage of this problem
domain is that an absolute, objective tness measure of hosts is possible: networks are
given every possible input to sort6 with the percentage of correctly sorted lists determin-
ing an absolute tness performance. A host network that can sort 100% of all possible
inputs is an optimal network.
Under each condition, performance is compared by calculating the mean of the ab-
solute performance of the best individual discovered each run. It should be noted that
(like the numbers game, section 6.1) the coevolutionary system has no knowledge of this
absolute tness performance; it is merely a way to record comparable results.
6.3.3 Results
6.3.3.1 Non-Spatial Model
Figure 6.8 displays the results of coevolving sorting networks without spatial embedding.
The ve conditions are labelled Maximum, Moderate, Null, Phantom and Random. Each
graph shows the mean (over 30 runs) of the current best-so-far network performance.
Without spatial embedding, the Moderate and Null conditions signicantly outper-
form Maximum, Phantom and Random conditions, particularly when population size is
small. However, this performance difference reduces as population size is increased, sug-
gesting thatsince disengagement becomes progressively less likely as population sizes
increasereducing virulence improves performance by diminishing the effects of disen-
6The set of input lists can be calculated efficiently by using the zero-one principle: ‘a network can sort
every input list if and only if it can sort every binary input list’ (Knuth, 1973).
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Figure 6.8: Coevolution of minimal length sorting networks with global (non-spatial)
interactions. As population size increases, the number of generations graphed is reduced
to depict approximately equivalent lengths of units of computational time.
gagement (rather than for some other reason).
Maximum does not perform signicantly better than Random until population size
reaches 100. Considering the weak selective pressure induced by Random parasites this
is a poor result, again suggesting that Maximum virulence produces long periods of dis-
engagement. Indeed, upon scrutinising individual runs (not shown), this can be observed.
6.3.3.2 Spatial Model
When spatial embedding is implemented (gure 6.9) Moderate and Null conditions sig-
nicantly outperform Maximum, Phantom and Random conditions across all population
sizes. Once again, this can be understood in terms of disengagement. Spatial embed-
ding exacerbates the asymmetrical advantage favouring parasitesas host and parasite
lineages repeatedly meet over many generations, parasites are able to specialise against
specic host weaknesses (overtting or overspecialising). As spatial embedding allows
only geographically local interactions, this effect is largely independent of population
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Figure 6.9: Coevolution of minimal length sorting networks with local (spatial) inter-
actions. As population size increases, the number of generations graphed is reduced to
depict approximately equivalent lengths of units of computational time.
size. Whilst the Maximum condition ensures that it is very difcult for hosts to engage,
Moderate and Null encourage engagement by stopping parasites from overtting host id-
iosyncrasies, thus resulting in improved performance.
These results are suggestive, but are certainly not conclusive. Evolving minimum-
comparison sorting networks is a complex problem domain, making it difcult to analyse.
However, we would expect the list-sorting problem to exhibit the kind of asymmetry that
led to disengagement in the counting-ones problem. Being a challenging set of lists is
much easier, at least at the outset of coevolution, than being an accomplished list sorter.
Could this asymmetry account for the relatively slow progress made by conventional co-
evolution? If this type of initial asymmetry is a feature of many coevolutionary optimisa-
tion problems, reducing parasite virulence in some way could turn out to be an approach
with wide application.
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6.4 Dynamic Parasite Virulence
6.4.1 Rationale
Until this point, reduced parasite virulence has been implemented with xed parameter
value λ. However, in order to drive a system to higher levels of performance, it is likely
that varying λ over the course of a run will be necessary (see discussion, section 6.1.3.2).
Virulence must simultaneously remain low enough to maintain engagement, but be high
enough to encourage progress by imposing strong selective pressure. As the system moves
through genotype space, the best compromise value for λ is likely to vary.
In domains more realistic than the numbers game and the coin toss game, problem
asymmetry will not tend to be constant over the course of evolution. Initially, one popu-
lation may enjoy an advantage over the other in terms of the ease with which successful
mutant counter-adaptations can be generated. Subsequently, this asymmetry may wax
and wane, or even reverse: a population of near-optimal sorting algorithms may enjoy
this type of advantage over their parasitic competitors. Under these conditions, in order
to maintain an ideal balance between engagement and selective pressure, λ values may
need to be constantly varied (for each population). The obvious way to address these
concerns is to produce an algorithm that dynamically adapts virulence levels in response
to the current state of the coevolutionary system.7
Here, a methodology for producing a process capable of dynamically moderating the
virulence function of parasites is developed. Still in its formative stages, this preliminary
work is primarily a proof of concept.
6.4.2 Measuring Engagedness
To create a dynamic virulence function, a quantiable measure of disengagement is neces-
sary: it is not sufcient to qualify systems as slightly or fully engaged. This section intro-
duces a method for dening the disengagement of a systema metric of disengagement
to be used to vary parasite virulence dynamically. Ideally, any metric should be informa-
tive, robust and computationally inexpensive.
Coevolutionary disengagement occurs when there is a lack of discrimination between
the relative tness scores of individuals. Thus, it is easy to intuit that discrimination is a
good indicator of engagedness. Since discrimination is easy to calculate, it is used here
to vary virulence.
7Initial work on a manually-guided virulence algorithm is underway (refer to section 7.6); allowing
human controllers to vary the value(s) of λ, as required, during the course of a run.
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Discrimination may be simply measured by the standard deviation of (relative) t-
ness scores within a population: more variation implies more discrimination, and thus
more engagement. However, standard deviation is sensitive to the distribution of tness
scoresmultimodal distributions are not accurately reectedand does not offer a max-
imum value that can easily equate to full engagement. Thus, for the purpose of varying
virulence, standard deviation is not an ideal statistic. For this reason, a novel (and slightly
contrived) method of approximating engagement is developed here.
Since the relative tness of an individual is measured as the success against a sample
of opponents, there are a discrete number of possible tness levels that each individual,
g, can achieve. In the numbers game, for example, each individual can win, lose or draw
against each opponent in the sample, S. Thus, there are 1+2|S| possible discrete values of
tness. By considering each of these values as an equivalence classindividuals in each
class have equivalent tnessdiversity within a population can be estimated, simply,
by calculating the proportion of classes containing at least one member.8 At least one
equivalence class must always be non-empty. In a disengaged population every individual
has the same relative tnessall individuals are equivalentand engagement is 0. If
individuals are found in all equivalence classes, or sparsely distributed amongst many
classes, then the population is maximally discriminated. Let C be the total number of
equivalence classes, c be the number of non-empty classes, and N be population size,
then engagement ε is calculated as:
ε =


c−1
C−1
if C < N
c−1
N−1
otherwise
For example, if 8 out of 11 possible classes are non-empty (population size 20), then
ε = 0.7; if 6 out of 40 are non-empty (population size 21) then ε = 0.25.
6.4.3 Implementation
Below, two dynamic virulence functions are introduced: Dynamic 1 and Dynamic 2.
Whilst both utilise ε (described above) to vary virulence, Dynamic 1 is designed to tend
towards lower levels of virulence, λ, than Dynamic 2.
Parasite Fitness:
f(x, λ) =
2x
λ
−
x2
λ2
8If there are more equivalence classes than there are individuals, then diversity is calculated as the
proportion of non-empty classes to population size.
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Dynamic Virulence 1:
λ =

 0.5 if ε ≤ 0.5ε otherwise
Dynamic Virulence 2:
λ =


0.5 if ε < 0.25
2ε if 0.25 ≤ ε ≤ 0.5
1.0 otherwise
The virulence functions Dynamic 1 and Dynamic 2 each produce a set of curves which
range from Null to Maximum (refer to gure 5.2). However, Dynamic 2 will often result
in higher virulence, λ, than Dynamic 1. Consider Dynamic 1: if ε ≤ 0.5, a Null virulence
curve is produced; if ε ≥ 0.5 then a λ = ε virulence curve is produced. Consider Dynamic
2: if ε ≤ 0.25, a Null virulence curve is produced; if 0.25 ≤ ε ≤ 0.5 then a λ = 2ε curve,
between Null and Maximum, is produced; if ε ≥ 0.5 then a Maximum virulence curve is
produced.9
It is assumed that dynamic virulence will aid coevolutionary progress by reducing
virulence to counteract disengagement, when necessary, whilst increasing virulence to
encourage periods of rapid evolution at other times. In the following section these as-
sumptions are tested.
6.4.4 Investigations
To investigate dynamic parasite virulence the numbers game and sorting network domains
are utilised once again. To aid comparison with previous results (sections 6.16.3), ex-
periments are repeated under the same conditions.
6.4.4.1 The Numbers Game
Following the set up of section 6.1.2, gure 6.10 displays three typical runs of the num-
bers game with parasite mutation bias Bpar = 0.75 and mutation rate m = 0.03. The same
initial conditions (random seed) as gure 6.1 are used for each run. When employing max-
imally virulent parasites (gure 6.10, left) the system twice disengages. However, swap-
9Although the curves chosen for Dynamic Virulence 1 and 2 are piece-wise linear, there is no reason to
expect this to be optimal. Indeed, it is quite likely that it is not. Virulence may well be more sensitive to
some values of ε than others, making non-linear curves more practical. However, since this work is only
intended as a conceptual proof, the simple (piece-wise) curves described above are sufficient.
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Figure 6.10: The Numbers Game dynamic virulence.
ping to Dynamic 2 at generation 250 circumvents the second period of disengagement
(gure 6.10, centre). Utilising Dynamic 2 from the start (gure 6.10, right) maintains
system engagement throughout. In comparison to Moderate virulence (see gure 6.1),
Dynamic 2 maintains a higher level of performance, occasionally reaching optimality.
Dynamic 1 (not shown) maintains a slightly lower level of performance, more similar to
that achieved by Moderate virulence (gure 6.1). Hence, the dynamic virulence functions
are both capable of reducing disengagement in the numbers game.
To test whether dynamic virulence reduces disengagement more generally, the exper-
iments of section 6.1.3.1 were repeated. Figure 6.11 displays the result of 30 runs using
host and parasite tournament size Th = Tp = 5, mutation rate m = [0.005, 0.050] and
parasite bias range Bpar = [0.5, 0.99]. Across all levels of asymmetry, Dynamic 1 results
in very little disengagement. Comparing gure 6.3, Dynamic 1 is outperformed only by
Null virulence when asymmetry is very large (parasite bias and mutation rate is high);
when asymmetry is very low, Dynamic 1 outperforms Null virulence. More likely to en-
courage higher levels of virulence, λ, Dynamic 2 does not perform as well as Dynamic
1 when asymmetry is large. Comparing gure 6.3, Dynamic 2 performs slightly better
than the Phantom Parasite, but worse than Moderate virulence. Both dynamic functions
perform much better than Maximum virulence.
In general, the dynamic functions appear able to reduce disengagement in the numbers
game. Can they also encourage near-optimal solutions with high values of n?
In section 6.1.3.2, the effects of virulence upon the performance of coevolution was
tested by ensuring populations maintained engagement. This was achieved by making
the host population an exact replica of the parasite population each generation. Results
suggested that Maximum virulence, reaching a mean level of 99.1% (30 runs), produces
the highest performance. Performance was shown to reduce with virulence.
To test the dynamic virulence functions, the experiment in section 6.1.3.2 was re-
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Figure 6.11: The average of 50 runs (each 600 generations) of the numbers game using
dynamic virulence.
peated. Impressively, Dynamic 1 averaged 99.2 ± 0.33% (95% condence limit) and
Dynamic 2 averaged 99.0± 0.76%; much higher than that achieved by Moderate (94.8±
1.50%) and Null (75.1 ± 2.59) virulence. This is easily explained. In each run, popula-
tions are manipulated to remain highly engaged (large ε). Thus, for prolonged periods,
the dynamic functions exhibit Maximum virulence. The resulting performance is very
high.
In the numbers game, at least, the dynamic virulence hypotheses appear correct. Dy-
namic 1 and 2 produce efcient coevolution and near optimal performance by utilising
high virulence during times of high engagement, and low virulence, when required, to
stop disengagement.
6.4.4.2 Sorting Networks
The previous section demonstrated that the dynamic functions exhibit the properties re-
quired of a self-moderating virulence function. To test the generality of these observa-
tions, this section investigates Dynamic 1 and 2 in the more complex domain of sorting
networks. In section 6.3, it was demonstrated that reducing the virulence of parasites can
aid in the coevolutionary optimisation of sorting networks. To test Dynamic 1 and 2, the
experiments of section 6.3 were repeated under the same conditions. The average results
of 30 runs are shown in gure 6.12.
Under both global (non-spatial; gure 6.12, top) and local (spatial; gure 6.12, bot-
tom) interactions, the dynamic virulence functions achieve high performance across all
population sizes. Comparing these results with gures 6.8 and 6.9, it can be observed that
Dynamic 1 and 2 perform at a level statistically indistinguishable from Null and Moderate
virulence (but much higher than Maximum, Random and the Phantom Parasite). Under
the assumption that higher virulence encourages a greater level of performanceif en-
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Figure 6.12: Results of coevolving sorting networks. The dynamic virulence functions,
Dynamic 1 and Dynamic 2, perform equivalently to Moderate and Null virulence (com-
pare gures 6.8 and 6.9), but much better than Maximum, Random and the Phantom
Parasite.
gagement is maintainedthis is unexpected.
Throughout all runs, for the majority of generations, ε varies between 0.2 and 0.5. At
such times, Dynamic 1 exhibits Null virulence; thus, it is little wonder that Dynamic 1
and Null virulence perform equivalently. However, the behaviour of Dynamic 2 is less
easy to understand. Regularly exhibiting high or Maximum virulence, it is surprising that
Dynamic 2 does not outperform Dynamic 1: if anything, it performs slightly worse (not
statistically signicant). The reason for this is not clear; perhaps periods of high virulence
push the system to near-disengagement, thus removing useful host diversity.
Given the preliminary nature of these experiments, the sorting network results are
not entirely disappointing; much work is left to be done in this area. Firstly, the current
process of measuring engagement, ε, is fairly crude; it is likely that much better measure-
ments exist. Secondly, translating ε to λ via the dynamic virulence functions can also be
improved. Rather than calculate λ as a linear (truncated) function of ε, perhaps dynamic
virulence should be sensitive to particular engagement values (a non-linear function), or
take the engagement of previous generations into consideration (evolutionary momen-
tum). Finally, it is possible that the sorting network domain is not suitable for dynamic
virulence; other domains of study should be considered (see section 6.5).
In conclusion, this section has succeeded in demonstrating that virulence can be dy-
namically manipulated during run time on the basis of system engagement. As proof of
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concept, this is a valuable preliminary result.
6.5 Summary
The reduced parasite virulence technique (introduced in chapter 5) has been shown to
combat disengagement in a number of domains, under a spectrum of conditions. When
compared to the Phantom Parasite (introduced in section 3.4.5)the only domain inde-
pendent competitorreduced virulence performed favourably in all investigations. Fur-
ther, reduced virulence has been shown to complement standard genetic diversity main-
tenance techniques (such as resource sharing; introduced in section 3.4.2); it is not an
alternative tool. Finally, a rst attempt at dynamic virulence has been introduced, demon-
strating that virulence can be automatically varied with system engagement.
The problem domains explored in this chapter were primarily chosen for simplic-
ity and resulting ease of analysis. However, the No Free Lunch theorem (Wolpert &
Macready, 1995) warns that reduced virulence will be effective on a particular subset of
problems only. Which problems are good candidates for the approach?
Firstly, the reduced virulence technique is likely to be of use in problems where a rea-
sonable (but not necessarily optimal) solution is required under strong constraints of lim-
ited time or computational resources (e.g., dynamic load allocation across a telecommu-
nications network) since reducing parasite virulence can accelerate rapid initial progress
towards high-quality solutions despite small population sizes.
Secondly, where the character of the problem is constantly changing and demands
constant evolutionary change in the solution population (such as maintaining a strong
immune response in a changing environment) reducing virulence is likely to improve
performance by encouraging and maintaining engagement.
Finally, for problem spaces where small genetic changes often give rise to qualitative
changes at the phenotype level and consequent discontinuous jumps in tness (e.g., chess
strategy) the reduced virulence technique may improve performance by promoting re-
engagement, when it occurs, rather than actively resisting it in the manner of traditional
coevolution.
Coevolutionary algorithms are very valuable and versatile tools, yet there remain an
ensemble of problems restricting their successful application. Hopefully, this chapter
has demonstrated that the introduction of reduced virulence has moved coevolutionary
computation (in general) one step closer to realising its potential.
Chapter 7
Visualizing Coevolutionary Dynamics
Evolutionary computation (EC) concerns the study of high-dimensional, time-varying
systems that exhibit complex dynamics on a number of time scales and levels of organi-
sation. Yet, before the potential of evolutionary algorithms can be fully realised, it is im-
perative that their behaviour is well understood. Informative and intuitive visualizations
offer a method of generating insight into evolutionary dynamics, but there has currently
been relatively little work in this area. While many idiosyncratic graphing techniques
have been developed for particular systems, there remains a reliance on simplistic plots
of summary statistics: visualizations that inherently disguise much system complexity.
Perhaps the only visualization technique designed specically for the study of coevo-
lutionary dynamics is the CIAO plot (Cliff & Miller, 1995, refer to section 3.4.1). As
a result, CIAO plots regularly appear in the coevolutionary literature. In this chapter,
an investigation of CIAO plots reveals the existence of previously unrecognised ambi-
guities in interpretation. To remedy this, it is recommended that CIAO plots be used as
part of a complementary suite of visualization tools, rather than in isolation. This multi-
visualization method is used to analyse a biological simulation of E. coli.
Following the investigations of CIAO plots, a rst attempt towards coevolutionary
steeringan interactive visualization toolis developed, demonstrating the possibility
of manipulating system parameters to guide/steer coevolving populations during run time.
The prospective future of (co)evolutionary steering for education, research and applica-
tion, is very exciting.
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7.1 Background
7.1.1 EC Visualization
A diverse array of EC visualization techniques exist: some represent the evolving popu-
lations, others the character of the problem being solved; some present information at the
end of a run, others show the development of a system during run time; some present loci-
or gene-level representations, some individual-level variables, and others population-level
statistics (e.g., Kapsalis & Smith, 1992; Dabs & Schoof, 1995; Collins, 1998; Bosman,
1999; Wu, De Jong, Burke, Ramsey, & Grefenstette, 1999; Pohlheim, 2001; Hart & Ross,
2001). However, of this wide variety, few have been published outside of technical re-
ports.
The range of visualization tools employed in evolutionary computing includes stan-
dard techniques such as various types of multi-dimensional scaling (e.g., Spears, 1994;
Collins, 1999; Pohlheim, 1999), Sammon mapping (Sammon, 1969; Dzwinel, 1994; em-
ployed by Dybowski, Collins & Weller, 1996) and quadcodes (Li & Loewn, 1987; inde-
pendently developed by Collins, 1997; Shine & Eick, 1997; Wiles & Tonkes, 2002), and
entirely novel approaches developed specically for dealing with EC issues such as tech-
niques for representing genotypic changes over evolutionary time (Wu et al., 1999; Hart
& Ross, 2001). However, none of these platforms or techniques has achieved signicant
penetration in the EC community, as of yet.
One stream of visualization research utilises EC theory by suggesting what type of
data will be informative, in what way, and in which situations. In addition to generating
useful visualization tools, this approach is intended to progress EC theory by providing
a richer insight into the behaviour of evolutionary systems. However, studies that have
combined EC visualization and theory are still relatively rare: Cliff and Miller (1995,
see below) proposed a visualization technique for detecting cycling in coevolutionary
systems; Harvey and Thompson (1996) explored the use of various visualization methods
in order to explain the role of neutral ridges in the evolutionary search space; Bedau
and Brown (1998) visualized an evolutionary activity metric; and Bullock (2001) used
visualization to demonstrate the biases inherent in a range of mutation operators.
With the considerable potential to build on these initial studies, the future of EC vi-
sualization, in general, seems bright. In the following section, the particular challenges
associated with visualizing coevolutionary systems are discussed.
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7.1.2 Visualizing Coevolutionary Systems
In an effort to either engineer articial adaptive systems or better understand natural sys-
tems, researchers have employed coevolutionary algorithms as design tools and simula-
tion models. However, while this research remains promising, it has raised several prob-
lematic issues. Perhaps the most pressing of these concerns our ability to understand the
dynamics of coevolutionary systems (refer to section 3.4).
In particular, there are inherent difculties associated with detecting coevolutionary
progress. Often, it is virtually impossible for an observer to know whether populations
are improving over time. A short-term improvement in tness, relative to contemporary
competitors, does not necessarily lead to long-term improvement in some objective sense,
since it is possible for coevolutionary systems to cycle: coevolving populations may fol-
low a repeating sequence of adaptive transitions.
In standard evolutionary algorithms, because the tness of an individual is measured
against a static function, continual progress can be detected as an improvement in tness
over time. However, this is not true of coevolutionary systems, where an individual’s
tness is measured relative to its contemporary opponents. When this type of relative
tness measure is plotted against time, individuals from different generations are being
compared using a metric which is itself varying unpredictably over time, since the oppo-
nents against which they were assessed will not, in general, have been the same. These
considerations suggest that such plots are not merely difcult to interpret, but are effec-
tively meaningless. Unfortunately, this ensures that detecting the occurrence of cycling
in either natural or articial systems is problematic, since an external observer cannot
determine, on the basis of relative tness measures, whether a coevolutionary system is
progressing, cycling, or drifting randomly.
In an attempt to circumvent this problem, Cliff and Miller (1995) proposed the CIAO
plot (refer to section 3.4.1) as a visualization tool for detecting coevolutionary progress.
At the conclusion of a coevolutionary run, CIAO plots can be constructed by pitting the
elite (i.e., best-scoring) individual from every generation against the elite opponent from
each ancestral generation and plotting the results as shaded cells in a matrix. In this way
individuals are directly assessed against the ancestors of their opponents. If, over many
generations, most individuals can beat their ancestral opponents, the matrix will exhibit
a consistent gradation in shading from dark cells at the origin to light cells at the leading
edge. This pattern suggests that there has been continual progress over the course of
coevolution, since individuals from later generations are outperforming their ancestors.
By contrast, coevolutionary cycling manifests itself as a diagonal banded pattern (see
section 7.2).
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In coevolutionary research, CIAO plots are a widely accepted problem-independent
visualization technique with few alternatives. However, the studies reported here explore
whether they are as easy to interpret as has previously been implied. In the following
sections, it is demonstrated that CIAO plots can be misleading even in a simple coevo-
lutionary domain. It is shown that coevolutionary cycling can fail to produce a charac-
teristic banded CIAO plot, resulting instead in a tartan pattern: a class of CIAO plot
that is commonly reported but has received little attention. In section 7.3, it is established
that tartan-like CIAO plots can result from cyclic coevolution that is irregular, or from
random drift. It is thus argued that CIAO plots are vulnerable to ambiguity and that, as a
result, their use should be accompanied by more problem-specic analysis.
7.2 CIAO Plots
Appearing in Lewis Carroll’s Through The Looking Glass, the Red Queen must continu-
ally run in order to maintain her position. No matter how fast she moves, the surrounding
landscape always keeps up with her.
van Valen (1973) made an analogy between the Red Queen and biological coevolution
after discovering a surprising trend concerning the probability of species extinction. After
analysing huge data sets collected across a wide range of biological taxa, van Valen (1973)
noticed that, counter to intuition, all groups for which data exist go extinct at a rate that
is constant for a given group. Assuming that species evolve in a relatively static envi-
ronment, one would expect benecial adaptations to accumulate over evolutionary time,
enabling progressive generations to be better equipped at defending against extinction.
To explain his ndings, van Valen proposed a new evolutionary law of extinction, with
the Red Queen Hypothesis as its central tenet: biotic forces provide the basis for self-
driving . . . perpetual motion of the effective environment. Any benecial adaptation by
a particular species is inevitably detrimental to other species inhabiting the same effective
environment. Coevolutionary forces will, in turn, select for specic counter-adaptations
in these species. In this way, adaptive advantage is continually eroded. In Red Queen
fashion, species continually struggle to maintain their relative tness.
One might expect Red Queen dynamics to drive a run-away process of continual
counter-adaptationa coevolutionary arms race. Such arms races are considered a pro-
found force driving evolutionary adaptation in the natural world, and have sometimes been
characterised as a source of strong selection for novel adaptations capable of accelerating
evolutionary progress (Dawkins & Krebs, 1979).
In order to take advantage of arms-race dynamics, the eld of evolutionary compu-
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tation has seized upon coevolution as an attractive alternative to standard evolutionary
optimisation. Living up to expectation, articial coevolution has had success in several
domains (refer to section 3.3 for a review). However, as an optimisation technique, co-
evolutionary search suffers from the relative nature of tness assessmentcoevolutionary
systems can be difcult to drive in a consistent, objectively progressive direction.
There are several ways in which an arms race can unfold. One side may win the
race, discovering an adaptation to which there is no available counter-adaptation. If co-
evolution is within a species, evolutionary stasis may be reached, but during between-
species coevolution the disadvantaged species may be driven extinct. Alternatively, one
population may temporarily win by outstripping the other to such an extent that the op-
ponents are no longer discriminated by selection: whilst a counter-adaptation may exist,
it has yet to be discovered (such disengagement is discussed further in section 3.4.5 and
throughout chapter 6). Finally, an arms race may cycle (see section 3.4.3), as populations
follow repeated trajectories through strategy space, discovering strategies that enjoy only
a temporary advantage over their opponents. From the perspective of coevolutionary opti-
misation, cyclic coevolution has gained the most attention. Since these cyclic trajectories
waste computational resources, it would be useful to detect (and ultimately prevent) their
occurrence; or, at least, to realize that the optimisation problem as-stated has a possibly
unanticipated set of unstable equilibria with no escape trajectory.
In general, one would like to know how coevolution is progressing. Has there been
steady and continuous improvement, or transient bursts of progress amidst long periods
of stasis? Is the system cycling, and, if it is, are the cycles regular? Frustratingly, the Red
Queen renders standard approaches to answering these questionsplotting individual t-
ness as it changes over timeobsolete (refer to section 3.4.1).
Consider a predator-prey arms race. As predators improve over evolutionary time, one
might expect them to catch more prey. The prey, however, are improving too. There is
no general reason to expect the average success of animals at out-running or out-witting
contemporary enemies, victims, prey or competitors, to improve over evolutionary time
(Dawkins & Krebs, 1979, italics added). This is a direct consequence of the Red Queen.
An improvement in any one species is countered by each coevolving species, resulting in
a deterioration of the effective environment (van Valen, 1973).
However, one might expect a progressive coevolutionary arms race to result in an
advantage for modern predators and prey over their ancestral adversaries. In nature, it is
difcult to perceive how a competition across evolutionary time may arise, without the use
of cloning or time-travel. Yet, in simulation it is quite feasible to carry out such ancestral
opponent competitions. Cliff and Miller developed this technique during a series of papers
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Figure 7.1: Schematic of a Current Individual versus Ancestral Opponents (CIAO) plot.
At each square (x, y) the result of competition between the A-elite from generation y and
the B-elite from generation x is plotted as a grey-scale value, with increasingly heavy
shading representing an increasing margin of victory in favour of A. The leading diagonal
(far-right) plots A-elite(g) against B-elite(g) for all generations, 0 ≤ g < N . The diagonal
immediately to the left plots each generation’s A-elite against the previous generation’s
B-elite. Horizontal rows plot the results of A-elite(y) against all ancestral B-elites(0 . . . y)
(adapted from Cliff & Miller, 1995).
in which they attempted to coevolve pursuer and evader strategies in continuous-time
neural-network controllers (Miller & Cliff, 1994a, 1994b; Cliff & Miller, 1995, 1996).
7.2.1 Plotting CIAO Contests
Once a coevolutionary run has terminated, ancestral opponent contests (competitions
against ancestral opponents) are carried out between the highest scoring individual of
each generation: the elite. The elite of population A (the A-elite) is pitted against
the elite of population B (the B-elite) in a series of contests. For each generation g of
coevolution, the A-elite(g) competes with the B-elite of the current, and each ancestral,
generation. Hence, A-elite(5) plays B-elite(5), B-elite(4), . . ., B-elite(0). The resulting
scores of each contest are normalised and converted into grey-scale values and plotted
on a 2-dimensional grid: the greater the victory in favour of the A-elite, the heavier the
shading of the relevant matrix cell (see gure 7.1, adapted from Cliff & Miller, 1995).
7.2.2 Progress and Cycling
Along with the invention of CIAO plots, Cliff and Miller left a lasting legacy: the idealised
plot. Idealised CIAO plots demonstrate the patterns that they predicted one would nd,
given either perfect continual coevolutionary progress, or perfect coevolutionary cycling.
Example schematics are shown in gure 7.2. Continuous progress appears as continuous
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Figure 7.2: Idealised CIAO plots showing smooth progress (left) and cycling with regular
period (right). With each horizontal row depicting the performance of one A-elite against
each ancestral B-elite, smooth progress produces a gradation in intensity from dark to
light: A-elites beat ancestral opponents, the more ancestral the greater the victory (i.e.,
the further left, the darker the cell). In contrast, regular cycling manifests as diagonal
banding. Whilst the latest A-elites beat recent ancestral B-elites (diagonals to the right
are dark), they perform less-well against more ancestral B-elites (middle diagonals are
light), but outperform even earlier ancestors (diagonals further left are dark), etc.
diagonal gradation from dark to light across the plot. Each individual beats its ancestral
opponents; the earlier the ancestor, the greater the victory. In contrast, coevolutionary
cycling produces diagonal banding. Whilst recent ancestral opponents are easily beaten,
elite opponents from a few generations earlier have the upper hand. As the contests span
increasing periods of evolutionary time, competitive advantage repeatedly transfers be-
tween novel and ancestral populations: the system is cycling.
7.2.3 Unpicking Tartan CIAO Plots
Since Cliff and Miller (1995) rst introduced CIAO plots for pursuit and evasion, they
have become widely accepted as a standard tool for visualizing coevolutionary progress.
As such, CIAO plots have received extensive use in the elds of evolutionary robotics,
(Floreano & Nol, 1997a, 1997b; Nol & Floreano, 1998; Stanley & Miikkulainen,
2002), the games of Go (Lubberts & Miikkulainen, 2001), 3-D Tic-Tac-Toe and Nim,
(Rosin & Belew, 1997), and in the coevolution of string generators and predictors (Ficici
& Pollack, 1998b).
However, the results obtained in these relatively complex domains rarely resemble
the idealised plots of Cliff and Miller. Even discounting noise, real CIAO plot visual-
izations are often qualitatively different from the ideal schematics. Many CIAO plots
exhibit a tartan patterna patchwork of unpredictable lines and rectangles across the plot
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Figure 7.3: Schematic of a tartan CIAO plot. Periods of competitive stasis (blocks of
uniform shade) are separated by sharp transitions in competitive advantage (block bound-
aries). Such an irregular pattern is referred to as tartan throughout this paper.
(gure 7.3 presents a hypothetical example). Of 22 plots found in the literature, 10 are
tartan in nature, 8 show progress (smooth gradation) and 4 show no progress (a largely
homogeneous plot). There are no examples of regular banding. In a tartan plot, blocks
of uniform shade represent periods of stasis bounded by adaptive innovations. Consider
RockPaperScissors, for example (see below): if the elites in both populations play Rock
from generation 50 onwards, until population A’s elite adopts Paper at generation 55, and
the B-elite adopts Scissors at generation 60, then the resulting CIAO plot will display a
grey rectangle with sides 5× 10 generations, cornered (50, 50).
Tartan CIAO plots have sometimes been interpreted as supporting evidence for cycling
(Floreano & Nol, 1997a, 1997b; Nol & Floreano, 1998). The principle reason appears
to be that, unlike the idealised progressive CIAO plot, there is little correlation between
grey-scale value and time. It is difcult to imagine how a jumble of dramatic jumps
between winning and losing can occur across evolutionary time in a continuously pro-
gressing coevolutionary system. How such a pattern relates to cycling, however, appears
unclear. It shall be shown (below) that although tartan plots of this kind are consistent
with coevolutionary change that is cyclic but irregular, it is dangerous to infer irregular
cycling from them uncritically. The following section demonstrates that tartan plots are,
in fact, ambiguous with respect to showing irregular cycling and/or random drift.
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7.3 Rock–Paper–Scissors: An Intransitive Domain
Here, coevolution is explored in a simple domain specically chosen to exhibit cyclic co-
evolutionary trajectories.1 To better understand the underlying coevolutionary dynamics,
several different visualizations are presented. However, whilst each individually offers
insight into the underlying coevolutionary dynamics, one cannot interpret them with con-
dence until information from the whole suite is considered: this is particularly true if
some are ambiguous.
This section considers the coevolution of two populations of strategies for the simple
parlour game RockPaperScissors (RPS). In each bout of the game, two players simulta-
neously choose one of the three possible moves (Rock, Paper, Scissors), the winner being
decided according to an intransitive superiority relationship (Rock blunts Scissors, Scis-
sors cuts Paper, Paper covers Rock; draws are shared). Although the global optimum for
either player is to play each move with equal probability, any deviation from this strategy
on the part of either population encourages a complementary counter-deviation.
If one population is biased in favour of playing Paper, for example, the other will
benet from playing Scissors more often than one third of the time. As the frequency
with which Scissors is played increases, the rst population is under selection pressure
to increase the frequency with which its members play Rock. In response, the opponent
population will tend to favour Paper. In this way, while both populations are continually
favouring offspring better able to compete against their current opponents, in the longer
term, the populations are continually and repetitively cycling through a sequence of glob-
ally sub-optimal strategies as they seek to exploit the temporary biases of their opponents.
7.3.1 Study 1: A Simple Encoding
In this baseline study the inherent intransitivity of the RockPaperScissors (RPS) game,
in combination with the smooth tness landscape resulting from a simple genetic encod-
ing, produces regular coevolutionary cycling. The visualizations that reect this include
CIAO plots that closely resemble the idealised banded plot (gure 7.2). For the most part
this section introduces fairly straightforward results and visualizations which are intended
to contrast with the more complex results from the subsequent studies.
For the simple encoding, each genome consists of three positive integers that sum to
100. Each integer represents the probability of choosing one of the three game moves,
Rock (R), Paper (P), or Scissors (S). For example, genome {50, 0, 50} represents an indi-
1Rock–Paper–Scissors is the simplest game to exhibit underlying intransitivity—a  b  c  a—likely
to induce cycling.
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vidual that chooses to play Rock and Scissors with equal likelihood, but will never play
Paper. Genome {33, 33, 34} represents a near-optimal individual that plays each move
randomly with almost equal probability.
During reproduction, mutation occurs with probability 0.1 per locus. A mutated gene
is incremented by an integer drawn at random from the uniform distribution [−30 . . . 30].
Following mutation, the genome is normalised to once again sum to 100.
Two reproductively isolated (initially randomised) populations, each containing 20
RPS players, are coevolved for 256 generations. Each generation, every individual is
pitted against every member of the opponent population. Each game consists of 10 bouts,
with each individual choosing R, P, or S probabilistically on the basis of their genes.
Throughout a generation, an individual accumulates a score from its 200 competitions.
Individuals reproduce asexually, with tournaments biasing selection in favour of high-
scoring individuals. The winner of each randomly assembled 5-member tournament is
chosen to reproduce.
7.3.1.1 Feature Detection
To assist the detection of features within the CIAO plots reported in this chapter, a three
stage processing of the raw images is employed. The method chosen (described below)
is generalizable and easy to implement. Further, Marr (1982) has suggested that it may
have biological implications as a model for the very rst stages of visual processing. For
further details, one should refer to Marr (1982, chapter 2).
1. Gaussian Blur: A 2-dimensional Gaussian lter (radius r) is initially applied to the
image; effectively removing structures smaller than the standard deviation of the
Gaussian distribution. As it is smooth and omnidirectional, a Gaussian distribution
is appropriate for blurring as it is unlikely to introduce structure that was not present
in the original image.
2. Laplacian of Gaussian (LoG): The Laplacian (∇2) is an isotropic second-order
differential operator that can be used to detect intensity changes in a blurred image,
as seen at the scale of the particular Gaussian employed (determined by the standard
deviation σ). The Laplacian operator is used to locate the zero-crossings of an
imagechanges from dark to light, or light to darkthus generating a contour
map.
In mathematical notation, the blur of an image function I(x, y) with a Gaussian
function G is denoted by G ∗ I , read as G convolved with I. The Laplacian of
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Figure 7.4: Study 1 results. CIAO plots depicting one representative run over N = 256
generations. From left to right: (1) Diagonal banding in the raw data plot suggests regular
cycling; (2) A large Gaussian (r = 20) removes ne detail; (3) LoG (σ = 8) produces a
contour map; (4) The image is binarized. The fully processed plot displays clear diagonal
banding.
 0  50  100  150  200  250
generation
Probability A-elite plays Paper > 0.66
Probability B-elite plays Rock > 0.66
Figure 7.5: Study 1 results. Event plot for a single representative run, labelling the gener-
ations in which the A-elite plays Paper or the B-elite plays Rock with probability 0.66 or
greater. The repeated Paper follows Rock event sequence suggests regular cycling.
this is denoted ∇2(G ∗ I) = (∇2G) ∗ I , read as the Laplacian of Gaussian (LoG)
convolved with I.
3. Binarize: Finally, the direction of each zero-crossing is highlighted by binarizing
the image. Areas with negative values are coloured black whilst areas with positive
values are left white.
Whilst stages 1 and 2 of the feature detection process naturally combine into one
operation, throughout this chapter they will be performed independently. This enables the
result of blurring to be viewed before zero-crossings are detected. Throughout, r and σ
values are chosen through trial and error: values are reduced to detect smaller features,
for larger features they are increased.
7.3.1.2 Results
Throughout this section, all data is the result of one representative coevolutionary run.
Figure 7.4 displays four CIAO plots. From left to right, plot 1 displays the raw data
set, with subsequent CIAO plots presenting the same data after each stage of the image
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Figure 7.6: Study 1 results. Graphs plotting the probability values of playing each RPS
move. Top-left: the A-elites. Top-right: the mean probabilities for all individuals in
population A. Bottom-left: the B-elites. Bottom-right: the mean probabilities for all
individuals in population B. The system completes one full cycle between generations
120 and 165.
processing routine described in section 7.3.1.1. In plot 1, regular patterns and possible
diagonal banding are discernable, potentially indicating regular coevolutionary cycling.
After blurring the image with a large Gaussian of radius 20 pixels, small features are
removed and diagonal banding becomes more pronounced (plot 2). A contour map is
produced using a Laplacian of Gaussian (LoG) with standard deviation 8 pixels: diagonal
banding is clear (plot 3). Plot 4 shows the result of binarizing the contour map in order
to highlight the direction of any zero-crossings. The regularity and clarity of diagonal
banding in the fully processed plot is striking. A comparison with the idealised banded
CIAO plot of gure 7.2 allows plot 4 to be easily classied as demonstrating coevolu-
tionary cycling with regular period: the feature detection routine has clearly enhanced the
interpretability of the original CIAO plot data.
However, to have condence in the nature of cycling, further visualizations were con-
structed. For this purpose, an event plot is used to highlight each occurrence of specic
events during coevolution: evidence for (or against) cycling is generated by the result-
ing sequence of events. Assuming events are chosen adequately, regular cycling should
manifest as a repeated sequence of events with xed period. The event plot of gure 7.5
records the occurrence of events associated with the play of the best scoring individual of
each population: the A-elite and B-elite. The plot is marked for each generation in which
the A-elite plays P , or the B-elite plays R, with probability p > 0.66. Figure 7.5 clearly
shows a repeated sequence. As expected, once B-elites regularly play Rock, A-elites
quickly evolve to play Paper. After approximately 40 generations, the system completes a
full cycle with B-elites once again predominantly playing Rock. The coevolutionary sys-
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Figure 7.7: Study 1 results. State transition table. Repeatedly following state transitions
from Scissors to Rock, from Rock to Paper and from Paper to Scissors, the system
is clearly cycling in a regular manner.
tem appears to be following a cyclic trajectory with regular period. In general, if mutation
rate or selection pressure (in the form of tournament size) increases, the cycle period
decreases.
In gure 7.6, the elite (i.e., best-scoring) and average (the mean of all individuals)
strategy of each population are depicted for a representative period of evolutionary time.
The vertical axis represents the probability of playing each of the three possible moves.
One full cycle takes place during the 45 generations depicted. At generation 120, the
elite member of population B (bottom-left) always plays Paper (genotype {0, 100, 0}).
Within 5 generations, Scissors dominates the elite strategy in population A (top-left). As a
counter-adaptation, population B converges on Rock, which in turn drives the elite of pop-
ulation A to play Paper with 90% probability (genotype {10, 90, 0}) by generation 140.
This completes a half-cycle. Scissors becomes dominant for population B elites around
generation 150, followed by Rock for population A, and nally the cycle is completed
around generation 165 as the elite strategy of population B returns to Paper (genotype
{3, 91, 6}). The mean population strategies (right) lag their elite counterparts slightly, but
demonstrate the same trend. Notice that each population is able to counter-adapt to its
opponents in a smooth, regular manner.
Figure 7.7 tabulates the state transitions of study 1; classied as follows. Each pop-
ulation enters a new state, m, the first time an elite of that population plays move m ∈
{R,P,S} with probability p > 0.66. Figure 7.7 records the transitions of each population
in response to the other. Thus, the rst time an elite of either population plays move
m ∈ {R,P,S} with p > 0.66, the system enters initial state, m. A transition occurs the
next time the opposing population enters a new state. For example, if the A-elite of gen-
eration 1 plays Rock with p > 0.66, then population A (and the system as a whole) enters
state P. Suppose the B-elite of generation 5 plays Paper with p > 0.66, then population
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Figure 7.8: Complex genotypes encode a deterministic nite state machine (FSM) that
governs player behaviour. State transitions are dictated by an opponent’s play (represented
by transition labels). Here we see that machine A beats machine B over a ve-bout
contest. The nal score is 3:2 in favour of A. As both machines have returned to their
initial states, further bouts will produce repeated play.
B enters state P and a transition from R to P is recorded. The next transition occurs
when population A enters a new state: if the A-elite of population 7 plays Scissors with
p > 0.66, then there is a transition from P to S. Figure 7.7 displays the state transi-
tions of an entire run. As expected, the system repeatedly follows the state transitions
from Scissors to Rock, from Rock to Paper and from Paper to Scissors, with little
deviation. Clearly, the system is cycling in a regular and predictable manner.
In summary, study 1 has (predictably) demonstrated that simple regular cycling can
manifest itself on CIAO plots as cyclic banding, closely resembling the idealised banded
CIAO plot in gure 7.2. In conjunction, it has also been demonstrated that greater insight
into cyclic coevolutionary behaviour can be obtained through the additional use of alter-
native, perhaps problem-specic, visualizations. In the following section, the complexity
of the genetic encoding is increased to demonstrate that, whilst cycling may persist, the
ease with which it is visualized is considerably reduced.
7.3.2 Study 2: A Complex Encoding
In this study a more complex genetic encoding scheme is employed. Although the strate-
gic structure of the RPS game remains unchanged, by increasing the complexity of the
strategies available to players, more complex courses of coevolutionary adaptation are
available. It is intended that this new encoding will inuence the system’s coevolutionary
dynamics, ensuring that the search for counter-adaptations more closely resembles that
experienced in more realistic models of coevolutionary competition.
Here, genomes code for a deterministic nite state machine (FSM). Example genomes
are presented in gure 7.8. The start node denes the choice of play during the rst bout of
a contest. In gure 7.8, both individuals initially play Scissors. From each node there are
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exactly three out-edges (which may be self-connecting), with each transition representing
an opponent’s move. In gure 7.8, since both individuals begin by playing Scissors, each
follows the state transition S. A returns to the start node (0) and continues to play Scissors
whilst B transfers to a new node (1) with state Paper. In the second bout of the game, A’s
Scissors beats B’s Paper. A follows the P transition associated with B’s play and once
again returns to state S (node 0). In response to A’s Scissors, B follows the S transition
to a new node (2) with state Rock. B is victorious in bout three, as Rock beats Scissors.
A moves to state P (node 1) and B remains at state R (node 2). Figure 7.8 details the full
results of a ve-bout contest.
Each node contains a unique integer identier, a play state, at least one in-edge and
three out-edges, each associated with an opponent’s play and each connecting to a legal
node. Both populations are initialised with random, self-connected, single-node FSMs.
During reproduction, three mutation operators are employed (described below).
Node Mutation: With probability 0.03 per genome, a node is either added or removed.
Any edges previously connected to a removed node become self-connections. FSMs
were constrained to have between one and one hundred nodes. In practice, however,
FSMs rarely grew above 10 nodes.
State Mutation: With probability 0.02 per node, a node state is mutated to one of the
other two states, chosen at random.
Edge Mutation: With probability 0.02 per edge, edges are mutated by randomly chang-
ing the node to which the edge is an in-edge.
Note that the deterministic FSM encoding employed in this study (and study 3) does
not allow individuals to reach the global optimum (available in study 1) of playing each
move randomly with equal probability, irrespective of opponent play: to achieve this a
non-deterministic FSM encoding is necessary. However, this is not problematic since a
direct comparison between the results of studies 1, 2, and 3 is not an objective of this sec-
tion. Rather, the impact of regular and irregular cycling on CIAO plot data is of primary
concern. It shall be shown that the deterministic encoding used here is a good choice in
this respect.
Two reproductively isolated (initially randomised) populations, each containing 25
RPS players, are coevolved for 256 generations. Each generation, every individual is
pitted against every member of the opponent population. Each game consists of 10 bouts,
with each individual choosing R, P, or S deterministically on the basis of their genes.
Throughout a generation, an individual accumulates a score from its 250 competitions.
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Figure 7.9: Study 2 results. CIAO plots depicting one representative run over N = 256
generations. From left to right: (1) The raw data plot exhibits a tartan pattern that is
difcult to interpret; (2) A large Gaussian (r = 20) removes ne detail; (3) LoG (σ = 8)
produces a contour map; (4) The image is binarized. Whilst the fully processed plot does
not exhibit diagonal banding, some vertical banding is clear. However, one cannot predict
regular cycling from this image.
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generation
Probability A-elite plays Paper > 0.66
Probability B-elite plays Rock > 0.66
Figure 7.10: Study 2 results. Event plot for a single representative run, labelling the gen-
erations in which the A-elite plays Paper or the B-elite plays Rock with effective proba-
bility 0.66 or greater. The strong correlation between events suggests (perhaps irregular)
cycling.
Individuals reproduce asexually, with tournament selection biasing selection in favour of
high-scoring individuals. The winner of each randomly-assembled 3-member tournament
is chosen to reproduce.
7.3.2.1 Results
Throughout this section, all data is the result of one representative coevolutionary run.
Figure 7.9 displays four CIAO plots. From left to right, plot 1 displays the raw data
set, whilst subsequent CIAO plots display the same data after each stage of the image
processing routine described in section 7.3.1.1. Plot 1 (far left) presents a tartan pattern
qualitatively similar to the schematic shown in gure 7.3: irregular blocks of uniform
shading indicate periods of competitive stasis separated by rapid transitions in competitive
advantage. Plot 1 resembles CIAO plots obtained from more complex (practical) problem
domains (e.g., Floreano & Nol, 1997a, 1997b). The patchwork effect suggests a lack
of progress and may imply cycling. However, the image is difcult to interpret with
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Figure 7.11: Study 2 results. Graphs plotting the effective probabilities associated with
playing each move. Top-left: the A-elites. Top-right: the mean probabilities for all indi-
viduals in population A. Bottom-left: the B-elites. Bottom-right: the mean probabilities
for all individuals in population B. The populations evolve in response to each other,
resulting in an irregular cycle.
condence.
After carrying out the same image-processing process employed in study 1, the plot
displays some vertical banding and one diagonal band to the right of the image, but re-
mains difcult to interpret. Whilst the vertical banding may be a result of bias in the
original CIAO plot designadaptive mutations will necessarily appear as banding on
the horizontal (if A-elite) or vertical (if B-elite)the black diagonal band to the right of
the plot is potentially interesting. Perhaps the diagonal reects a competitive advantage
enjoyed by each population over its immediate ancestral opponents, or even regular cy-
cling that can be observed over short evolutionary time scales, but that is lost over longer
periods. Alternatively, perhaps the diagonal is an artefactual edge-effect of the CIAO
plot: a result of the dark plot meeting a white background. In either case, whilst the
processed plot has highlighted some potentially interesting structures, ideal banding is
not exhibited. Considering the intransitive dominance relationships inherent within the
RPS domain, however, one might suspect cycling to be taking place (particularly when
the genetic encoding does not allow global stability to be reached). To investigate the
underlying coevolutionary dynamics, further analysis is necessary.
The simplicity of the RPS domain enables us to gain insights into its coevolutionary
dynamics by direct observation of genotypes and phenotypes as populations change over
generations. At the beginning of a run, when each player’s FSM has only one node,
all strategies are simple. Each player repeatedly chooses the same play irrespective of
its opponent’s behaviour. Over evolutionary time, more complex strategies arise. These
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multi-node FSMs change state in response to an opponent’s play. However, as more time
passes, simple strategies, such as always play Scissors, again begin to dominate. This
process often repeats several times throughout a coevolutionary run.
For a coevolutionary system to be described as cycling, it must repeatedly enter the
same or similar states in the same or similar order. Regular cycling repeats with xed
period, irregular cycling does not. Either class may fail to enter exactly the same set of
states during each cycle, or maintain exactly the same ordering over these states during
each cycle. However, each is clearly distinguishable from random drift. Whilst a ran-
domly drifting system may return to previous states over evolutionary time, unless there
is a heavy bias inuencing the random walk (perhaps due to some bias within the ge-
netic encoding or genetic operators, e.g., Bullock, 1999, 2001), the trajectory of change is
unpredictable. Any useful method for detecting coevolutionary cycling should be able to
distinguish cases of regular or irregular cycling from stochastic repetition that may arise
due to random drift. It shall be shown that, when used in isolation, this is something CIAO
plots struggle to do.
Choosing suitable visualizations for complex problems is often challenging. The
space of variable length FSMs is difcult to represent graphically. In order to re-apply
some of the graphing techniques used for the simple encoding scheme, some extra work
is necessary.
FSM networks can be re-described simply using three probabilities: the likelihood of
playing each of the three possible moves. Since each FSM is a directed graph, an m-bout
contest against an opponent can be described by a path of length m through the graph. By
traversing each of the 3m possible m-length paths through the networkthe equivalent of
playing every possible gamethe effective probability of a network playing each of the
three possible moves can be determined. Since these probabilities are comparable to the
three probabilities encoded in the simple genomes of study one, they can be plotted in a
similar fashion. However, whilst the effective probabilities of FSMs are comparable to
the probabilities of study 1, they are not equivalent: deterministic FSMs do not behave
probabilistically but are sensitive to opponent play.
Figure 7.10 shows an event plot for study 2. The plot is marked for each generation in
which the A-elite plays P, or the B-elite plays R, with effective probability p > 0.66. The
system repeatedly moves through the same states in a similar sequence. B-elite plays
Rock is always followed by A-elite plays Paper. However, on 2 out of 8 occasions, the
system enters A-elite plays Paper without passing through B-elite plays Rock. The
repeating event plot sequence provides some evidence for irregular cycling: if cycling is
occurring, it is not as regular as that exhibited in gure 7.5.
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Figure 7.12: Study 2 results. State transition table showing predictable, but irregular,
cycling.
Cycling can be directly observed by plotting the effective probabilities of each popula-
tion’s elite and mean strategies during a particular (representative) coevolutionary period
(see gure 7.11). Whilst it is not perfectly predictable, sequential cycling can be observed
between generations 22-57. The B-elites (bottom-left) and B-means (bottom-right) com-
plete one cycle with the expected sequence SPRS. In response, the A-elites (top-left)
and A-means (top-right) also complete one cycle, but with the less predictable sequence
RSRP. However, the unexpected shift from S to R (rather than directly to P) at gener-
ation 49 can be explained by considering the system as a whole at generation 48. With
every individual in population A playing S (top-right) and every individual in population
B playing R (bottom-right), the system is disengaged in generation 48: every member of
population B is beating every member of population A. At this point, a novel mutation
of either Paper or Rock is benecial to population A: whilst Paper gives victory, Rock
allows a draw. Thus, the move from Scissors to Rock is a direct result of disengage-
ment and is not entirely unexpected (for a further discussion of disengagement, refer to
section 3.4.5). Such irregular cycling is conrmed by the state transition table of g-
ure 7.12. Whilst the system is most likely to move from R to P, to S, to R, etc., transitions
are not as predictable as those of study 1 (gure 7.12).
Comparing the graphs of elite strategies with those of the population mean strate-
gies in gure 7.11 shows that each population exhibits several variable-length periods of
strategic stasis. Typically, during these periods, the majority of population A (top) are
being beaten by the majority of population B (bottom). Unlike in gure 7.6, population
A appears unable to easily discover counter-adaptations to the successful adaptations of
population B. This is a result of the deterministic FSM encoding and the limitations of
the associated mutation operators. A desired mutation may be difcult to achieve. The
initial 57 generations of study 2 are shown in the expanded CIAO plot of gure 7.13. The
rapid changes in strategy depicted in gure 7.11 clearly reect the internal structure of
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Figure 7.13: Enlarged CIAO plot depicting the coevolutionary period graphed in g-
ure 7.11. The rapid strategy transitions depicted in gure 7.11 clearly reect the bound-
aries in the CIAO plot pattern.
the CIAO plot. The patchwork nature appears because the FSM mutation operators tend
to produce either no change in player strategy, or very rapid changes in behaviour.
The different nature of the coevolutionary dynamics generated in study 2 most likely
result from the ruggedness and/or neutrality introduced into the tness landscape by the
more complex genetic encoding scheme and associated genetic operators. Single muta-
tions, such as remove node, can result in large changes in player behaviour. By contrast,
it can often be difcult to make a small change to a player’s behaviour (e.g., increasing
the tendency to follow Rock with Paper) without altering several parts of the FSM, which
requires several separate mutation events. The simple genetic encoding scheme and asso-
ciated mutation operator of study 1 ensured that single mutations tended to have modest
phenotypic impact, yet most phenotypes were only a few mutations apart. In general, for
any population in study 2 some parts of strategy space will be less attainable than others
to a larger degree than was the case in study 1. The resulting CIAO plot is difcult to
interpret. However, alternative visualizations have shown that cycling is occurring, but
that it is irregular.
7.3.3 Study 3: Random Drift
Do banded and tartan CIAO plots directly imply regular and irregular cycling, respec-
tively? Can other coevolutionary trajectories lead to banded or tartan CIAO plots? In
particular, what kind of CIAO plot is generated by the kind of walk through strategy
space produced by random drift? As previously discussed, random drift can generate
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Figure 7.14: Study 3 results. CIAO plots depicting one representative run over N = 256
generations. From left to right: (1) The tartan pattern of the raw data plot is difcult to
interpret; (2) A large Gaussian (r = 20) removes ne detail; (3) LoG (σ = 8) produces
a contour map; (4) The image is binarized. Whilst there is no diagonal banding, some
horizontal banding is clear. However, one can neither predict nor rule out cycling on the
basis of the fully processed plot.
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generation
Probability A-elite plays Paper > 0.66
Probability B-elite plays Rock > 0.66
Figure 7.15: Study 3 results. Event plot labelling the generations of one representative
run in which the A-elite plays Paper or the B-elite plays Rock with effective probability
0.66 or greater. Given the lack of correlation between events, the likelihood of cycling
appears small.
jectories that revisit earlier states despite being non-cyclic. Can this kind of repetition
be distinguished from regular behaviour using CIAO plots? In order to derive a base-line
plot from which CIAOs displaying interesting phenomena need to be distinguished, this
study attempts to discover the patterns exhibited by CIAO plots portraying random drift.
Random drift is simulated for the same complex encoding scheme and mutation op-
erators employed in study 2 (256 generations with 25 individuals in each population).
Evolutionary selection pressures are removed, allowing each individual an equal chance
of reproduction irrespective of ability. Individuals reproduce asexually and at random,
irrespective of score. Figure 7.14 displays four CIAO plots resulting from typical ran-
dom drift. From left to right, plot 1 displays the raw data set, whilst subsequent CIAO
plots display the same data after each stage of the image processing routine described in
section 7.3.1.1. Plot 1 (far left) presents a patchwork pattern of a tartan nature, but less
regular than that shown in gure 7.9. The irregular blocks of shading suggest a lack of
progress, but may imply cycling of some sort. The plot is difcult to interpret with con-
dence. After image processing, the binarized plot (far right) displays no diagonal banding.
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Figure 7.16: Study 3 results. Graphs plotting the effective probability values of playing
each move during random drift. Left: the A-elites. Right: the B-elites. The populations
do not appear to evolve in response to each other. Cycling is not observed.
The most prominent features are the horizontal bands across the centre of the image. It is
likely that these bands are an artefact of the underlying grid structure of the raw plot, sim-
ilar to the horizontal banding seen in the binarized plot of study 2 (gure 7.9). The most
signicant difference between the binarized plots of study 2 and 3 is the diagonal band to
the right of gure 7.9 that is missing in gure 7.14. The binarized plot of random drift
shows no sign of cycling (diagonal banding) even in the short term. However, whilst the
processed plots highlight this feature, they still remain difcult to interpret. Can irregular
cycling and random drift be correctly classied on this basis alone?
Figure 7.15 shows an event plot for the random drift of study 3. Once again, the plot
is marked for each generation in which the A-elite plays P, or the B-elite plays R, with
effective probability p > 0.66. Unlike the event plot of study 2 (gure 7.10), random drift
shows no obvious sequence repetition. Events occur without regularity. The event plot
strongly suggests that the system is not cycling.
Figure 7.16 displays the effective probabilities of each population’s elite strategies
during a particular (representative) period. The state transitions of each population’s elites
appears random, suggesting that neither cycles. Further, there is no obvious correlation
between the two populations: knowing the state of one population does not improve the
ability to predict the state of the opponent population. Thus, both populations vary inde-
pendently and at random: it is not the case that one population changes randomly, with
the other adapting to it in a regular way. This is conrmed by the state transition table of
gure 7.17: transitions are highly unpredictable and do not follow the expected pattern
from Rock to Paper to Scissors to Rock.
Random drift allows populations to return to previously evolved strategies, but not
systematically: the system is not cycling. Despite this, random drift produces a CIAO
plot with a tartan nature, not dissimilar to that produced by the irregular cycling of study
2. While we have not quantitatively measured the differences between the CIAO plots
generated in studies 1, 2, and 3, the very fact that we might have to rely upon some
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Figure 7.17: Study 3 results. State transition table showing transitions are unpredictable
and do not follow the expected pattern of R to P to S to R, etc.
such measure applied to CIAO plots in order to discover what they have to tell us about
coevolutionary dynamics is disappointing. To anybody using CIAO plots as their only
method of coevolutionary visualization, the results reported here are unfortunate. Not
only can coevolutionary cycling result in tartan, rather than banded, plots, but these tartan
patterns can also occur in the absence of any cycling at all. If used alone, CIAO plots are
potentially ambiguous.
7.3.4 Understanding Irregular Coevolutionary Cycling
In section 3.4.3 the prevalence of cycling in natural systems was highlighted with a series
of examples demonstrating the ubiquity of the phenomenon. Cycling is not conned
to toy articial coevolutionary systems, such as those studied here. The three studies
carried out above have demonstrated that although one particular kind of coevolutionary
cycling is easily detected using CIAO plots, a second class of cyclic behaviour is much
harder to detect without resorting to alternative visualizations. Whilst CIAO plots can give
valuable insights into coevolutionary dynamics, they should preferably be used amongst
a suite of techniques in order to enhance their interpretability.
In general, these results contribute to a growing realisation that our understanding of
coevolutionary dynamics in articial systems is far from complete. More specically,
their signicance hinges, to some extent, on how important irregular coevolutionary cy-
cling turns out to be. It is argued here that there are good reasons to suppose that this class
of dynamic will be more frequently encountered than regular cycling, and that for many
kinds of interesting system, when these irregular dynamics are exhibited, they will often
be of both theoretical and practical signicance.
As evidenced by the different results of studies 1 and 2, as search problems become in-
creasingly complex, their search spaces are increasingly structured by the genetic encod-
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ings and genetic operators employed, in addition to the strategic advantages of different
phenotypes. This ensures that some (perhaps most) adaptations will only be discovered
after a period of evolutionary exploration. The stochastic nature of this exploration cou-
pled with the rugged and/or neutral structure of the search space ensures that the time that
this takes is variable. Under such conditions, if a coevolving system nds itself cycling,
and hence repeatedly rediscovering the same or similar adaptations in the same or similar
order, there is no guarantee that the period of coevolutionary cycling will be constant
indeed it is likely not to be. For these reasons, regular cycling should be regarded as a
rarely attainable special case of the more general class of irregular cycling. Perhaps un-
surprisingly, of the 22 CIAO plots found in the literature, none display regular cycling
(Cliff & Miller, 1995; Floreano & Nol, 1997a, 1997b; Rosin & Belew, 1997; Ficici
& Pollack, 1998b; Nol & Floreano, 1998; Lubberts & Miikkulainen, 2001; Stanley &
Miikkulainen, 2002).
Search-space neutrality occurs when many genotypes share the same tness, perhaps
as a result of redundancy in the genetic encoding. A neutral set contains all the genotypes
that achieve a particular tness score, while a neutral network comprises evolutionarily
adjacent members of a neutral set. It has been argued that the presence of neutral networks
may have profound consequences for the dynamics of evolutionary search. For instance,
the neutrality exhibited by natural RNA search spaces has been demonstrated to be of a
potentially useful kind, allowing more efcient search (Huynen et al., 1996). More gener-
ally, neutrality of the right kind is thought to reduce the chance of premature convergence
(Harvey & Thompson, 1996; Barnett, 1998). However, since evolving populations tend to
drift at random across neutral networks (but see Bullock, 2002, for analysis of the biases
that this drift is subject to) it is difcult to predict how long a population will spend on
each one. If a coevolutionary system cycles through a repeated sequence of neutral net-
works each population will spend some time drifting across each neutral network, before
transitioning to the next. As such, although a particular sequence of phenotypes may be
generated over evolutionary time, this repetition is unlikely to exhibit a constant period.
Coevolutionary disengagement occurs in a competitive coevolutionary system when
one population outperforms the other to the extent that different individuals are not dis-
criminated from their contemporaries in tness terms, i.e., oor or ceiling effects (Watson
& Pollack, 2001; Cartlidge & Bullock, 2002, 2004a; also refer to section 3.4.5). For in-
stance, in the coevolution of pursuit and evasion, disengagement could occur if evaders
discover a simple hiding strategy that defeats all contemporary opponent pursuers; each
hiding evader would score 100%, while all opponent pursuers would score 0%, despite
variation in their strategies. When disengagement occurs, selective pressure disappears,
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Figure 7.18: Study 2 results. Graph showing the mean tness (left) and tness variation
(right) within populations A and B. Periods of zero variance signify disengagement. In
both populations, there is very little tness variation during generations 28-36 and 44-49.
During these periods, population B is easily outperforming population A. As expected,
disengagement coincides with stasis (homogeneous shading) on the enlarged CIAO plot
of gure 7.13.
leaving populations free to drift until such time as populations happen to re-engage. Re-
engagement takes place when mutant strategies arise that achieve distinctive tness scores
(e.g., a pursuer able to discover hidden evaders, or an evader unable to hide successfully).
The time taken for such mutants to arise via neutral drift, and hence the duration of disen-
gagement, is variable for the reasons described above. As a result, a cycling coevolution-
ary system suffering from disengagement is also likely to cycle with non-xed period. In
short, irregular cycling is likely to be evolutionarily typical because useful evolutionary
innovations and counter-innovations are not typically discovered at a constant rate.
The data collected during study 2 exhibits these variable periods of coevolutionary
disengagement and neutral drift (in coevolutionary systems the two concepts are closely
related). At generation 23, for example, gure 7.11 shows the elite strategy in population
one plays Rock, whilst the elite strategy of population two plays Paper. In contrast with
the immediate and smooth coevolutionary responses reported for study 1, it is not until
generation 37 that the elite strategy of population one discovers the Scissors counter-
adaptation. The intervening period is one in which the populations have disengaged,
and are drifting across neutral networks of equivalent strategies. Disengagement can be
directly observed in gure 7.18, where mean tness (left) and tness variance (right)
in both populations is plotted over time. During generations 28-26 and 44-49, tness
diversity is very low and occasionally falls to zero (right): here population B is easily
outperforming population A (left).
In the following section, CIAO plots are used (for the rst time, as far as the au-
thor is aware) to analyse simulation data from a biological model: a replication of the
RockPaperScissors E. coli experiments of Kerr et al. (2002, refer to section 3.4.3). It
is demonstrated that CIAO plots, whilst specically developed for evolutionary compu-
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tation, may benet evolutionary biology (and the modelling of adaptive behaviour more
generally).
7.4 Study 4: A Simulation of E. coli
RockPaperScissors cycling has been demonstrated in E. coli populations (Kerr et al.,
2002). However, practical problems forced experiments on real bacteria to end after short
time periods. To collect more data (and gain a better understanding of the coevolution-
ary dynamics) Kerr et al. (2002) ran a simulation. This was shown to behave realistically
and suggested that RPS dynamics characterised the system. However, it is argued here
that more effective visualization techniques could have afforded greater insight into the
underlying dynamics. To test this, the simulation of Kerr et al. (2002) is replicated in this
section. The resulting data is then investigated using the visualizations discussed in this
chapter (CIAO plots, event plots and probability graphs), demonstrating that the lessons
learned in previous studies can be applied to a biological system with potential relevance
to evolutionary biologists.
7.4.1 Replication
Three strains of E. coli exist on a (toroidal) lattice grid of 1002 cells. At the start of each
run, each cell is initialised at random (equal probability) to one of four states: occupied
by C, S, R, or empty. Cells are asynchronously updated. A focal cell, c, is randomly
chosen and updated probabilistically based upon local interactions (the relative states of
the 8 nearest neighbouring cells). If c is empty a bacteria of strain i ∈ {C, S, R} is
chosen to occupy the cell. The probability of choosing i is given by fi, the fraction of the
local neighbourhood occupied by each strain. If c is occupied, the bacteria is killed with
probability ∆i. Throughout the simulation, ∆C and ∆R are xed. However, ∆S varies
with fC (the fraction of neighbouring C cells) such that ∆S = ∆S,0 + τfC , where ∆S,0 is
the probability of death for S cells with no neighbouring C cells, and τ is the toxicity of
C cells.
To set up a RockPaperScissors intransitivity, it is necessary for ∆S,0 < ∆R <
∆C < ∆S,0 + τ , which ensures S displaces R, R displaces C, and C (if sufciently dense)
displaces S. Following Kerr et al. (2002), the following parameter values were chosen:
∆C =
1
3
; ∆S,0 = 14 ; ∆R =
10
32
; and τ = 3
4
.
An epoch is dened as the mean turnover time across all cells. In the 1002 lattice
used here, an epoch occurs every 104 updates. We consider each epoch to be 1 timestep.
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Figure 7.19: Study 4 results. Adopting the visualization scheme employed by Kerr et al.
(2002), we plot the locations of each bacterial strain during one representative run of the
E. coli simulation (toroidal grid size 1002). Sensitive (S) bacteria are coloured black,
Resistant (R) are dark grey and Col toxic (C) are light grey. Empty cells are white. From
left to right: (1) At time step 1000 the three strains coexist across the grid; (2) By time
step 1200, C (light grey) have moved into areas occupied by S (black), S have moved
to areas originally occupied by R (dark grey), and R have replaced C; (3) S continue to
replace R, R replace C and C replace S; (4) By time step 1600, the three strains have
returned to roughly the same locations they occupied at time step 1000. One full cycle is
complete.
The E. coli simulation was run for 5000 timesteps.
7.4.2 Results
Adopting the visualization scheme employed by Kerr et al. (2002), gure 7.19 shows
four instantaneous snapshots taken of the simulation at timesteps (from left to right)
1000, 1200, 1400, and 1600. The state of each cell in the lattice is denoted by its colour.
Whilst empty cells are white, those occupied by C, R, or S strains are coloured light grey,
dark grey, and black, respectively. It is possible to observe areas of black replaced by
light grey, light grey by dark grey, and dark grey by black. The bacteria are following
the relationship S>R>C>S (analogous to RPS). Between timesteps 1000-1600, one full
cycle takes place: the system returns to a similar state.
These results qualitatively map those of Kerr et al. (2002) who showed the same suc-
cession sequence both in simulation and in real bacteria populations. Whilst the continued
coexistence of all three strains and the S>R>C>S relationship are adequately demon-
strated, the visualizations are not wholly satisfying. One cannot determine the nature of
cycling from a series of snapshots.
To further visualize the E. coli data, the local density of each strain was recorded for
one 5 × 5 portion of the lattice. Since the three strains coexist without large uctuations
in global density, plotting CIAO plots for the entire lattice is uninformative. Due to the
RockPaperScissors intransitivity of E. coli strains, each local density can be considered
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Figure 7.20: Study 4 results. CIAO plots depicting one representative run of the E. coli
simulation over N = 5000 timesteps (sampled at a resolution of 50 generations). From
left to right: (1) Some diagonal banding is observable in the raw data plot; (2) A large
Gaussian (r = 5) removes ne detail; (3) LoG (σ = 2) produces a contour map; (4) The
image is binarized. The fully processed plot exhibits clear diagonal banding.
equivalent to the probability of playing a particular move in RPS. For example, equal den-
sities of each strain {Col = 33 1
3
, Resistant = 33 1
3
, Sensitive = 33 1
3
} is equivalent to the
optimum RPS strategy of playing each move with equal probability, whilst a neighbour-
hood containing only Resistant bacteria {0, 100, 0} is equivalent to the strategy always
play Paper. Figure 7.20 shows four CIAO plots of the E. coli simulation. The CIAO
plot data is calculated by comparing the local density at each timestep against the local
density at each previous timestep. To reduce the size of the CIAO plot, data is sampled
every 50 timesteps (hence the plot is 100 pixels wide and deep). Each density comparison
is evaluated as the expected result in a RockPaperScissors contest: results in favour of
the later timestep (y axis) are dark. For example, if local density D1 = {100, 0, 0} is
compared with the later local density D2 = {50, 50, 0}, the expected result will be 0.75
in favour of D2; thus giving pixel (D1, D2) a grey value 75% of maximum darkness.
From left to right, the CIAO plots display the raw data, Gaussian blur, zero-crossings,
and fully processed image. The raw data plot (far left) exhibits both diagonal banding
and tartan structures. The binarized image (far right) is much easier to interpret. The
clear diagonal banding suggests that the system is exhibiting fairly regular cycling in this
region of the lattice. The vertical fault line down the centre of the plot is an artefact of
sampling: without sampling this feature does not exist. However, unsampled CIAO plots
are too large to appear here.
The event plot of gure 7.21 highlights the points (sampled at a 50-timestep reso-
lution) at which the local density of strain R, or strain C, exceeds 66%. The sequence
Resistance follows Col toxic occurs regularly enough to again suggest fairly regular cy-
cling in this region of the lattice. Figure 7.22 displays the local density of each strain over
the rst 1000 timesteps (plotted at a 50-timestep resolution); once again, regular cycling
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Figure 7.21: Study 4 results. Event plot labelling the points (sampled at a 50-timestep
resolution) at which the local density of Resistant (R) bacteria or Col toxic (C) bacteria
exceeds 66% during one representative run. The repeated R follows C event sequence
suggests regular cycling.
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Figure 7.22: Study 4 results. Graph plotting the local density of each of the three bacterial
strains during the rst 1000 time steps (at a 50-timestep resolution). Cycling can be
observed with regular sequence CRSCRS.
is clear. Finally, the state transition table of gure 7.23 also exhibits regular cycling.2
In summary, a suite of visualization techniques, including (for the rst time) CIAO
plots, have enabled the exploration of the nature of cycling suggested in the initial system
snapshots of a biological model. In particular, the regularity and period of this cycling
has been determined. The image processing techniques introduced in section 7.3.1.1 have
been very useful in achieving this.
Given the discussion in section 7.3.4, of reasons why we would not expect regular
cycling to be exhibited particularly often by coevolutionary systems, why is it that the
model of E. coli coevolution generates such regular, periodic behaviour? There are two
candidate explanations. First, the E. coli simulation employs a very simple representation
of the space of possible strategies. Even the simple RPS system analysed in study 1
employed a discrete three-dimensional space of 1003 possible strategies, whereas the E.
coli system implements what is basically a simple set containing three strategies. There
is no equivalent of the genotype space employed in our previous studies.
However, even if the E. coli model involved a more complex treatment of genotype
space, coevolutionary cycles could remain regular, since the three bacterial morphs are
2Here, a state is entered when the local density of any one strain rises above 66% and exited once density
falls below 66%. This classification scheme may be responsible for the 4 same-state transitions, without
which cycling appears much more regular.
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Figure 7.23: Study 4 results. State transition table demonstrating regular cycling.
typically always present in the evolving population. While the strategy being played in
each cell of the 100×100 world varies over time, the global frequency of each strategy
remains non-zero and roughly constant.
The update rules for the model ensure that if, for instance, all S individuals were
to die, this strategy could never re-enter the populationonly strategies that are already
present may reproduce and spread to unoccupied cells since the model includes no ana-
logue of mutation. Since, for the particular parameter values reported here, all three pos-
sible strategies are ever present, the system never spends time searching genotype space
for adaptations and counter-adaptations; they are already present somewhere in the pop-
ulation. The cycling evident in the population time-series data reects the time taken for
a strategy to migrate across the grid, exploiting inferior competitors. At the relatively
high population densities employed in the model, this leads to regular, periodic waves of
succession.
The game-theoretic Evolutionarily Stable Strategy models of evolutionary dynamics
typically employed in theoretical biology (Maynard Smith, 1982) also have no explicit
representation of genotype space or mutation. In effect, such models assume that every
possible strategy is always present at some non-zero (but perhaps innitesimal) frequency
within the population. All that varies in such models are the rates of reproduction enjoyed
by these strategies. This ensures that the factors here identied as responsible for the ir-
regular period of coevolutionary cycling (disengagement, neutrality, etc.) are not typically
considered. The very different nature of the nite (co)evolving populations simulated in
the adaptive behaviour literature offers an important opportunity to explore these factors.
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7.5 Revisiting the Coin Toss Game
In this section, CIAO plots are used to visualize the results from section 6.2the coin
toss gamepreviously displayed in gure 6.6. The reason for this is two-fold. Firstly,
CIAO plots may offer new insight into coin toss dynamics, affording better understanding
of the effects of reduced virulence and resource sharing. Secondly, it will be interesting
to observe CIAO plot visualizations of cycling, mediocre stability, engagement and fun-
nelling. Offering a variety of dynamics, the coin toss data set is excellent for studying
CIAO plot visualizations.
For all plots, full CIAOs are shown: ancestral elite (AE) contests across all gen-
erations are plotted, producing square rather than triangular output (see gure 7.24). To
reduce the size of images, CIAO plots sample AE contests every 3 generations, producing
2002 pixel plots. Each AE competition consists of 25 coin toss games between H-elite
(host) and P-elite (parasite) opponents. Each game, the P-elite tosses a coin proba-
bilistically, playing Heads or Tails according to the probability function 6.1 (displayed in
gure 6.5). Results in favour of H-elites are output light, those in favour of P-elites are
dark.
Figure 7.24 (top, left): cycling with stasis. Maximum virulence without resource shar-
ing leads to cycling in the coin toss game (gure 6.6). However, this cycling is not reg-
ular; it is characterised by long periods of stasiswith parasites outperforming hosts
followed by rapid state transitions. For the majority of coevolution, the system is near dis-
engagement. Unsurprisingly (see discussion in section 7.3.4), irregular cycling produces
a tartan plot. The regularity of the plot results from the strict order of state transitions:
Heads to Tails, Tails to Heads. Complementing gure 6.6, gure 7.24 nicely supports
the inferences of section 6.2.3.
Figure 7.24 (top, right): mediocre stability. Maximum virulence with resource sharing
leads to mediocre stability, or collusive disengagement, in the coin toss game (gure 6.6).
Throughout coevolution, victories are shared between hosts and parasites. The resulting
CIAO plot is very interesting. With the system at equilibrium throughout, one may expect
AE contests to produce a homogenous grey CIAO plot. However, small uctuations in
elite strategies produces a ne-grained tartan pattern. Without the aid of gure 6.6, this
plot is ambiguous, potentially showing stability, irregular cycling, or drift. Once again,
the importance of using complementary visualizations to support CIAO plot data is con-
rmed.
Figure 7.24 (bottom, left): engagement. In the coin toss game, reduced virulence with-
out resource sharing results in engagement in the most difcult (unpredictable) part of
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space (gure 6.6). When competing with recent ancestral P-elites, H-elites perform well;
indicated by the white banding observed on the leading diagonal. Throughout coevo-
lution, hosts are always capable of competing with parasites. Continually striving to
escape hosts, parasites relentlessly move through difcult regions of genotype space.
As hosts chase, previous adaptations are lost. This is indicated by the prevalence of
dark shading throughout the plot: if adaptations were preserved, the plot would be much
lighter. Whilst hosts can compete with current parasites, they are not good at predict-
ing parasites from much earlier, or future, generations: there is short term evolutionary
memory. This additional insight is not available from gure 6.6.
Figure 7.24 (bottom, right): funnelling. Finally, reduced virulence with resource shar-
ing produces funnelling: after a period of mediocre stability, populations engage in the
most difcult part of space (gure 6.6). Around generation 440, a change in H-elite strat-
egy produces a dramatic transition from mediocre stability to engagement. Before now,
such transitions have not appeared in the CIAO plot literature. As such, in isolation, the
plot is difcult to interpret; however, when considering the suite of plots, in conjunction
with the alternative visualizations of gure 6.6, interpretation becomes clear. As an ex-
ample of funnelling, this plot may prove a useful reference for future CIAO plot studies.
Conclusions: CIAO plots offer expressive and informative visualization of coevolution-
ary dynamics. However (reiterating the conclusions already reached in this chapter), to
be interpreted correctly and unambiguously, it is necessary to complement their use with
other (perhaps domain specic) visualizations.
7.6 Steering Coevolution Through Interactive Visualiza-
tion
Typically, evolutionary algorithms are run in batch mode: once initial conditions have
been decided, the evolutionary process is left to run without further human intervention
(for example, see the simple GA of section 2.2.1). Upon termination summary statis-
tics are presented, often in the form of simple graphs, and often disguising much critical
(mid-run) information. Signicant interaction with the algorithm can only take place at
this stage: on the basis of crude and fragmented end-of-run visualizations, starting pa-
rameters (initial conditions) may be varied for subsequent runs. This method is employed
throughout chapters 6 and 7. Unfortunately, this laborious process is not guaranteed to
nd the required parameter settings.
At the opposite extreme, some algorithms require user interaction at every stage. Each
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Figure 7.24: CIAO plots visualizing typical coevolution of the coin toss game. Top left:
irregular cycling with periods of stasis and sharp transitions. Top right: mediocre stability.
Bottom left: hosts engage parasites in difcult regions of space. Bottom right: a transition
(funnelling) from mediocre stability to engagement occurs around host generation 440.
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generation users select which members of the population will contribute genetic material
to the following generation. Without user interaction, the system halts. Hence, these
algorithms demand much human input. As such, they are typically only considered when
an accurate tness function is difcult, or impossible, to operationally dene. Examples
include aesthetic evolution evolved to users’ taste (Dawkins, 1986), computer graphics
(Sims, 1991) and works of art (Dorin, 2001).
Computational steeringhere dened as the ongoing, informed intervention of users
in the execution of an otherwise autonomous computational process (see, e.g., Parker,
Johnson, & Beazley, 1997)lies somewhere between these two extremes. Algorithms
may be guided by human intervention, when appropriate, but will otherwise continue au-
tonomously; hence, the degree of interventionaltering system parameters, or turning
on or off aspects of the algorithm, etc.is decided by the user. As such, computational
steering offers the power of intervention without the demands of forced interaction. Com-
putational steering tends to be used in situations where the skills and knowledge of human
users are critical to system performance, but are difcult (or impossible) to operationalise.
If it were possible, it may not be necessary to rely on humans in the system at all.
7.6.1 Prospects for Computational Steering
Computational steering of (co)evolutionary algorithms is potentially benecial for sev-
eral reasons. Foremost, expert guidance through human intervention may well improve
the quality of evolutionary algorithms for design and problem solving; as knowledge un-
captured in the algorithm itself is delivered by hand. In conjunction, steering may lead to
insights into how systems work; as experts perform run time manipulation, tacit knowl-
edge may be teased out. As a secondary effect, a drive towards evolutionary steering
is likely to encourage the development of novel visualization techniques that are bene-
cial in their own right. Finally, steering devices offer an excellent method of teaching
novices about systems; allowing students to gain practical experience of evolutionary
phenomenon in an engaging and intuitive way.
However, to make evolutionary steering work, it is critical that users are able to make
effective interventions. To achieve this, three conditions are necessary. Firstly, users must
have the expertise to effectively steer computation: to guide evolution appropriately, users
require a strong theoretical grounding. Secondly, users must be able to exert the required
inuence in a suitable manner: if the necessary means of interaction are missing, expert
users become redundant; for example, knowing that mutation rate should be lowered is
little use if such functionality is not available. Finally, users must be presented with the
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information they require in a similarly intuitive manner: visualization must offer users
the stimulus they need to impart necessary guidance (for a more detailed discussion of
these principles, and treatment of the prospects of evolutionary steering in general, refer
to Bullock, Cartlidge, & Thompson, 2002).
In the following section, a rst attempt at coevolutionary steering is presented. This
simple α-model demonstrates an example interface for steering the virulence of popula-
tions coevolving in the numbers game (refer to section 6.1).
7.6.2 Proof of Concept
7.6.2.1 Steering the Numbers Game
Here, a novel coevolutionary steering tool is presented. Utilising the simple numbers
game of section 6.1, an interactive user interface is developed, enabling users to vary
the virulence of parasites (and hosts) and other evolutionary parameters during run time.
Inherently simple and easy to visualize, the numbers game is an ideal domain to demon-
strate coevolutionary steering. Further, in the drive for dynamic virulence (section 6.4),
steering potentially offers an alternative solution to autonomous tness variation; if not di-
rectly, then at least insofar as steering may help tease tacit knowledge out of expert users,
providing a greater theoretical framework on which to develop future dynamic virulence
techniques.
Figure 7.25 shows the graphical user interface designed to steer the coevolutionary
numbers game. A: the virulence curve of parasites, showing the relationship between
parasite score and parasite tness (refer to gure 5.2); also used to display the distribution
of parasite scores (see gure 7.26). B: the virulence curve of hosts used to show the
relationship between host score and tness. Unlike previous models, the tness of hosts
is also subject to virulence (the biological analogy breaks down here somewhat). C: slider
used to vary parasite virulence, λp, between 0.5 and 1.0 (Null to Maximum), displayed in
graph A. Here, λp = 0.59. D: slider used to vary host virulence, λh, displayed in graph B.
Here, λh = 0.94. E: slider used to vary parasite bias, Bpar between 0.0 and 1.0. Host bias
cannot be varied and is always 0.5. F: slider to vary the speed of coevolution. When run
at slow speeds, the interface affords more user control. G: the set of initial parameters:
once a run begins, these parameters are xed. Runs may be repeated by reusing the
same random seed. Random seeds may be input manually, or selected at random using
the random button. When ticked, the scaling box normalizes the scores of hosts and
parasites with respect to the highest scoring member of each population before utilising
the virulence function (as performed throughout this thesis). Without scaling, scores are
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Figure 7.25: Coevolutionary steering interface.
input directly. H: control buttons to start a run, pause/continue, or exit the interface. I:
absolute tness graph displaying the n values of each individual; equivalent to the large
(top) graphs of gures 6.1 and 6.2. J: scroll bar allowing users to scroll across generations
of graphs I and K. K: relative tness graph displaying the mean relative score of each
population; equivalent to the small (bottom) graphs of gures 6.1 and 6.2. In all gures,
parasites are depicted in dark shade, with hosts in light.
The virulence graphs of the steering interface (gure 7.25, A and B) are also used to
visualize the distribution of relative tness scores in each coevolving population. This is
achieved by effectively overlaying a histogram of tness scores on top of the virulence
curves: at each tness score, a bar is drawn in proportion to the number of individuals
attaining that tness. Figure 7.26 shows two schematical examples. In each graph, a Null
virulence curve (λ = 0.5) is shown, however, the value of λ does not affect the size of
the distribution bars, only their position: each bar is always centred on the curve. The
graph to the left shows a uniform distribution with each bar of equal size. This shows
that equal numbers of individuals are achieving each of the possible relative tness scores
(between 0.0 and 1.0). To the right, an exponential distribution is shown. Here, far fewer
individuals score high tness values than those that score low: as relative tness increases,
the size of the distribution bars gets smaller; most individuals score 0.0 (indicated by large
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Figure 7.26: Example schematics of relative tness distributions. Left: uniform distribu-
tion of tness scores; right: exponential distribution. Bars are centred on the virulence
curve, with length proportional to the number of individuals attaining each tness score.
These lengths are independent of virulence; shown as λ = 0.5 in both graphs.
bars) and none score 1.0 (no bar). This novel visualization method is intended to present
users with information regarding the underlying distribution of tness scores within each
population; potentially useful when determining the appropriate level of virulence.
7.6.2.2 Example Output
This section describes an example coevolutionary run utilising the interactive steering
interface previously described. The purpose of this section is to demonstrate the func-
tionality of the steering interface. Unlike previous sections, there is no attempt to either
coevolve successful individuals, or to maintain engagement. The example is intended
only to give the reader an insight into relationships between user interactions and system
behaviour.
Initial conditions. At the beginning of the run, the following initial conditions are input
into the interface: population size 25, sample size 5, mutation rate 0.03, random seed
10000 and scale scores on. Once the run begins, these parameters may not be altered.
The following variable parameters are chosen to begin: parasite virulence λp = 0.75,
host virulence λh = 0.75, and parasite bias Bpar = 0.9. For the rst 100 generations,
these values are unaltered.
Screen shot 1: figure 7.27 shows the system at generation 100. The graph of absolute t-
ness (top, right) shows both populations quickly evolve to approximately n = 85 1-alleles.
The populations are engaged throughoutshown in both the absolute and relative tness
(bottom right) graphswith parasites (dark shade) having the upper hand; a result of the
large asymmetrical bias, Bpar = 0.9. The relative tness distributions of both populations
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Figure 7.27: Screen shot 1. Generation 100.
Figure 7.28: Screen shot 2. Generation 150.
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Figure 7.29: Screen shot 3. Generation 200.
Figure 7.30: Screen shot 4. Generation 250.
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is fairly uniform (top; left and centre); there appears little danger of disengagement. As a
result, parasite virulence is increased to λp = 0.95.
Screen shot 2: figure 7.28 shows the system at generation 150. The increase in λp
has increased the n-values of both populations (top, right), however, as a consequence,
the populations are nearing disengagement. This can be observed in the graph of mean
relative tness (bottom right) and the distribution graphs: nearly all parasites score 1.0
(top, left) whilst the majority of hosts score 0.0 (top, centre). However, parasite virulence
is further increased to Maximum; λp = 1.0.
Screen shot 3: figure 7.29 shows the system at generation 200. The populations have
disengaged (observable in the distribution and relative tness graphs). This occurred soon
after parasite virulence was increased to Maximum. As a result, the absolute tness of
both populations has fallen towards the mutational baseline levels of n = 50 for hosts,
n = 90 for parasites. In response, parasite bias is dramatically lowered to Bpar = 0.1.
Screen shot 4: figure 7.30 shows the system at generation 250. The reduction in Bpar
at generation 200 has shifted asymmetrical advantage in favour of hosts. Initially, the ab-
solute n-values of parasites fall towards the baseline mutation bias, however, upon reen-
gaging with hosts, both populations progress to around n = 65. To increase the system’s
n-values, host virulence is increased to Maximum; λh = 1.0.
Screen shot 5: figure 7.31 shows the system at generation 275. The increase in λp has
pushed the system to the brink of disengagement.
Screen shot 6: figure 7.32 shows the system at generation 350. The system is disen-
gaged. Both populations have reached their baseline levels of n. The system is unlikely
to reengage under current conditions. As such, parasite bias is increased to Bpar = 0.8;
returning asymmetrical advantage back to parasites.
Screen shot 7: figure 7.33 shows the system at generation 400. After increasing λp,
the populations have reengaged and the system is performing well, averaging n-values
around 85. In an attempt to maximise n, parasite bias is increased to Bpar = 0.95. To
compensate, parasite virulence is marginally decreased to λp = 0.95.
Screen shot 8: figure 7.34 shows the system at generation 500. The system is engaged at
near maximum values of n.
7.6.2.3 Future Work
The demonstration platform presented in this section has been used to highlight the poten-
tial utility of (co)evolutionary steering. However, this α-model is very much the beginning
of this line of study. The majority of work lies ahead.
In future, this platform will be used to perform several studies. Firstly, the interface
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Figure 7.31: Screen shot 5. Generation 275.
Figure 7.32: Screen shot 6. Generation 350.
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Figure 7.33: Screen shot 7. Generation 400.
Figure 7.34: Screen shot 8. Generation 500.
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will be modularised, allowing parts of the interface to be removed, or xed, thus enabling
more or less complex interfaces to be easily constructed. Experiments will compare the
performance (maximum stable n-value achieved) of naive users with experts as they at-
tempt to effectively steer coevolutionary under various conditions. These subjects will be
carefully debriefed in an effort to understand how they went about their task. Any insights
gained could be used to design more efcient automatic coevolutionary algorithms (i.e.,
dynamic virulence; section 6.4).
In addition, the platform will be used directly as a tool with which to explore coevo-
lutionary disengagement. The nature of the platform allows a rich interaction with the
coevolutionary system, which will hopefully lead to improved insights into algorithm be-
haviour. Finally, the steering platform will enable the teaching of coevolutionary concepts
to students in a hands-on manner that will hopefully be engaging and informative.
This example of computational steering is very crude in many respects. The visual-
izations used to inform the user of algorithm behaviour are, for the most part, standard
plots of tness over time. In general, much more sophisticated indicators of a wider range
of system aspects could be employed. Similarly, the range of interaction supported by the
example steering platform is limited to varying a small number of the parameters gov-
erning evolutionary selection pressures. There are, of course, many alternative aspects of
algorithm performance that could be inuenced by the user. However, the simple steering
interface presented here is adequate for the specic purpose of exploring the relationship
between virulence and engagement in the minimal coevolutionary numbers game.
7.7 Summary
If coevolutionary algorithms are to ever reach their full potential, appropriate (effective)
visualization techniques are necessary. However, visualization tools specically designed
to further the theoretical understanding of coevolutionary algorithms are rare. CIAO
plotsprimarily designed to highlight cyclingare an exception.
Cycling occurs in many adaptive systems. Mutational stochasticity, neutrality, disen-
gagement and rugged tness landscapes each contribute to the irregularity of these cycles.
As a result, irregular cycling may characterise the adaptive behaviour of many unstable
coevolutionary systems and may contribute to the failure of coevolutionary optimisation.
Detecting and characterising this type of dynamic is difcult within modelling paradigms
that privilege stable states (e.g., evolutionary game theory). As a result, coevolutionary
adaptive behaviour simulation and visualization are good candidates for improving our
understanding of these types of irregular cycling.
Chapter 7 166 Visualizing Coevolutionary Dynamics
In this chapter, it has been demonstrated that CIAO plots, a widely used tool for vi-
sualizing coevolutionary progress, are difcult to interpret with respect to irregular co-
evolutionary cycling. Further, there are reasons to believe that irregular coevolutionary
cycling is a common and signicant category of coevolutionary dynamics. Hence, CIAO
plots should preferably be used in conjunction with other visualizations: problem-specic
analysis methods can usefully complement CIAO plots and can aid in their interpretation.
For the rst time, CIAO plots have been applied to biological simulation data, afford-
ing valuable insights into the underlying coevolutionary dynamics that agree with empir-
ical observations. This exemplies the potential cross-over between techniques designed
for evolutionary computation and adaptive behaviour more generally.
Computational steering offers a method of ongoing, informed intervention of users
in the execution of an otherwise autonomous computational process. In this chapter an
example steering interface is presented, allowing users to guide coevolution through in-
teractive visualization. Allowing virulence to be manually manipulated during run time,
coevolutionary steering offers an alternative approach to autonomously varying virulence
functions, and may offer new insight into the relationship between virulence and engage-
ment. To achieve this, however, effective visualizations are critical.
Working towards computational steering for evolutionary computation has consider-
able merit if there is some chance of achieving the improvements in algorithm perfor-
mance and insights into algorithm behaviour that it may bring. However, even if such
a research effort were to fail in its stated primary aim, in pursuing it, several secondary
goals would be progressed.
First, effective visualization and interaction are worthy targets in their own right; as
demonstrated by the investigation of CIAO plots. Second, and perhaps more importantly,
in integrating visualization, interaction and EC theory, research into computational steer-
ing for evolutionary computation has the potential to improve our understanding of all
three. To the extent that visualization and interaction techniques are motivated by some
theory of evolutionary computation, the ability of these techniques to support computa-
tional steering is a good indicator of the success of EC theory in guiding our understanding
of evolutionary algorithms.
Chapter 8
Transient Neutrality
Throughout this thesis, it has repeatedly been described how coevolutionary disengage-
ment results in periods of evolutionary drift. Recently, within the evolutionary computa-
tion community, there has been some interest in the role of neutral drift in the behaviour
of evolutionary algorithms (Barnett, 1998). It has been suggested that neutral drift might
alleviate problems of premature convergence, and that proper appreciation of such drift
necessitates a radical reappraisal of our picture of how evolutionary algorithms work (Bar-
nett, 1998; Shipman, Shackleton, Ebner, & Watson, 2000; Smith, Husbands, Layzell, &
O’Shea, 2002). How does the drift that results from coevolutionary disengagement relate
to that experienced by populations percolating across neutral networks?
Within the evolutionary computation community, search-space neutrality has been
dened as the property of adjacent points in a search space exhibiting equivalent tness
scores. A neutral network is a set of such points, where each member of the set neighbours
at least one other member. Clearly, these notions of adjacency and neighbourhood
must be understood in terms of a search algorithm’s genetic operatorsoften this will
be a complicated matter. Moreover, the idea of equivalent tness that lies at the heart
of the neutrality concept is perhaps not as straightforward as it might appear (see, e.g.,
Bullock, 2002).
For certain real-world search spaces, such as the RNA folding map, it has been demon-
strated that the neutrality present is of a potentially useful kind (Huynen, 1996; Huynen
et al., 1996; Fontana & Schuster, 1998a, 1998b). Neutrality in this case stems from the
fact that many RNA sequences (genotypes) fold into the same secondary structure (phe-
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notypes). This redundancy ensures that some mutations may alter a genotype without
altering the associated phenotype. It just so happens that neutral networks percolate the
RNA space, ensuring that a large proportion of possible phenotypes (RNA secondary
structures) are accessible from an arbitrary genotype via drift. Furthermore, RNA neu-
tral networks enjoy a property of constant innovation in that, over many generations, a
neutral walk across such a network will tend to encounter novel phenotypes at a constant
rate comparable to that which would be achieved by a random walk in the search space.
These properties would seem to ameliorate RNA evolution. Could similar properties be
exploited by evolutionary optimisation algorithms?
Notice that in this canonical example of neutral drift, the notion of equivalent tness
is understood in terms of equivalent phenotype. Two adjacent RNA strands that fold
into the same structure are clearly part of a neutral network, since they code for pheno-
types that are practically identical. However, since different phenotypes may nevertheless
achieve the same tness score, it is quite possible that a single neutral network may in-
clude many different phenotypes that are selectively neutral with respect to one another.
Although this complication is acknowledged within the neutrality literature, it is not given
much attention.
In evolutionary (rather than coevolutionary) systems, if two phenotypes achieve the
same tness score, one has reasonable grounds for classifying them as equivalent in
some important and enduring senseselection (ignoring noise and sampling error) will
never discriminate between themneutrality is inherent. However, in a coevolutionary
scenario, the fact that two phenotypes achieve equivalent tness is less compellingsince
tness intrinsically depends upon opponents faced, it is entirely possible that they may
never achieve equivalent tness againneutrality is transient.
In fact, where tness is calculated relative to performance against a coevolving pop-
ulation, the notion of neutral drift requires a signicant overhaul. No longer can one
consider neutral networks to be a (xed) property of a tness landscape. Rather, neu-
trality is now a relational property predicated on the current makeup of both populations.
Neutral networks are transient phenomena, merely reecting the subjective (and hence
temporary) equivalences that may exist between the current conspecics with respect to
their current coevolutionary opponents. As a result, whereas neutral drift in an evolution-
ary system is likely to preserve the quality of evolved solutions by restricting genotypic
change such that phenotypes are equivalent in some objective sense (e.g., they code for
the very same physical structures), the same drift in a coevolutionary system is not nec-
essarily so constrained. In particular, the drift caused by coevolutionary disengagement
may involve genotypic changes that correspond to radical phenotypic change, just so long
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as these phenotypic changes are undetected or invisible to the individuals that happen
to make up the contemporary coevolutionary partner population.
In many cases, given that a disengaged population will often be more likely to generate
more disengaged offspring than offspring that re-engage with their coevolutionary partner
population, this type of disengaged drift may resemble random movement through the
local genetic neighbourhood of the disengaged population. Given that, in the period prior
to disengagement, a population contains reasonably high-quality individuals, far from
preserving phenotypic quality, this type of disengaged drift is likely to be deleterious.
The exact character of any evolutionary drift is likely to be inuenced by the nature of
the genetic encodings and genetic operators employed (Bullock, 1999, 2001). Since these
encodings and operators may be different for each population involved in a coevolutionary
algorithm there is no guarantee that disengaged drift will readily lead to re-engagement.
It is possible that encoding/operator biases ensure that drifting populations tend to re-
main within portions of genotype space that effectively maintain disengagement (as was
observed, for example, in the numbers game, section 6.1). In general, the issues briey
raised here suggest that our appreciation of neutrality and drift and how these phenomena
apply to coevolutionary systems deserves more careful consideration. In the following
sections, a potential framework for studying these (coevolutionary) phenomena is consid-
ered.
8.1 Modelling Neutrality With NK Landscapes
Providing a tuneably rugged family of model tness landscapes, the NK framework was
developed to investigate the effects of landscape ruggedness on evolving populations
(Kauffman, 1993). In Kauffman’s NK model, N corresponds to the number of genes in
a genotype (or traits in an organism), while K corresponds to the number of other genes
(traits) which affect the tness contribution of each gene (trait). Thus, K corresponds
to the richness of epistatic linkages. If K is increased from low to high, the ruggedness
of the landscape increases: i.e., the number of tness peaks increases, the steepness of
the sides of tness peaks increases and the mean height of tness peaks decreases. By
altering N and K, the NK framework provides a family of landscapes which range from
the single peaked and highly correlated (K = 0) to the fully random and uncorrelated
(K = N − 1).
Since the tness contribution of each trait depends upon itself and epistatically on K
other traits, there are 2K+1 traits which bear upon its tness. Thus, each trait’s tness con-
tribution is determined by the particular combination of inputs. For each of the possible
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2k+1 input combinations to the ith trait, a real valued tness contribution is assigned in
the range 0 ≤ wi < 1; to capture the complexity of epistatic interactions, contributions
are assigned randomly. The tness of the entire organism (genotype) is calculated as the
mean contribution of each of the N traits (loci); also in the range 0 ≤ W < 1.
Figure 8.1, left, demonstrates an example NK landscape with N = 3 and K = 2.
As the diagram shows, since K = N − 1, each of the N traits are epsitatically linked
to all other traits. The tness contribution of each trait, wi, is assigned a real value at
random. The tness of the entire organism, W, is calculated as the mean value of each
trait’s tness contribution. Notice that each W is different: there is no neutrality. Since
tness contributions are (randomly) assigned real values, the probability of any two being
equal is extremely small. Thus, any single mutation will likely result in a different tness
contribution: there are unlikely to be any neutral mutations in an NK landscape. Be-
fore NK landscapes can be used to investigate neutrality, therefore, they require structural
alteration.
Several models have been proposed to generalize Kauffman’s NK framework so that a
tuneable level of neutrality can be added. Perhaps the most pervasive are the NKp (prob-
abilistic NK) model, developed by Barnett (1998) and another (the NKq, or quantised
NK; as termed by Geard, Wiles, Hallinan, Tonkes, & Skellett, 2002)developed by New-
man and Engelhardt (1998). While both extend Kauffman’s NK model, each employs a
distinctly different approach to modelling neutrality.
The NKp model introduces a novel parameter, p, to the NK framework. This param-
eter controls the probability that a certain input combination will make no contribution
to an organism’s tness. Thus, if p is high, many input combinations make no contribu-
tion. When a non-contributory input combination is mutated, mutation is neutral when
the new input combination also makes no tness contribution. The likelihood of neutral
mutationi.e., the amount of neutralityincreases with p. Figure 8.1, centre, demon-
strates an NKp landscape with N = 3, K = 2 and p = 0.75. This landscape is identical
to the NK landscape displayed to the left, except that the tness contribution of 75% of
input combinations have been reduced to 0.0. As a result, half of all possible organisms
are neutral (have equal tness, W).
The NKq model introduces neutrality to the NK framework through the novel param-
eter, q. Rather than assign tness contributions as random real numbers in the range
0 ≤ wi < 1, Newman and Engelhardt (1998) assign random integers in the range
0 ≤ wi < q; thus if q = 2, say, each contribution wi is either zero or one. The t-
ness W of the entire organism (genotype) is proportional to the sum of the contributions
at each locus:
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Figure 8.1: Example NK, NKp and NKq landscapes. Top: organisms consist of three
traits (N = 3), each epistatically linked to all other traits (K = 2). For each trait, there
are 2K+1 possible input combinations of traits. These are shown in the table, below. In
the NK landscape, tness contributions (wi) are assigned random real numbers: there is
no neutrality; total tness values (W) are all different. The NKp landscape maps tness
contributions to 0.0 with probability p = 0.75: this produces neutrality. By quantising
tness contributions to integer values, the NKq landscape (q = 2) produces three levels of
neutrality.
W =
1
N(q − 1)
∑
i
wi (8.1)
The tness of all sequences thus falls in the range from zero to one, and there are
Nq −N + 1 possible tness values in this range. In the limit, as q → ∞ the probability
that two sequences will posses the same tness becomes vanishingly smallequivalent to
the NK modeland there is no neutrality. Neutrality is greatest when q takes the smallest
possible value of two. Figure 8.1, right, demonstrates an example NKq landscape, with
q = 2. This is a quantisation of the NK landscape, shown left. The NKq landscape has
three distinct levels of neutrality, with tness values 0.00, 0.33 and 0.67.
NKp and NKq landscapes have inherent structural differences: while NKq landscapes
correlate with the underlying NK landscape, NKp landscapes do not (Geard et al., 2002).
NKq landscapes relate more closely to the intuitive idea of a terraced NK landscape in
which rugged hillsides are attened into local plateau. In contrast, NKp landscapeswith
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neutrality largely conned to low regions of tness spacemore accurately capture the
features of lethal mutations in biological organisms. Yet, despite structural differences,
both NKp and NKq landscapes offer powerful, tuneable frameworks for investigating neu-
trality. However, since neither framework supports coevolutionary interactions, they are
incapable of modelling coevolutionary neutrality.
To model coevolutionary systems using the NK framework, Kauffman and Johnsen
(1991) proposed a generalization: the NKCS family of coupled tness landscapes of dif-
ferent interacting species. Here, it is supposed that genes, or traits, in each species make
tness contributions which depend not only upon K other traits from within that species
itself, but also upon C traits in each of the other species with which the species interacts.
Thus, adaptations in one species may deform the landscape of its partners. Parameter
S controls the total number of species that interact; Si controls the (perhaps restricted)
number of these with which any species, i, interacts.
In short, landscapes are coupled by expanding the random tness table for
each trait in species 2 such that it looks at its K internal epistatic inputs
and also looks at the C external epistatic inputs from species 1 . . . This
couples the two landscapes. Each is in the niche of the other (Kauffman &
Johnsen, 1991).
The NKCS framework permits the study of how landscape ruggedness, landscape cou-
plings, the number of species and the structure of the ecosystem affect coevolution. How-
ever, since the NKCS model randomly assigns the tness contributions of each combina-
tion of trait inputs a real valuedirectly inherited from the original NK frameworkthere
is no neutrality; hence, NKCS landscapes, despite allowing coevolutionary interactions,
cannot model coevolutionary neutrality. In the following section, a novel framework for
modelling coevolutionary neutrality is suggested.
8.2 Towards an NKCqd Landscape
Considering the extensions to Kauffman’s NK framework introduced in the previous sec-
tion, the necessary step needed to model coevolutionary neutrality seems clear: since
NKp/q includes neutrality and NKCS includes coevolution, why not combine these frame-
works? This can be simply achieved by quantising tness contributions (using random
integer values a la NKq) in the NKCS framework; thus producing an NKCSq framework
(or NKCq, given two populations) that incorporates both neutrality and coevolution.
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Figure 8.2: A partial NKCqd landscape (K = 1, C = 1, q = 2, d = 0.25 and N is
unspecied). A tness contribution of d indicates that traits have disengaged. If wi = d+
then W = 1; if wi = d− then W = 0. If no traits are disengaged, W is calculated as the
mean value of all tness contributions. Values of d+ and d− are distributed equally.
As previously discussed, neutrality may be either inherent or transient. Inherent neu-
trality remains irrespective of environment: if two genotypes are inherently neutral, they
either map to (near) identical phenotypes, or different phenotypes with (near) identical
behaviour. Transient neutrality, however, varies over time as the environment changes:
genotypes g1 and g2 may be (transiently) neutral at time t0, but not at time t1. The NKCq
framework captures both.
While the NKCq framework models transient neutrality, it does not incorporate the
widespread (catastrophic) neutrality that appears during periods of disengagement. Given
the complexity of trait interactions (both within and between species)represented by
random tness contributionslarge scale transient neutrality is unlikely. To resolve this,
an NKCqd (disengaged NKC) generalization is proposed. Here, the NKC model is rst
quantised (in the manner of Newman & Engelhardt, 1998) to add neutrality, before a novel
parameter, d, is used to control the probability of coevolutionary disengagement: if d = 0
there is no disengagement; if d = 1.0 the system is permanently disengaged.
To characterize disengagement, when particular coevolving traits disengage, the con-
tributions of all other traits are ignored. In this way, large scale regions of transient neu-
trality form. As a biological analogy, suppose parasites nd a strategy capable of killing
all susceptible hosts. Then, as long as parasites and hosts maintain these traits, all other
traits are irrelevant: size, metabolic rate, sexual attractiveness, etc.
Figure 8.2 displays a partial NKCqd landscape with unspecied N, K = 1 and C = 1.
The table shows the tness contributions of trait one, w1, under each combination of input
traits. Using Kauffman’s NKC framework, tness values are real numbers: as a result,
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there are no neutral mutations. Neutral mutations are introduced by quantising tness
contributions (q = 2; middle column of table). In addition, disengagement is added using
parameter d. For each input combination there is a probability, d, that disengagement will
occur. In gure 8.2, d = 0.25; however, for practical modelling d will usually take a much
smaller value. When disengagement occurs in favour of a trait (d+), the entire organism
(whole genotype) receives tness W = 1, irrespective of the tness contributions of all
other traits. When disengagement occurs in favour of the opposition (d−), the entire
organism receives tness W = 0. Once a value of d has been read, the rest of the traits
are ignored. If no traits are disengaged, the tness of the entire organism, W, is calculated
as the mean of all tness contributions. In this way, the NKCqd landscape is able to model
neutralityboth transient and inherentand disengagement.
While this section has only suggested a potential framework, in future the NKCqd
framework will be fully developed into a working model. Henceforth, it will be used to
investigate the effects of neutrality and disengagement in coevolutionary systems.
8.3 Summary
In recent years, many researchers have become interested in the (benecial) effects of
neutrality. However, despite this enthusiasm, coevolutionary neutrality has been largely
overlooked. While formal frameworks have been developed to study evolutionary neutral-
ity, none have (as yet) been extended to incorporate coevolutionary neutrality. Here, steps
have been taken towards the development of a framework with which to study coevolu-
tionary neutrality and disengagement: the NKCqd landscape. In future, this framework
will be fully developed into a working model. Hopefully, the insights it generates will en-
able greater understanding of coevolutionary phenomena; particularly disengaged drift.
Chapter 9
Conclusions
The following conclusions can be drawn from this thesis:
1. Disengagement is a common phenomenon that is more likely to occur when asym-
metry favours one coevolving population. Though disengagement occurs when
within population tness diversity falls to zero, it is largely independent of genetic
tness diversity.
2. Disengagement can be combated by biasing selection in favour of individuals that
win some proportion, λ, of competitions: the reduced virulence technique. This
approach has been shown to outperform alternative techniques.
3. When utilising reduced virulence, there is a trade off between engagement and op-
timality: low virulence reduces the likelihood of disengagement, but sacrices sys-
tem performance. Thus, to maximise the quality of solutions, virulence should vary
during the course of a run: when disengagement is unlikely, λ should be raised;
when disengagement is likely, λ should be lowered.
4. CIAO plots are the most commonly used technique specically designed for visu-
alizing coevolutionary dynamics. There are few alternatives.
5. When used in isolation, CIAO plots suffer from potential ambiguity. To be inter-
preted with condence, CIAO plots should be used as part of a suite of complemen-
tary techniques.
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6. Steering tools enable users to interact with coevolutionary systems during run time.
Such interactive visualization techniques offer the potential to generate novel in-
sights into system behaviour, improve visualization and aid the development of
new tools.
9.1 Summary of Contributions
This thesis has made the following contributions of new knowledge:
1. If an asymmetrical bias exists in favour of one coevolving population, reducing
the virulence of the advantaged populationencouraging individuals to lose some
competitionsreduces the likelihood of disengagement.
2. Potentially ambiguous, CIAO plots are difcult to interpret when used in isolation.
As such, they should be used as part of a suite of complementary visualization
techniques.
3. Interactive visualizations can be used to steer coevolutionary systems during run
time.
4. The concepts of tness propensity and tness realization can be used to classify
coevolution from non-coevolution in both articial and biological systems.
5. Coevolutionary disengagement can be classied into three different categories: full
disengagement, asymmetrical disengagement and collusive disengagement.
6. Linkage disequilibrium is a good measure of within population niching.
7. Image processing routines may aid the interpretation of CIAO plots.
8. CIAO plots can be used to visualize biological systems.
9.2 Limitations of the Thesis
The results presented in this thesis are subject to the following limitations:
Reduced virulence: Still in early stages of development, Dynamic virulence (chapter 6
is limited. The metric of engagedness (ε) and Dynamic virulence functions (Dy-
namic 1 and 2) are arbitrarily chosen.
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CIAO plots: In chapter 7, CIAO plots are shown to be ambiguous with respect to ir-
regular cycling and random drift. However, such classication involves subjective
interpretation: plots may appear similar to one person and not another. There are
currently no quantitative methods of classication.
Coevolutionary steering: The steering visualization introduced in chapter 7 is a demon-
stration model. Currently, no experimentation has been performed. While the po-
tential of steering is hinted at, the ability of this system has not been quantiably
assessed.
9.3 Future Research
1. The possibility of a dynamically varying virulence function has been conceptually
proven. However, this work is in its earliest stages of development. Firstly, a (less
arbitrary) metric of engagement (ε) needs to be formulated; perhaps utilising an
entropy measure of the results of pairwise contests. Secondly, the relationship be-
tween engagement and virulence (the dynamic function) needs much work. Specif-
ically, should dynamic virulence be sensitive to particular values of ε? Should
virulence be calculated from the current value of ε, or should previous values be
considered, providing evolutionary momentum? These lines of research are likely
to be time consuming, but offer potentially high rewards.
2. What happens at the moment of re-engagement? It has been shown that high viru-
lence increases the likelihood of populations bouncing apart once they re-engage.
However, it would be useful to have a better understanding of this. Under different
virulence schemes, it would be useful to visualize each individual lineage for sev-
eral generations immediately following re-engagement. As systems immediately
following re-engagement are the most sensitive to virulencein the sense that dis-
engagement is most likely to occuranalysing these periods offer the best chance
of gaining insight into the relationship between virulence, thrashing and disengage-
ment. Such detailed micro-analysis of the effects of virulence may generate insight
useful for developing dynamic virulence routines.
3. The coevolutionary steering platform developed in chapter 7 can be used to explore
disengagement and its relationship with virulence. To tease out tacit knowledge
of users, novices and experts will attempt to maximise the absolute tness n
number of 1sof both populations by varying virulence during runtime as asym-
metry varies. If experts perform best, it is likely that they are using some
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knowledge unavailable to novices. Once this knowledge has been accessed, there
is potential to incoroprate it procedurally into a autonomously varying dynamic
virulence function. Alternatively, if such knowledge cannot be operationally de-
ned, the experiments will serve to demonstrate the utility of steering; not only as
a research tool, but as a technique capable of improving the performance of coevo-
lution.
4. Chapter 8 suggested a potential frameworkthe NKCqd modelto study coevolu-
tionary neutrality. Further development of this (or a similar) framework will greatly
benet coevolutionary computing.
5. This thesis has suggested that funnelling (refer to section 7.5), a previously unob-
served phenomenon, has potential to offer a scaffold for coevolutionary develop-
ment. This could be proven by using a simple domain in which coevolution cannot
reach the global optimum without funnelling. If proven, the scaffolding ability of
funnelling is potentially very powerful.
6. Fourier analysis of CIAO plots offers a potential framework for quantifying cycling
within a coevolutionary system. If successful, this approach may allow the develop-
ment of a cycling metric. When used in connection with a metric of engagedness,
these parameters may allow users to observe the healthiness of a coevolutionary
systemwhether the system is exhibiting problematic dynamics, or notduring
run time (assuming CIAO plots are updated each generation, rather than calculated
once a run has terminated). Further, by incorporating steering, when such problem-
atic dynamics occur, users may take preventative action.
9.4 Verification
Some of the results presented in this thesis have been independently veried. Reduced vir-
ulence has been shown to improve performance when coevolving simulated maze-solving
agents and mazes-to-be-solved: without a reduction in virulence, mazes quickly become
unsolvable (Clarke, 2002). The sorting network results presented in chapter 6 have also
been reproduced.1
1Simon McGregor, School of Cognitive and Computing Sciences, University of Sussex, UK, 2003 (per-
sonal communication).
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